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Preface 
This PhD research was forged as a collaboration between K.U.Leuven, my Alma Mater, and 
CIRAD in Montpellier, which has an impressive track record of research for development. 
When Pierre-Yves Le Gal of CIRAD proposed the Office du Niger irrigation scheme in Mali 
for the case study, I said yes. How exciting! I knew almost nothing about this country, but 
would be able to discover all the more! It took however almost a year of writing and rewriting 
research proposals before I could actually set foot in Mali. Research money was still uncertain 
when Dirk Raes, my promoter from K.U.Leuven, and I finally decided to carry out an on-site 
inspection and hopefully force a break-through. So Jean-Yves Jamin, my co-promoter from 
CIRAD, arranged a one-month stay at URDOC. This was a local research center in Niono, the 
lively heart of the irrigation scheme.  
I disembarked in Niono, where I was warmly welcomed by Paul Kleene, then technical 
assistant at URDOC. He generously offered his guidance and arranged numerous meetings 
with the stakeholders involved in the irrigation scheme. I also met Loïc Eliës, who had just 
started his own project, VISION, at the Office du Niger headquarters in Ségou and lobbied for 
my research work as enthusiastically as for his own project. We visited many of the people on 
the list of Paul Kleene together and as such started a much-appreciated cooperation.  
Later on, Dirk joined me in Niono, and in spite of dozens of flee and mosquito bites, we 
managed to write a brand new research proposal. It was still not the last, but it was 
miraculously well received by at once the K.U.Leuven, CIRAD and the Office du Niger. This 
meant the go-ahead for the research, and a little later, Jean-Yves Jamin secured the necessary 
financial funds to sponsor the journeys to Mali and logistics in the field. Importantly, the 
proposal also got the interest of Yacouba Coulibaly, head of URDOC, who agreed to host the 
research project in its office in Niono. This proved to be crucial for the PhD research, and I 
owe it to Jean-Yves who introduced us to each other. Yacouba Coulibaly was my mentor and 
friend in Niono. Through his advice, he helped me focus on what is both realistic and 
important for improving water management in the Office du Niger and averted many 
diplomatic mistakes. He also generously shared the facilities of URDOC and his practical 
experience in doing research in the area.  
So off I went, naïveté abound, to live and work for six months a year in Niono. The first 
year, I was lodged in the “case de passage” in Niono, together with the national trainees of 
URDOC. The culture shock was complete, but the experience unforgettable. We also had lots 
 2
of fun, not in the least when in the evening, power breakdowns forced us to play cards by 
candlelight. The house saw multiple improvements throughout the year: the hole in the 
ground changed for a toilet, the bucket for a shower and after a while, we were able to tap the 
signal from the neighbor’s satellite dish on our TV. Meanwhile, I roamed the irrigation 
scheme on my motorbike, interviewing farmers and Office du Niger staff, and tried to get a 
grip on the subject of farmers’ water management. I hardly got much further than rewriting 
the research proposal.  
For the second and the third year, I moved to the house of Paul Kleene, who by then had 
left Niono. This meant a great leap forward for my standard of living, with no power breaks 
and an air conditioner making the night temperatures tolerable. By then, I also knew precisely 
where I was going with my research, and unrolled the methodology I had prepared. It 
demanded more courage, perseverance and diplomacy than I had expected, but in the end, it 
worked. An IWT scholarship gave some extra financial clout for the fieldwork, which was 
very welcome and made an elaborate data collection possible.  
From the start, Abdoulaye Keita was a member of my little research team, first in the 
frame of his master research on the social aspects of water management, and later as my direct 
collaborator. Through his courage for fieldwork, diplomatic talents and keen insight in 
farmers’ minds, his contribution to this research is priceless. It was nice to share with him my 
passion for the topic of farmers’ water management, not in the least because we both enjoyed 
discussing it endlessly, thereby deepening our understanding of it bit by bit.  
Many others have joined our team for shorter periods and provided a significant input for 
this research through their work and by sharing their views. Leen Boeckx and Leentje 
Bastiaens spent several months in Niono for their master research and left a fond memory in 
many peoples’ mind. The circumstances in which they lived and worked were not always 
easy, but their open mind allowed them to go with the flow and contribute to the good 
atmosphere of our team. Daouda Keita, Abdoualye Dembele, Mamadou Koné and Amadou 
Cissouma collaborated as interpreters or interviewers. In a day of interviews in the villages, 
there is lots of time waiting for people to arrive, and I was lucky to share it with such joyful 
and interesting people. 
Of course, we all learnt the most from the farmers of the Office du Niger. We took hours 
of their time asking questions, and they generously extended us their warm, African 
hospitality. The water guards and staff of the directorates of the different zones of the 
irrigation scheme have also largely contributed to the data collection and gave their valuable 
point of view on results. At the Office du Niger’s headquarters, we found the doors open, and 
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many of its people have helped to construct this research. In particular, Souleymane Sidibé 
and Yaya Diarra supported us within the Office du Niger and towards its financial and 
technical partners.  
In Niono, our research found a welcome home at URDOC. I quickly discovered that its 
staff was always prepared to help us out with the practical problems we encountered, and join 
us in the reflection on farmers’ water management. Together with many others in Niono, they 
also made my life pleasant and interesting in Mali. If you think that Niono is an out-of-the-
way place, you are mistaken. During my stays, I met many local and international experts, 
scientists and consultants working on or for the Office du Niger. They contributed to this 
work by sharing their expertise. On the other hand, Niono is quite far away from home, and I 
thank Loïc and Anne, Christian and Maité and Toon and Elly for their kind hospitality and for 
looking after me. 
After the third year of fieldwork, Abdoulaye Keita and I got the ambition to put our 
knowledge and insights to use for the farmers of the Office du Niger. We found support for 
our projects and the necessary financial funds to accomplish them at the Dutch embassy and 
the Delegation of the European Commission in Bamako and more in particular from Jaap 
van der Velden and Géza Strammer. Bruno Lidon from CIRAD provided invaluable support 
during their realization. 
Throughout the research, Dirk Raes and Jean-Yves Jamin proved to be very stimulating 
promoters. They gave me autonomy when I wanted it, and guidance when I needed it. They 
always believed in my research and in me as a researcher, which gave me the confidence to 
carry on. I also learned a lot from their feedback on the various drafts of the papers they co-
authored, and finally on this dissertation. In their turn, the jury members read this work with 
much appreciated attention, and their comments improved it considerably. My colleagues in 
Leuven provided a fun working environment and the moral support of those going through the 
same process. With his persistent questions during lengthy discussions, Bruno Verbist helped 
me to see the connection again between the different papers I had been writing. Sofie Bruneel 
and Viviane Crabbé have lifted many administrative and practical obstacles, which I usually 
placed before them with a time constraint of just a few days.  
During the years of this research, friends and family shared my small successes and 
setbacks and made them more important and less bad respectively. My parents also did this 
very enthusiastically, but their most significant contribution was indirect: From them I inherit 
the appetite to question, and the curiosity to explore. Finally, the most precious support came 
from Bart. With an infinite patience and sincere interest, he listened to my detailed reports on 
 4
the field work, analysis and writing, and along the way, he had no choice but to become an 
expert himself on the topic of farmers’ water management in the Office du Niger. This turned 
out to be quite convenient, as it made his input all the more relevant. It was a bit unfortunate 
that three weeks after I got together with him, I had to leave for my first long stay in Mali. 
Luckily, our love proved larger than the distance. 
 
My gratitude and respect go to all these people and institutions whose path I crossed 
during the past few years, for the various ways in which they contributed to this research.  
 
Klaartje 
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Samenvatting 
In de context van de structurele aanpassingsprogramma’s wordt in vele ontwikkelingslanden 
onder druk van internationale donoren het beheer van publieke irrigatieprojecten 
overgedragen. De onderliggende assumptie is dat boeren betere beheerders zijn dan de 
inefficiënte bureaucratieën die ze vervangen, aangezien zij een onmiddellijk belang hebben 
bij een degelijk bestuur. Het hervormingsproces verliep echter dikwijls moeilijk en werd 
geplaagd door tegenslagen. Dit is te wijten aan een onvoldoende begrip over hoe deze 
irrigatieprojecten functioneren, wat een correcte implementatie van de bestuursoverdracht 
onmogelijk maakt. Dit onderzoek ontrafelt het waterbeheer door boeren na de overdracht via 
een gevalstudie in het Office du Niger irrigatieproject in Mali.  
Het irrigatieproject is 80 000 hectare groot en rijst is er het voornaamste gewas. 
Grootscheepse hervormingen in de jaren 1980 en 1990 verdrievoudigden de rijstproductie per 
hectare en verhoogden de rendabiliteit van rijstproductie aanzienlijk. Gezien dit succes en een 
groot potentieel aan geïrrigeerd areaal, is een snelle uitbreiding van het irrigatieproject 
gaande. Wegens de groeiende druk op het water zal deze uitbreiding echter moeten gebeuren 
zonder een significante toename van de totale waterconsumptie. Dit kan als de irrigatie-
efficiëntie, momenteel amper 25 %, verbetert. Een verhoging van de efficiëntie is vooral 
mogelijk op het tertiair niveau. Boeren zijn hier gezamenlijk verantwoordelijk voor het beheer 
van de infrastructuur en het water sinds de bestuursoverdracht. Volgens de internationale 
donoren en het centraal bestuur ligt een gebrekkig waterbeheer door boeren aan de grond van 
de huidige waterverliezen. Daarom werden verschillende projecten opgezet om de inzet van 
boeren voor waterbeheer te verhogen. Aangezien boeren geen belang hebben bij de 
uitbreiding van het irrigatieproject, zijn zij echter niet geïnteresseerd in irrigatie-efficiëntie. 
Hun strategie is om het rendement op arbeid te maximaliseren. Voor boeren is arbeid een 
schaarse productiefactor die verdeeld moet worden over verschillende bronnen van 
inkomsten. De huidige ongelimiteerde en vraaggestuurde waterverdeling laat hen toe een 
minimale inzet aan arbeid te combineren met een vlotte irrigatie. Enkel voor boeren wiens 
veld een onvoordelige ligging heeft, zou collectieve actie voor het reguleren van de 
waterverdeling binnen het tertiair niveau nuttig zijn. Deze verschillen in belangen liggen aan 
de kern van de huidige conflicten tussen boeren onderling, en tussen boeren en het centraal 
bestuur. Door middel van een veldonderzoek werden de relaties tussen collectieve actie, 
arbeid en irrigatie-efficiëntie onderzocht in het licht van de praktische en sociale beperkingen 
die het waterbeheer en de mogelijkheden tot verbetering mee bepalen. 
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Resultaten van het veldonderzoek geven aan dat dankzij de fysische rehabilitatie van de 
irrigatie-infrastructuur en de vraaggestuurde waterverdeling, de watertoevoer naar het tertiair 
niveau adequaat is. Irrigatieproblemen zijn dan ook zeldzaam, hoewel ze voorkomen in 
tertiaire blokken met een ongelijke topografie. Regels rond waterverdeling tussen boeren 
kunnen zulke problemen oplossen, maar wegens een gebrek aan sociaal kapitaal slagen 
sommige boerengroepen er niet in deze op te stellen en af te dwingen. Met een gemiddelde 
van 60 % blijft de irrigatie-efficiëntie zeer laag. Een verhoging met 14 % is mogelijk door 
middel van collectieve actie aan de inlaat van het tertiair blok. Het veldonderzoek bevestigde 
bovendien dat de lage efficiëntie excessieve waterverliezen veroorzaakt die het 
drainagesysteem opvullen, en zo een belangrijke oorzaak zijn van drainageproblemen. Op het 
moment van de oogst doen deze zich voor op een derde van de oppervlakte. Aangezien het 
drainagenetwerk bestaat uit communicerende vaten, wordt het resultaat van de inzet van een 
individuele boer om water te sparen verspreid over een groot gebied. Het voorkomen van 
drainageproblemen zorgt hierdoor niet voor de nodige motivatie om zuinig met water om te 
springen. Als men met de uitbreiding van het geïrrigeerde areaal wil doorgaan, moeten 
daarom andere manieren onderzocht worden om de waarde van het water te verhogen.  
Een lopend project richt zogenaamde Associaties van Watergebruikers op, die een welkom 
platform zouden kunnen bieden voor collectieve actie. Voorlopig ontbreekt het hen echter aan 
effectiviteit. Door rekening te houden met bestaande informele patronen van besluitvorming 
zou hun impact wellicht kunnen verhoogd worden. De huidige trend van diversificatie van 
inkomsten leidt bovendien tot een toenemende tewerkstelling van landarbeiders, die dan ook 
bij de Associaties van Watergebruikers zouden moeten betrokken worden.  
Om boeren in staat te stellen de Associaties van Watergebruikers ten volle te benutten en 
de uitdaging van waterbesparing aan te gaan, zijn vorming en beslissingsondersteuning nodig. 
In het kader van dit onderzoek werden hiervoor hulpmiddelen ontworpen. Een eerste 
hulpmiddel bestaat uit educatief materiaal dat aantoont hoe boeren water kunnen besparen en 
irrigatieproblemen vermijden bij een beperkt wateraanbod door bepaalde beheerspraktijken 
toe te passen. Een tweede hulpmiddel is een simulatiemodel van het waterbeheer, dat gebruikt 
kan worden om een optimale combinatie van beheerspraktijken te vinden om de irrigatie-
efficiëntie tot op een bepaald niveau te brengen en tegelijk de belangen van de boeren te 
respecteren. In de toekomst zal verder gezocht moeten worden naar een passend beleid, 
aanbevelingen en hulpmiddelen. Hiervoor zal een proces van “trial and error” nodig zijn 
waarbij alle betrokken partijen elkaar regelmatig ontmoeten om lessen te trekken uit 
ervaringen. Onderzoekers kunnen in dit proces een positieve bijdrage leveren door hun meer 
neutrale en wetenschappelijke kijk op de zaak.  
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Résumé 
Dans le contexte de l’ajustement structurel, les bailleurs de fonds ont imposé un transfert des 
responsabilités de la gestion de l’eau dans la plupart des périmètres irrigués des pays en 
développement. L’hypothèse de base était que, vu leur intérêt à la réussite des périmètres, les 
paysans seraient de meilleurs gestionnaires que les bureaucraties qu’ils remplaçaient. Mais du 
fait d’une mauvaise compréhension du fonctionnement de ces périmètres, le transfert a été 
souvent mal mis en œuvre et n’a pas engendré l’amélioration de l’entretien des infrastructures 
et l’usage rationnel de l’eau qui étaient espérés. Cette recherche a pour objectif d’acquérir une 
compréhension approfondie de la gestion de l’eau paysanne, à travers une étude de cas du 
périmètre rizicole de l’Office du Niger au Mali (80 000 hectares).  
La gestion de l’eau au niveau tertiaire du périmètre a été transférée aux exploitants. Ce 
transfert faisait partie d’un éventail de réformes économiques et institutionnelles qui ont 
permis d’améliorer fortement la productivité des rizières et la rentabilité des exploitations 
agricoles. Vu cette réussite, et le potentiel considérable en terres aménageables, l’Office du 
Niger a lancé une extension de ses surfaces irriguées. Comme elle doit être réalisée sans une 
augmentation signifiante de la consommation en eau totale, la faible efficience de l’irrigation 
est considérée comme potentiellement préjudiciables pour l’extension prévue. Cette recherche 
analyse la gestion de l’eau par les paysans dans le contexte de leurs objectifs et stratégies, et 
des relations sociales et des évolutions économiques qui influent sur la prise des décisions en 
matière de gestion de l’eau. Les résultats de ces analyses sont ensuite traduits en outils et 
recommandations pour appuyer la gestion de l’eau par les paysans.  
Les résultats de l’étude de terrain montrent que, grâce à la réhabilitation des infrastructures 
et au transfert de la gestion de l’eau, la disponibilité en eau est adéquate au niveau tertiaire. 
Avant les réformes, des pénuries d’eau étaient fréquentes et provoquaient des pertes de 
production. Par contre, avec une moyenne de 60 %, l’efficience de l’irrigation demeure très 
basse. L’étude confirme que les pertes d’eau qui l’explique sont une cause importante des 
problèmes de drainage rencontrés, qui affectent un tiers des surfaces à la récolte. Les 
stratégies des exploitants sont de maintenir en permanence une offre en eau excédentaire, afin 
de minimiser le besoin d’action collective et de travail individuel. Le temps de travail est 
précieux pour les exploitants, car ils doivent le partager entre plusieurs activités 
rémunératrices. Pour l’action collective, la disponibilité du capital social est un autre facteur 
contraignant. La tendance actuelle à la diversification des sources de revenu diminue 
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l’importance accordée à la gestion de l’eau et complique l’action collective. Les Associations 
d’Usagers de l’Eau qui sont actuellement établies dans la zone pourraient constituer une plate-
forme pour institutionnaliser l’action collective, mais elles souffrent d’un manque d’autorité. 
Jusqu’à maintenant, ces aspects n’ont pas été suffisamment pris en considération par les 
politiques des bailleurs de fond et par l’Office du Niger. De plus, certaines étaient fondées sur 
des hypothèses inexactes sur l’importance de certains aspects de la gestion de l’eau pour 
l’efficience de l’irrigation. Par conséquent, elles ont eu peu d’effet.  
L’extension des surfaces irriguées est importante pour les exploitants futurs, la croissance 
économique régionale et la sécurité alimentaire du Mali. Pour la permettre, l’efficience de 
l’irrigation devra augmenter. Les intérêts des exploitants actuels et les contraintes pratiques et 
socio-économiques qui freinent l’amélioration de la gestion de l’eau devront aussi être pris en 
compte. Les analyses effectuées ont permis d’améliorer la compréhension de la réalité 
technique autant que sociale de la gestion de l’eau et de formuler des recommandations. Le 
besoin d’un renforcement des capacités de gestion de l’eau et d’une aide à la décision sont les 
points les plus importants. Dans le cadre de cette recherche, des outils d’appui ont été mis au 
point. Un premier outil est constitué de matériel didactique pour montrer comment les 
conséquences d’une diminution de la disponibilité en eau peuvent être évitées grâce à 
certaines pratiques de gestion de l’eau. Un deuxième outil est constitué d’un modèle de 
simulation qui, à travers la simulation de différents scénarios, aide à trouve la combinaison 
optimale de pratiques qui permet d’atteindre un certain niveau d’efficience d’irrigation tout en 
respectant les intérêts des exploitants.  
Dans le futur, la recherche de politiques appropriées, de dispositions et d’outils d’appui, 
nécessitera un processus itératif d’essais et d’erreurs incluant des rencontres régulières entre 
bailleurs de fonds, gestionnaires et exploitants pour évaluer les leçons à en tirer. Du fait de 
leur regard plus neutre et sans trop de préjugés, les chercheurs pourraient contribuer 
positivement à ce processus. 
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Summary 
In the context of structural adjustment, international donors have pushed Irrigation 
Management Transfer (IMT) in state-led irrigation schemes all over the developing world. It 
was assumed that, having a direct stake in the success of their irrigation scheme, farmers 
would be better managers than the inefficient bureaucracies that they replaced had been. 
However, insufficient understanding of these irrigation schemes often led to poor 
implementation of IMT. The reform process proved complex and fraught with difficulties, 
and usually did not result in improved water management as expected. This research aims to 
acquire a thorough comprehension of farmers’ water management after IMT through a case 
study of the Office du Niger, an irrigation scheme of 80,000 ha in Mali with rice as the major 
crop.  
Comprehensive institutional and economic reforms conducted in the 1980s and 1990s 
boosted the profitability of rice production in the Office du Niger, with yields increasing 
threefold. In view of this success and the large untapped agricultural potential, the irrigation 
scheme is expanding rapidly. Because of growing pressure on water resources, the expansion 
has to be realized without a significant increase in total water consumption. This is possible if 
irrigation efficiency, currently at barely 25 %, improves. The largest potential for increasing 
efficiency lies at the tertiary level, where since IMT, farmers are collectively in charge of 
managing water and the infrastructure. In the view of international donors and the central 
management, poor water management practices by farmers are to blame for the current water 
losses. Therefore, several interventions were set up to increase farmers’ efforts for water 
management.  
As they have no stake in the expansion of the irrigation scheme, farmers are however not 
interested in increasing irrigation efficiency. Their strategy is to maximize returns to labor, 
which is valuable to them as it comes at the price of time available for other income 
generating activities. The presently unrestricted and demand-driven water delivery allows 
them to combine a minimal labor input with easy irrigation by maintaining a constant over-
supply. For farmers with a disadvantageous plot location, collective action for regulating 
water allocation would be useful in times of temporary supply disruptions, but it requires 
sufficient social capital. This divergence of interests with respect to water management lies at 
the heart of the conflicts among farmers and between farmers and the central management. 
Through a field study, relations between collective action, labor input, and irrigation 
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efficiency are investigated in the light of the practical and social constraints that shape water 
management and determine its potential for improvement. 
Results from the field study revealed that thanks to the physical rehabilitation of the 
irrigation infrastructure and a demand-driven water supply, water delivery to the tertiary level 
is adequate. As a result, irrigation problems are rare, even though they exist on some tertiary 
blocks with an uneven topography. It was furthermore shown that collective action for water 
allocation could effectively solve these problems. Lacking the social capital, some farmer 
groups, however, do not succeed in establishing collective action. Irrigation efficiency at the 
tertiary level, on average about 60%, remains low, but collective action at the inlet of the 
tertiary block can improve it with 14 %.  
The field study furthermore confirmed that water losses caused by the low irrigation 
efficiency fill up the drainage system and are an important source of the drainage problems 
currently affecting a third of the surface at harvest. Because the drainage system consists of 
communicating vessels, the impact of an individual farmer’s effort dissipates throughout the 
irrigation scheme. Avoiding drainage problems can therefore not provide the necessary 
incentives to save water. Other incentives to increase the value of water to farmers should 
therefore be considered if the expansion of the irrigation scheme is to be realized.  
Water User Associations (WUAs) currently being set up in the irrigation scheme could 
provide a much-needed platform to institutionalize collective action, but are not yet effective. 
Taking into account existing informal patterns of decision-making could enhance their 
impact. The current trend of farmers diversifying their sources of income results in the 
increased employment of wage laborers, who should therefore be involved in the WUAs.  
In order to enable farmers to respond to incentives and make full use of the structures and 
procedures offered by the WUAs, training and decision support on water management will be 
necessary. In the frame of this research, tools have been developed for this purpose. A first 
tool consists of training material that shows how farmers can save water and avoid irrigation 
problems under a limited water supply by adopting the right water management practices. A 
second tool is a simulation model, which can be used to find the optimal mix of measures to 
increase irrigation efficiency to a certain level while preserving farmers’ interests.  
The search for appropriate policies, measures and tools will probably require an iterative 
process of trial and error with regular meetings among stakeholders to evaluate lessons learnt. 
Providing a neutral and unbiased view, researchers could play a beneficial role in 
accompanying this process. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The context of farmers’ water management 
In the 1950s and 1960s, a fast expansion of large publicly funded surface irrigation schemes 
took place in developing countries. In these schemes, smallholder farmers share collective 
irrigation infrastructure (Svendsen and Meinzen-Dick, 1997). The ambitious goals were to 
meet the rapidly rising demand for food and to stimulate economic development (Plusquellec, 
2002a; Bolding, 2004). At that time, the common conviction was that such irrigation schemes 
needed a strongly centralized management. Given their public nature, the state usually 
assumed the management through governmental agencies (Meinzen-Dick, 1997; Ostrom, 
1999). Farmers were considered as “beneficiaries” of irrigation services, and their 
responsibility did not extend beyond plot level (Meinzen-Dick, 1997; Shah et al., 2002). The 
governmental agencies however quickly grew into over-sized and expensive bureaucracies 
that put a heavy charge on national budgets instead of fostering economic growth (GRET, 
1991; Vermillion and Sagardoy, 1999; Diemer, 2002).  
This situation was not unique for large irrigation schemes. In many developing countries, 
the state was heavily involved in the majority of economic activities, sometimes combining 
mismanagement with heavy costs and provoking budget deficits. In the wake of the debt crisis 
at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, international donors proposed the so-
called Structural Adjustment Programs throughout the developing world (Rodrik, 1996). The 
objective of structural adjustment was to combat macroeconomic malaise and to promote 
growth through pervasive institutional and economic reforms (Dollar and Svensson, 2000). 
These reforms implied the sale of government enterprises, opening previously monopolistic 
sectors to competition, abolishing price regulation and trade restrictions and finally 
dismantling governmental agencies involved in agriculture and natural resource management 
(Dembélé and Staatz, 1999). 
In collective irrigation schemes, the reform translated into Irrigation Management Transfer 
(IMT), which shifted powers and responsibilities from government agencies to farmers 
(Svendsen and Meinzen-Dick, 1997). The objective of the donors was to involve farmers in 
operation and maintenance of hydraulic infrastructure, financing, and decision-making on the 
cropping pattern and the physical and institutional layout of the irrigation scheme (Groenfeldt 
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and Svendsen, 2000; Abdelhadi et al., 2004). Government disengagement however also 
meant that subsidies were cut back, forcing irrigation schemes to become financially self-
sufficient. As such, farmers pay for operation and maintenance through water fees. 
Significantly, international donors, not farmers requested these reforms.  
Whereas the driving force behind IMT was structural adjustment, improving the 
performance of water delivery provided another argument for farmers’ participation in water 
management. In this dissertation, performance is understood as an assessment of the actual 
results in comparison to the desired results. Results can refer to the output as such, or output 
in relation to input, considering the processes and procedures expanded to achieve the output. 
In water management, a first important aspect of performance is to get water to the crop on 
time and with the volume required. A second aspect is irrigation efficiency, which designates 
the ratio of net irrigation requirement to the amount of water supplied. The lower this ratio, 
the more water is lost through conveyance and/or application losses. Although part of the 
water losses might be reused downstream, some of it might evaporate or drain to the sea, a 
deep aquifer or another sink and as such is wasted in physical terms. In addition, passing 
through the irrigation scheme, all water losses represent sunk costs of pumping and might 
become polluted (Seckler, 1996).  
In the 1980s and early 1990s, when IMT was at top speed, saving water was not yet high 
on the agenda. Gradually, it became however clear that the pending food crisis, triggered by 
fast population growth, is actually a water crisis (Worldwatch Institute, 2000; FAO, 2000; 
Rosegrant et al., 2002). Indeed, since boosting agricultural output depends largely on 
irrigation, water becomes increasingly scarce through competition from households and 
industry (Rhoades et al., 1999; Howell, 2001; Plusquellec, 2002b). Hence, the challenge of 
irrigation became to produce more with less water. Collective irrigation schemes performed 
notoriously bad on water delivery. Deliveries were untimely or insufficient, resulting in 
disappointing yields. Meanwhile, in many of these schemes, irrigation efficiencies were as 
low as 30 % (Burt and Styles, 1999; Kirpich et al., 1999). Getting enough water to the crop on 
time while improving irrigation efficiency is a vital part of the answer to the irrigation 
challenge (Gleick, 2003; Rijsberman, 2006). In a first response, irrigation infrastructure was 
rehabilitated and/or modernized in order to facilitate the operation of the system and to make 
water delivery more flexible (Diemer and Huibers, 1996). Even though the rehabilitation has 
generally improved the irrigation efficiency, and might even be a necessary condition (Horst, 
1999; Plusquellec, 2002a), experience has shown that it is not sufficient to focus on 
infrastructure only (Saleth, 2006). Attention of donors and practitioners has therefore shifted 
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to management aspects (Kirpich et al., 1999; Gleick, 2003). Under the impulse of studies on 
indigenous irrigation schemes, and common-pool resources management in general, it became 
gradually accepted that farmers can be effective managers (Ostrom, 1994a; Larson and Ribot, 
2004; Agrawal and Gupta, 2005). The underlying assumption was that having the greatest 
stake in a good performance of water management, farmers themselves would invest more in 
water management than government officials did (Svendsen and Meinzen-Dick, 1997).  
Farmers’ role in water management was thus strongly enlarged through IMT (i) by 
shifting from supply-driven to demand-driven water delivery and (ii) by assigning them the 
responsibilities on operation and maintenance of (part of the) irrigation scheme (Kijne, 2001; 
Latif and Pomee, 2003). As such, farmers became managers and had to look beyond their plot 
to coordinate water supply with their neighbors, and even beyond the irrigation scheme, to 
share water with upstream and downstream users. 
Even though farmers do find a timely and sufficient water delivery important, they were 
not necessarily demanding responsibility. On the contrary, IMT has generally been imposed 
on them (Jamin et al., 2005). Hence, it is not self-evident that they are willing and able to 
assume responsibility beyond the borders of their plot (Le Gal et al., 2001; Meinzen-Dick et 
al., 2002; Moustafa, 2004). Nevertheless, farmers’ participation in irrigation management is 
here to stay (Saleth, 2006). Furthermore, a supplementary rehabilitation or modernization of 
irrigation infrastructure geared to farmers’ water management is unrealistic due to the high 
investment costs. The goal of this dissertation is therefore to investigate how under given 
constraints, the prospects of farmers’ water management can be enhanced in the future. 
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Chapter 1  
Enhancing the prospects of farmers’ water 
management 
1.1 Problem setting and objectives 
Even though farmers’ water management in irrigation schemes is put forward as the better 
alternative for management by the government, Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) was 
never expected to be a simple process. Scholars and practitioners have pointed out several 
pre-conditions for success. First, it should be carefully planned and prepared, with all 
relevant stakeholders being involved in order to ensure their support (Vermillion and 
Sagardoy, 1999). Second, it requires an appropriate legal and institutional framework, taking 
into account local institutions and sources of leadership (Ostrom, 1993; Meinzen-Dick and 
Reidinger, 1995). In particular, water rights should be clearly defined, and responsibility 
should go hand in hand with accountability (Ribot, 1996). Insufficient clarification at this 
level can create insecurity and perverse incentive structures thwarting the goals of IMT 
(Vermillion, 1997). Third, the necessary social capital1 should be in place, so that farmers 
can engage in collective action to achieve common goals (Ostrom, 1994b; Meinzen-Dick et 
al., 2002). Indeed, a collective irrigation scheme is considered as a man-made common-pool 
resource2. Individual farmers have therefore an incentive to extract more water and invest less 
in maintenance than is optimal at the collective level (Tang, 1992). Collective action, i.e. 
certain rules, activities or the coordination of activities that promote the collective interest 
                                                 
1 Social capital consists of relations of trust between people, reciprocity, common norms and social organization 
such as networks that facilitate cooperation and coordination for mutual benefit (Pretty, 2003). 
2 In common-pool resources, consumption by one person reduces the amount available to others while it is costly 
to prevent someone from using it. Furthermore, the benefits of investments dissipate to all users, which creates 
incentives for free riding (Ostrom, 2003). In the case of collective irrigation schemes, both the water and 
infrastructure are common-pool resources. 
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(Poteete and Ostrom, 2004), is needed to overcome this problem. Last, farmers should possess 
the necessary knowledge and understanding of the management tasks transferred to them 
(Le Gal et al., 2001; De Nys, 2004). Indeed, in order to make the right strategic decisions, 
they need to know the alternative management options and their consequences. This is often 
too complex for common sense to do the job (Baland and Platteau, 1997).  
The pre-conditions for success are well described in theory, but in practice they are either 
not applied as they should, or do not work as expected. Consequently, IMT does not always 
deliver the desired results, in particular in African irrigation schemes (Shah et al., 2002; Jamin 
et al., 2005). In particular, performance of water management remains unsatisfactory. Indeed, 
insufficient and/or inefficient water deliveries jeopardize a further expansion of the irrigated 
sector necessary to feed the growing population. The lack of fit between theory and practice 
of IMT often relates to an insufficient understanding of how these irrigation schemes actually 
work (Letsoalo and Van Averbeke, 2006). There is a fascinating paradox in this statement. 
Indeed, most of the surface irrigation schemes built in the 20th century -especially those in 
regions without existing indigenous irrigation- are designed and constructed by western 
experts, using hydraulic and agronomic principles developed by western scientists. Sure it is 
known how these schemes function? The big unknown, however, is how the local 
management and farmers appropriated and possibly adapted infrastructure and management 
procedures (Plusquellec, 2002a). This depends largely on their perceptions and attitude vis-à-
vis the water resource and infrastructure and their mutual relations, which often differ largely 
from the view of the designers. Designs furthermore rely on a series of assumptions, such as 
numbers and qualifications of staff operating infrastructure and farmers’ practices. These 
assumptions often do not correspond with reality, which in addition is not static, but likely to 
evolve over time (Gowing, 1999; De Nys, 2004).  
Furthermore, the need for training of farmers on water management aspects is often 
underestimated because of the implicit assumption that local knowledge, based on daily 
experience, is adequate. Farmers in government-funded irrigation schemes however 
commonly originate from rain fed agriculture and did not bring a culture of hydraulics with 
them. Next, upon arrival in the irrigation scheme, a central management monopolized all 
decision-making on water management so that farmers have no experience to rely on at the 
moment of IMT (Shah et al., 2002). In addition, past experiences do not always prepare 
farmers well for the challenge of water scarcity that looms over many irrigation schemes. 
In order to help farmers to become good managers, actual problems with farmers’ water 
management should be understood so that solutions can be proposed. This dissertation 
therefore takes up two challenges, which are tackled for the case of the Office du Niger 
irrigation scheme. First, it aims to develop an analytical framework for acquiring a thorough 
comprehension of farmers’ water management. Using this framework, the process of IMT and 
resulting farmers’ water management are scrutinized for their strengths and weaknesses, 
opportunities and strengths. Furthermore, the dissertation explores the physical, agronomic, 
economic, socio-cultural and institutional constraints that shape water management and its 
potential for improvement. After several rounds of reforms, farmers are still trying to adapt to 
the new reality after IMT. Therefore, rather than propose new reforms to alleviate them, the 
goal is to verify how performance of water management can be improved within the given 
constraints. Broadly speaking, there are two options. Either rules and procedures are adapted 
to actual farmers’ practices, or farmers adapt their practices to existing rules and procedures. 
In this dissertation, both options will be explored.  
With farmers participating in water management, they should be able to make informed 
decisions. The second challenge is therefore to show how the acquired knowledge can be 
translated into guidelines and tools to support strategic and day-to-day decision-making on 
water management. This challenge is not limited to theoretical reflections, but is tested in 
practice by developing examples of such tools.  
By attacking these two challenges, this research hopes to contribute to farmers’ successful 
transformation into managers in the Office du Niger, and collective irrigation schemes in 
general. Indeed, throughout this dissertation, it will be verified whether the insights gained 
can be extrapolated to other schemes. Such an extrapolation should be possible at three levels: 
First, the research approach as a whole, and in particular the analytical framework, is meant to 
be applicable (if not replicable) in other situations. Next, several of the conclusions and 
recommendations drawn from the analysis could be relevant for other cases. Finally, the 
major principles of the design of tools and guidelines should apply to other collective 
irrigation schemes.  
 
1.2 Research approach 
1.2.1 Justification of a case study and the selected case 
When the goal of a research is to understand the lack of fit between theory and practice, it 
should take place in a real-life context. A case study then becomes the logical choice (Musch, 
2001). Focusing on a single case furthermore allows entering in the full complexity of the 
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selected case, which would not be possible if time was to be divided over multiple cases. 
However, in order to be able to generalize the findings, it is important that the selected case is 
sufficiently representative. The Office du Niger irrigation scheme in Mali is an interesting 
case, as it provides a classic example of the current trend of IMT in government-built, 
centrally managed irrigation schemes (Stemerding et al., 2002). One of the major irrigation 
schemes of West Africa, it is of strategic importance for international donors and has been a 
showcase for IMT. Furthermore, it harbors a considerable diversity in hydraulic 
infrastructure, which favors generalization. A peculiarity that sets the Office du Niger apart 
from other irrigation schemes is that because of its physical layout, pumping costs can be 
avoided and water is unusually cheap (see Chapter 2). In many irrigation schemes, as in the 
Office du Niger, farmers do not pay for their actual consumption, so that incentives at farmer 
level are similar. In addition, the opportunity cost of water in the Office du Niger is quickly 
rising, making water as valuable as elsewhere. 
 
1.2.2 The analytical framework 
Stakeholder analysis 
IMT, with its implicit water conservation agenda, was (and sometimes still is) based on the 
naïve paradigm that water conservation is good for all stakeholders. Often, it was not realized 
that some conservation practices are neutral or can even go against the interests of 
participating farmers, who generally carry the largest burden of conservation activities but not 
necessarily reap the rewards. Furthermore, the conservation practices might be beyond the 
farmers’ capacity. As a consequence, not all transfer programs have led to the desired results 
(Cleaver, 1999; Moustafa, 2004; Blaikie, 2006). In fact, the different stakeholders (farmers, 
central management, government, donors, …) take decisions based on their own objectives 
and a mental model of how actions, (i.e. water management practices in the context of 
irrigation), will influence results (van Noordwijk et al., 2002) (Figure 1.1). Performance is 
then defined as the divergence between objectives and actual results (Dia, 1993).  
The stakeholders are diverse and can have competing objectives, often because they 
operate at different scales in time and space. In addition, mental models are determined by 
certain assumptions, knowledge or perceptions. Different stakeholders therefore define 
problems in different ways and policies often fail as they are implemented to address certain 
problems that are not relevant in the view of farmers (Adams et al., 2003). A first step in the 
analytical framework is therefore to explore the objectives and mental models of the different 
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stakeholders in a stakeholder analysis. Only if we understand these, we can distinguish 
whether sub-optimal performance linked to sub-optimal farmers’ water management is a 
question of capability or incentives. 
 
Evaluation of organization and performance of farmers’ water management 
Stakeholders’ mental models of how actions influence results might not only conflict with 
each other, they might also deviate from reality. In particular, mental models might be 
prejudiced by an idealistic view on how management should be. In the course of time, 
stakeholders can learn and adjust their mental models based on their increasing experience on 
the actual results of actions in the real world. The relation between actions and results 
however is not always directly visible, which obstructs learning cycles. Discerning this 
relation clearly might require a more distant and neutral perspective, which a scientific 
approach should have. In order to set the problem statement right, it is therefore necessary to 
analyze the impact of different management practices on performance in the real world 
through a field study (Figure 1.1). Usually, a variety of practices is in use, as farmers attach 
varying importance to water conservation and the available social capital in farmer groups 
differs. Rather than test new practices, the approach adopted by this research is therefore to 
make stock of the diversity of existing practices and assess their impact on performance. 
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Figure 1.1 Theoretical framework of natural resource management driven by manager’s objectives 
and mental models (adapted from van Noordwijk et al., 2002) 
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The evaluation consists in the following steps: Firstly, actual performance should be 
assessed. What is considered as “good” or “bad” performance of water management depends 
heavily on stakeholders’ objectives, which have been assessed in the stakeholders analysis 
(Dia, 1993). In order to measure performance from these different points of view, 
performance indicators should be constructed for each of them. Secondly, current 
management practices have to be identified and understood. In collective irrigation schemes, 
water allocation and consumption, maintenance and cropping calendars are typical water 
management aspects that might benefit from collective action. Still, despite obvious benefits, 
collective action is not guaranteed to take place, as designing and enforcing rules demands 
time and effort and may face social or other constraints (Olson, 1973; Le Gal and Papy, 
1998). It is therefore important to gain insights on the diversity of current water management 
practices, with in particular the prevalence and strength of collective action and mechanisms 
that monitor and enforce it. Finally, possible connections between management and 
performance should be explored. For this last step, quantitative analysis has a valuable 
advantage over a qualitative approach because it allows distinguishing which relation is 
important and which is not. Even though there is a fast build-up of knowledge on how local 
users individually and collectively engage in natural resources management, studies on 
farmers’ water management in collective irrigation schemes after IMT are still quite rare (e.g. 
Dayton-Johnson, 1999; Sokile and van Koppen, 2004; Marothia, 2005). Furthermore, most 
studies on natural resources management focus on social performance, investigating whether 
user groups succeed in establishing collective action. Quantifying the impact of various 
individual and collective management strategies on technical performance is still 
underdeveloped and is an innovative aspect in this dissertation. 
 
Analyzing the social forces behind water management 
This research follows Vincent’s (2003) assertion that social forces, more than scientific 
principles, shape water management practices. These social forces comprise in the first place 
the socio-economic factors determining the trade-off of expected costs and benefits of 
collective action. In a wider sense, they also include the social relations among users, their 
attitude towards water and the infrastructure and the legitimacy of formal and informal 
leaders. The current trend of seeking “social fixes” to water management problems, such as 
IMT and the setting up of WUAs, tries to set the social context right. Most often, they are 
imposed in a top-down manner following principles such as democratic representation that are 
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thought to be universal conditions for a successful organization (Abdelhadi et al., 2004; 
N’Khoma and Mulwafu, 2004; Jamin et al., 2005). However, at the same time, the way these 
“social fixes” turn out in practice is subject to the same social context, thoroughly 
impregnated in culture and its historical path (Cleaver, 1999; Mosse, 1999; Steins and 
Edwards, 1999). In the analysis of the social forces behind water management, two points 
stand out. First, informal institutions and leaders often continue to take an important part in 
decision-making after WUAs were put into place (Ribot, 1996; Wester et al., 2003; Thakadu, 
2005). It is therefore important to find out how decisions are really taken in order to 
understand current management practices. Second, in order to create the right conditions for 
collective action and recognize possible limitations, the influence of the socio-economic 
determinants has to be understood.  
 
Box 1 Approach to field work 
The research was set up as “research for development”. This not only reflects its goals of supporting 
farmers’ water management to enhance sustainability and expansion of irrigation activities in the study 
area. It also determines the research approach, which implied a close cooperation with farmers, water 
guards and the central management. As such, they participated in many of the research activities and 
several occasions were created to present and discuss results. A local research center experienced in 
training and extension for farmers in the irrigation scheme accommodated the research project. This 
created a necessary degree of independence from the central management, and greatly favored 
interaction with farmers. The field study lasted three years and covered several researches using 
separate samples to ensure the independence of the results. In irrigation schemes, systematic data on 
water management (e.g. flow rates or water levels in canals) are often scarce or inexistent, which 
makes an elaborate data collection necessary. This scarcity of data is furthermore reflected in the 
scarcity of measurement structures, so that alternative sources of information must be explored. In 
addition, some questions demand a more in-depth understanding, to which systematic data series do 
not necessarily provide an answer (Goering and Streiner, 1996). Consequently, quantitative as well as 
qualitative and participative research methods were used, depending on the questions to be 
answered. Local researchers, Office du Niger staff and farmers contributed to the data collection, 
which allowed boosting the amount of available data, enhanced their participation in the research 
process and generated additional viewpoints and insights. Research activities furthermore included 
participation in workshops on ongoing projects on water management and meetings with Office du 
Niger staff, NGOs and international donors that designed the projects. Existing scientific and project 
literature complemented data collection. During the three years of fieldwork, periods of data collection 
were alternated with periods of reflection, which allowed digging deeper into certain subjects after 
several iterations.  
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1.2.3 Developing tools for improved farmers’ water management 
In this dissertation, it is substantiated that farmers need training and decision-support on water 
management in order to cope successfully with the tasks transferred to them by IMT. The 
dissertation furthermore provides examples of tools for training and decision-support. These 
tools have not yet been fully implemented and evaluated and therefore should not be seen as 
ready-to-use research results. The objective is rather to demonstrate through realistic 
examples what such tools need to be. Practically, the question to ask is: what do they need to 
tell, how and to whom. In other words, in order to be both efficient and effective, information 
needs to be selected that responds best to needs. Next, when the tools deal with certain 
relations, variable and invariable parameters need to be chosen in function of constraints 
faced by farmers that determine which of the parameters they can influence. Last, the target 
audience needs to be determined, so that both those most in need of information are included, 
as well as possible opinion leaders who might foster the adoption of the tools. The necessary 
knowledge to answer these questions follows from the analytical part of this study.  
 
1.3 Outline of the dissertation 
This dissertation is structured in different parts that each contains several chapters. Figure 1.2 
presents a schematic overview of the logical coherence between chapters 2 to 10.  
The Introduction part contains two chapters: 
• Chapter 1 outlined the problem setting of farmers’ water management after IMT and 
explained the research approach developed throughout the research. 
• Chapter 2 explains the context of the Office du Niger case. It describes the physical, 
institutional and social environment. The chapter also presents the results of the 
stakeholder analysis of water management in the irrigation scheme, which is the starting 
point for further analysis.  
Part I contains the evaluation of organization and performance of farmers’ water management 
based on the results of a field study. This part is divided into four chapters that each 
correspond to one or more steps of the evaluation as described in the analytical framework: 
• Chapter 3 assesses the hydraulic performance at the tertiary canal level. It therefore uses 
indicators for efficiency, adequacy, dependability and equity of water delivery. 
Furthermore, the evolution of performance is examined in the light of the interventions in 
the irrigation scheme and farmers’ water management strategies. 
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• Chapter 4 aims to identify and understand current management practices at the tertiary 
block level. In particular, it studies how farmers resolve collective action problems 
concerning maintenance of irrigation canals and water allocation through devising, 
monitoring and enforcing rules. It investigates the diversity and effectiveness of these 
rules and looks at the impediments to successful organization of water management. 
• Chapter 5 explores the relation between water management practices and irrigation 
performance using a quantitative approach. Performance indicators are constructed, taking 
into account the different stakeholders’ perspectives. Combining the results from the field 
study and from the stakeholder analysis, the chapter sets out some suggestions for 
improving water management in the face of the expansion of the irrigated surface. 
• Chapter 6 investigates the relation between water management practices and drainage. In 
particular, it looks at drainage problems at harvest, which are widespread in the irrigation 
scheme. It estimates the impact of various measures to alleviate these drainage problems. 
Part II corresponds to the analysis of the social forces behind water management. Specifically, 
it aims to get insights in social relations among water users, their attitude towards the water 
resource and infrastructure and the legitimacy of formal and informal leaders, which all shape 
farmers’ water management. This part contains two chapters: 
• Chapter 7 studies decision-making on water management at the village level. Specifically, 
it compares formal Water Users Associations to informal centers of decision-making on 
water management through an institutional analysis. It evaluates their effectiveness and 
flaws within a historical perspective to gain an understanding on how institutional change 
can be more successfully implemented.  
• Chapter 8 investigates farmers’ motivation for collective action on water management. By 
looking at the socio-economic determinants of motivation, the prospects for collective 
action given the present dynamics in the irrigation scheme are assessed. The results of the 
analysis lead to policy recommendations to enhance the prospects for collective action.  
Part III presents tools for training and decision support at farmers’ level. Rather then 
presenting new research results, this part aims to demonstrate how the insights gained through 
Part I and II can be translated for this purpose. It includes two chapters that each present a 
different tool: 
• Chapter 9 presents an example of training material (extension posters and a trainers’ 
manual) that is expected to help farmers in understanding the impact of individual 
management practices and collective action on performance. 
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• Chapter 10 presents a simulation model of water management at the tertiary level. It 
consists in an analytical tool that can be used to find the optimal mix of water management 
practices that increase irrigation efficiency while preserving farmers’ interests. The 
chapter translates the results of simulations into practical guidelines for farmers. 
The final part of the dissertation contains the conclusions and perspectives. It comments on 
the research process in the Office du Niger case study. Next, it evaluates the relevance of the 
research results for other irrigation schemes. Finally, it discusses the interest of the research 
approach and opens some perspectives for further research or follow-up of results.  
The dissertation furthermore contains several boxes, presenting briefly subjects related to 
farmers’ water management in the Office du Niger irrigation scheme but which are not fully 
treated in the body of this dissertation. They aim to complete the analysis, show the 
complexity of the case under study or put the subject of water management in perspective. 
 
CONTEXT OF THE OFFICE DU NIGER CASE STUDY
Chapter 2: Present the problem setting of the selected case and the physical, agronomic, 
institutional and social context of farmers’ water management
STAKEHOLDER 
ANALYSIS
Chapter 2: Explore 
stakeholders’ 
objectives and 
mental models of 
how actions will 
influence results
ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATION AND 
PERFORMANCE OF FARMERS’ 
WATER MANAGEMENT
Chapter 3: Assess hydraulic 
performance
Chapter 4: Identify current 
management practices
Chapter 5: Explore the relation 
between water management practices 
and irrigation performance
Chapter 6: Explore the relation 
between water management practices 
and drainage problems
ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL 
FORCES BEHIND 
WATER MANAGEMENT
Chapter 7: Map decision-
making on water 
management at the village 
level
Chapter 8: Investigate 
farmers’ motivation for 
collective action on water 
management
Translation of research results
DEVELOPMENT OF TOOLS FOR DECISION SUPPORT
Chapter 9: Develop training material to help farmers understand the impact of various water 
management practices on performance
Chapter 10: Develop a simulation model of water management that helps determine the optimal 
mix of water management practices to face present and future challenges
 
Figure 1.2 Schematic overview of the logical coherence of chapters 2 to 10 
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Chapter 2  
Presenting the case study: The Office du Niger 
irrigation scheme in Mali 
2.1 Problem setting  
With its 80,000 ha of irrigated land, the Office du Niger is one of the largest irrigation 
schemes of West Africa. It is situated in the Ségou region in Mali (Map 2.1 and 2.2). At 
present, it is of vital importance for national food security in Mali, providing approximately 
465,000 tons of paddy each year or 40 % of the national production. As such, the Office du 
Niger contributes significantly to the self-sufficiency of the country in rice, which is currently 
at about 90 % (Chohin-Kuper et al., 2002). The current achievements contrast sharply with 
the situation at the end of the 1970s, when the notoriously low agronomic and financial 
performance nearly obliterated the Office du Niger. Created in the 1920s by the French 
colonial power, the central management tightly ran the irrigation scheme until it was pressed 
into reforms. By the end of the 1970s, the Malian government sought the financial support of 
international donors for a physical rehabilitation of the Office du Niger to improve the 
conditions for crop production. The latter were prepared to get involved on the condition of 
economic and institutional reforms. The reform process started in the early 1980s and 
completed in 1994. It led to the liberalization of crop production and marketing and the 
reduction of the central management in favor of more farmer autonomy and participation 
(Bolding, 2004). As such, the competencies of the central management were reduced to 
operation and maintenance and a partial Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) to farmers 
was carried out (Aw and Diemer, 2005). This transfer has been most complete at the tertiary 
canal level, where water management is entirely left to farmers (Touré et al., 1997). The 
tertiary level will therefore be the focus of the case study.  
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Zone of the 
Office du Niger 
irrigation scheme 
 
Map 2.1 Location of the Office du Niger irrigation scheme 
 
The economic success of the intervention package is beyond doubt. Yields have risen from 
barely 1.5 t/ha to about 6 t/ha (Couture et al., 2002), resulting in significant increase of 
farmers’ income and economic activity in the region (Mariko et al., 2000). The difference 
between before and after the reforms were in fact so impressive that the Office du Niger 
irrigation scheme became the textbook example of how reforms should be successfully 
conducted (see Box 2). These achievements have created ambitions for further development 
of the area (Coulibaly and Sangaré, 2003; AFD, 2004). With an irrigable surface of about 
1,000,000 ha, a huge agronomic potential remains untapped. An expansion of the irrigation 
scheme would provide a more stable livelihood for many rural dwellers that now depend on 
the vagaries of rain fed agriculture. Waiting lines for obtaining a plot in the area are lengthy, 
and many communities living in the fringe of the irrigation scheme lobby for the construction 
of irrigation infrastructure on their territory. Furthermore, thanks to the fact that no pumping 
costs are involved in conducting water to the irrigation scheme, and that manual labor and 
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animal traction are the main production factors, the rice produced in the Office du Niger is 
highly competitive nationally as well as internationally. The expansion would therefore be 
beneficial for the Malian economy, generating further economic development and making the 
country less reliant on food imports. Mali is currently among the ten poorest countries of the 
world, with almost three quarters of people living below the poverty line of one dollar a day 
(UNDP, 2006). Agriculture accounts for more than a third of GDP and around 80 % of the 
working population and therefore remains crucial for human as well as economic 
development (Toulmin and Guèye, 2003).  
 
Box 2 The Office du Niger in a box 
In recent years, many reports have featured the successful reforms of the Office du Niger as a 
textbook example in one of its boxes. Most of them measure the success by the increase in rice 
production from 1.5 t/ha before reforms to 6 t/ha afterwards. Even though this is perhaps an optimistic 
estimate, the result is still impressive. A small survey learns that the Office du Niger story is used to 
illustrate different theories to explain its success. For some authors, the rise in yields is basically the 
result of technological innovations. Modernization of irrigation infrastructure and laser leveling of land 
made a better water control possible, which in turn allowed the adoption of improved rice varieties and 
techniques such as transplanting (Plusquellec, 2002a; IPTRID, 2003; World Bank, 2006; not dated). 
For others, it was the liberalization of agricultural markets and the devaluation of the CFA Franc that 
provided the necessary incentives for increased rice production (Gabre-Madhin and Haggblad, 2004). 
A third point of view is that disengagement of the state, more farmer autonomy and farmer 
participation in decision-making has provided the right conditions for yield increase (Johnson et al., 
2004; Unesco, 2006). Finally, according to a last group, only the mix of all of these made the success 
of the Office du Niger possible (Davis and Hirji, 2003; Darghouth, 2005). This vision is supported by a 
thorough review of the reform process by Aw and Diemer (2005). They show that the reforms were not 
the result of a ready-made package with the right ingredients. The reforms rather consisted in a series 
of small steps that followed from tough negotiations between the Malian government and international 
donors. The latter formed a united front on some occasions so that fundamental changes could be 
pushed through. They engaged in a fierce competition on others moments, so that the Office du Niger 
benefited from complementary views and was able to build on the most successful ones.  
 
The Office du Niger has already embarked on an impressive expansion program, aiming to 
reach 200,000 ha by 2020 (CDP, 2004). The head works of the irrigation scheme are already 
used at full capacity to supply water to the actual 80,000 ha of irrigated land. Since extending 
them would require costly investments, the expansion should be realized without a significant 
increase in water consumption. This is possible if overall irrigation efficiency, currently no 
more than 25 %, is substantially improved. Another reason to focus on irrigation efficiency is 
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Map 2.2 Map of the Office du Niger irrigation scheme with indication of the five administrative zones 
 
that national as well as international competition for water increases. The irrigation scheme 
withdraws its water from the Niger River, which crosses five countries. As the population of 
these countries grows and their economies develop, water demand from households, 
agriculture and industry rises. Annually, the Office du Niger withdraws around 10 % of the 
Niger River’s water. Most of the water lost in the irrigation scheme cannot be used 
downstream as it flows to depression in the desert where it percolates or evaporates. Being 
such a significant consumer, large-scale water losses cannot be justified. Furthermore, 
increasing irrigation efficiency is important to reduce the recurrent drainage problems in the 
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Map 2.3 Planned expansion of the Office du Niger irrigation scheme 
 
area. These might negatively influence the quantity and quality of rice production and bring 
along the risk of soil degradation through salinisation and alkalinization (N’Diaye, 1987; 
Dicko, 2005). Drainage problems furthermore foster water-borne diseases such as malaria and 
schistosomiasis (Klinkenberg et al., 2002). Besides the human suffering, these diseases might 
produce an economic cost because of the loss of labor that even goes beyond the agronomic 
losses (Audibert and Etard, 1998).  
Ouvry and Marlet (1999) have shown that the tertiary level takes up an important share of 
water losses and present the greatest potential for increasing irrigation efficiency. Evaporation 
and percolation losses occur in the abandoned river channels, but they are expected to remain 
constant in absolute terms when the conveyed water volumes increase. Next, few conveyance 
losses occur in the primary and secondary canals, but efficiency is low at the tertiary level. 
The central management and international donors blame the water losses on poor farmers’ 
water management. They set up several projects to remedy this situation, introducing new 
institutions, procedures and regulations for water management at the tertiary level, albeit with 
limited success. Farmers on the other hand, appreciate their independence, but feel they lack 
the necessary knowledge and skills to be in full control of water management (Colin and Petit, 
2007). In this context, the further success of the irrigation scheme will depend on the 
strengthening of farmers’ water management, which is studied in this dissertation. 
 
2.2 Description of the study area 
2.2.1 The physical environment 
The zone of the Office du Niger (14°18’N 5°59’W) has a semi-arid climate. Yearly rainfall 
varies from 300 to 600 mm and is concentrated in the months from July to September (Figure 
2.1 and Figure 2.2). Reference evapotranspiration amounts to about 2,500 mm a year and 
exceeds rainfall in all months except August (Hendrickx et al., 1986). Yearly rainfall 
increases from north to south in the study area (Boeckx, 2004). Soils are predominantly 
Fluvisols and Vertic Cambisols with a clayey texture (Haefele et al., 2003). The water table, 
initially at 40 m deep, is at 1 to 2 m deep during the dry season and reaches the ground level 
during the rainy season (Dicko, 2005). 
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Figure 2.1 Mean monthly reference evapotranspiration (ET0) and monthly rainfall with a probability of 
exceedance of 20, 50 and 80 % for Niono 
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Figure 2.2 Yearly rainfall with a probability of exceedance of 20, 50 and 80 % at different locations in 
the study area (Source: Boeckx, 2004) 
 
The entire irrigation scheme is dominated by a dam on the Niger River, from which it 
withdraws water by gravity. Water is first diverted to two abandoned river branches (called 
fala) that are put back into use (Map 2.2). The dam, abandoned river branches, their intakes 
and control structures correspond to the head works of the irrigation scheme. The river 
branches then supply a hierarchic irrigation network consisting of primary (distributeur), 
secondary (partiteur) and tertiary canals (arroseur), all of them unlined. Field canals connect 
the tertiary canals with tertiary drains (Figure 2.3). In this study, the tertiary level is defined as 
the aggregate of hydraulic structures, canals and fields in between the intake of the tertiary 
canal and the outlet of the tertiary drain. The water enters the system through the intake of the 
tertiary canal. On the tertiary canals, five to twenty field canals are connected trough field 
intakes. Each field canal serves a field of about two hectares. The aggregate of fields along a 
tertiary canal is called tertiary block.  
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Field
canal
Plot composed of 
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Figure 2.3 Layout of a tertiary block 
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A field contains different basins into which water flows through breaches in the dikes that 
enclose them. The same field canals evacuate water towards the drainage network. Farmers’ 
plots consist of several basins, but do not necessarily follow the boundaries of the fields. One 
plot can comprise basins in several fields, and one field can be shared by two or three farmers. 
A farmers’ unit of decision-making on the crop, planting date, irrigation and drainage is an 
aggregate of several basins of his plot within the same field. Such a unit of decision-making 
or management unit, will thus get a uniform treatment. 
Rehabilitation of the irrigation scheme makes steady progress and by now has reached 
more than half of the irrigated surface. The various donors who financed the rehabilitation 
have followed each their own philosophy with respect to the construction and operation of the 
hydraulic infrastructure, resulting in different types of infrastructure with particular designs 
and dimensions of intakes, canals and basins. At the tertiary level, these types can be roughly 
divided in two groups (Table 2.1). The Retail-type (as the French project that first 
implemented it) uses baffle modules for the tertiary intakes. Thanks to the design of the 
baffles in the opening of the intake, the modules maintain a constant incoming flow for a wide 
range of upstream water level variations. The various modules of the intake each have a 
specific flow rate, so that the incoming flow is easy to control. The design flow rate is 1.8 to 
2 l/s/ha at the tertiary intake. As the modules come in blocks of 30 l/s, the capacity of the 
intake can go up to 4.5 l/s/ha, depending on the surface to be served by the tertiary canal. As a 
rule, a lock secures the intake and only water guards can open or close the modules. In 
practice, the lock is often missing, or farmers have a copy of its key. The Retail-type 
furthermore has overflow structures at the level of every field canal intake that discharge in 
the field canal and then the tertiary drain to prevent damage to the banks of the tertiary canal 
when the water level is too high. The Arpon-type (as the Dutch project) uses semi-modular 
weirs as tertiary intakes that can be closed with a single sliding gate. The width of the weir is 
adapted to the irrigated surface of the tertiary block, so their capacity is always around 2 l/s/ha 
when the upstream water level is at its design level. Small variations in the upstream water 
level however cause large variations in the incoming flow rate. Tertiary canals of this type 
have only one overflow structure at its end that discharges directly into the secondary drain. 
Since the early 1990s, the Arpon type is no longer built (IOV, 1992). Finally, some areas have 
not yet been subject to rehabilitation and still have the original infrastructure with non-
modular sliding gates at the intakes of the tertiary canals. Here, both the upstream and the 
downstream water level influence the incoming flow rate, which is therefore hard to control. 
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The original design did not feature field canals, but farmers often created them themselves. 
Otherwise, plots are irrigated and drained from basin to basin. 
Tertiary canals are about 2 to 4 m wide and less than 1 m deep. This makes for a very 
large cross-section compared to volume of water they need to transport. Consequently, the 
hydraulic slope is quasi nil and field canal intakes are situated all at the same level, even 
though tertiary canals can be over 1,000 m long. 
 
Table 2.1 Properties of the design and dimensions of intakes, canals and basins of the Retail and 
Arpon type of irrigation infrastructure 
Type of 
infrastructure 
Properties Photo of the tertiary intake 
Retail type Baffle modules at the intake of tertiary canals; 
intake at the tertiary level locked; evacuation 
of excess water of the tertiary canal through 
overflow structures discharging in the field 
canals; 1 field canal per 2 ha; basins of 0.1 
ha constructed by engineers and machine 
leveled 
Arpon type Semi-modular sliding gates at the intake of 
tertiary canals; intake at the tertiary level not 
locked; evacuation of excess water of the 
tertiary canal directly to the drainage network 
through an overflow structure at the end of 
the canal; 1 field canal per 3 ha, additional 
field canals constructed by farmers; basins 
constructed and leveled by farmers 
Not 
rehabilitated 
Non-modular sliding gates at the intake of 
tertiary canals; intake at the tertiary level not 
locked; no field canals, unless constructed by 
farmers 
 
The drainage network is structured analogous to the irrigation network. The tertiary drains 
are dimensioned at a capacity of 1.4 l/s/ha, which corresponds to the peak drainage 
requirement (Sogreah, 1987). Drainage water is conveyed by gravity from the tertiary drain to 
the secondary drain and finally to the collector drain, both with a capacity of about 0.5 l/s/ha 
(Sogreah, 1987). All fields and drainage canals discharging either directly or indirectly to the 
same collector drain constitute one drainage system. Given the flat area and the absence of 
hydraulic control structures, all drainage canals of a drainage system function as 
communicating vessels. Although the collector drains close to the Niger River discharge into 
the river, most collectors dump the drainage water in natural depressions where the water 
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infiltrates and evaporates. At the borders of the irrigation scheme, drainage water is often used 
to irrigate illegal plots. In order to extract water by gravity, dams are sometimes constructed 
in the drainage canals (Van der Walle, 1982). 
 
2.2.2 The crop 
The principal crop is paddy rice (Oryza sativa L.) grown during the rainy season May to 
November). A second rice crop and vegetables are grown during the dry season on 10% to 
20% of the total surface (see also Box 6). The irrigation scheme contains also a sugarcane 
plantation (3,000 ha) and some orchards (1,000 ha). This research focuses on rice cultivation 
during the rainy season, as it is by far the most important crop.  
Water requirements for rice cultivation amount to 5 to 12 mm/day, depending on the 
atmospheric demand, rainfall and percolation losses. Variations between the different 
varieties are minimal. Consequently, differences in total water requirements mostly depend on 
the climate, soil type and the length of the growth cycle. In addition, for rice cultivation, some 
water is needed for land preparation and to maintain a water layer throughout the growing 
season. Even though research has pointed out that this water layer is not strictly necessary for 
rice cultivation (Bouman, 2001), it acts as a buffer to allow flexible spacing of irrigation 
events. Without this buffer, farmers would need to have a permanent access to water for 
irrigation, as even short periods of water deficit can cause large reductions in yield. The most 
sensitive periods are the late vegetative period and flowering. The water layer furthermore 
reduces weed growth and protects the crop against damage by rats and other ravagers.  
In the process of the reforms of the Office du Niger irrigation scheme, improved rice 
varieties have been introduced. These are non-photosensitive, short stem varieties with a 
growth cycle of 120 to 145 days. The most commonly used varieties are BG 90-2 and Kogoni 
91-1, also known as Gambiaka Suruni, which have a growth cycle of respectively 130 and 
140 days and a yield potential of 10 t/ha. Their total seasonal water requirements amount to 
about 1,050 mm. Transplanting is the common practice for crop establishment (Haefele et al., 
2003). Rice is sown in seedbeds and transplanted after 30 days on average (Dicko, 2005). The 
season sets off at the end of May with the installation of seedbeds. Rice transplanting begins 
gradually by mid-June and continues until the end of September (Figure 2.4). The peak 
irrigation demand falls during the month of September, when over ninety percent of the 
cultivated surface is irrigated and the rainy season reaches its end. The first fields are 
harvested already by mid-September and harvesting continues until the end of December. 
Late rice (harvested in December) often suffers from low yields as the cool temperatures 
 40
during flowering induce sterility. For the reasons mentioned above, a water layer is 
maintained from the moment of transplanting until about 10 days before harvest. 
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Figure 2.4 Evolution of transplanting, harvesting and the total cultivated surface during the main 
growing season (Source: survey data) 
 
2.2.3 The institutional environment 
Since the reforms, responsibilities have been clearly divided between the Malian state, 
farmers, and the central management of the irrigation scheme. They are renegotiated every 
three years between representatives from all involved parties and recorded in a “Contrat-
Plan”, or negotiated contract. The core responsibilities of the central management are water 
delivery and maintenance of the irrigation infrastructure. It is furthermore in charge of 
management of the territory and capacity building at farmers’ level, including technical 
assistance, tasks that have been assigned to the Malian state, but are confined to the central 
management. It has its headquarters in the city of Ségou, but is decentralized in five 
administrative zones that each has a directorate implementing water and land management 
quite independently in their part of the irrigation scheme. Regarding water management, the 
headquarters are responsible for operating and maintaining the head works. For this, it 
receives funds from the Malian state. The primary and secondary canals are operated by the 
water guards of the directorates. The directorates are also responsible for maintenance of 
these canals. Farmers participate in the management and allocation of these funds through a 
so-called Joint Committee on Maintenance at Secondary Level, of which there is one for each 
administrative zone. Operation and maintenance of primary and secondary canals are paid for 
by farmers’ water fees. Rates are non-volumetric, but linked to the type of crop, growing 
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season, and land class. The most expensive class corresponds to rehabilitated land, where a 
full water service is guaranteed. Then follows not-rehabilitated land, and finally the so-called 
‘hors-casiers’ that are irrigated through illegal outlets constructed by farmers. Fees are 
negotiated yearly between the Malian state, the central management and farmers. For the rice 
crop in the main growing season, they correspond to about 25 % of total production costs.  
Finally, farmers are collectively responsible for water management at tertiary block level. 
Certain regulations stipulated in the negotiated contract limit farmers’ liberty of action 
(Couture et al., 2002). The regulations concern the obligation to maintain tertiary 
infrastructure, respect the prescribed cropping calendar (Figure 2.4) and cultural practices in 
line with intensification of rice production, limit water use, and practice double cropping on 
the plots destined for that purpose. Every tertiary block has a canal chief, who acts as an 
intermediary for passing on information between farmers and water guards and is supposed to 
organize and coordinate water management activities at the tertiary level. Lacking recognition 
by fellow farmers, the chief has often little substance. Since 2002, tertiary level WUAs are 
created on the initiative of international donors to formally organize farmers around water 
management and as such fill the power vacuum left by the implementation of IMT. 
 
2.2.4 The social environment 
Farmers live in villages nearby the downstream plots of one to three nearby secondary canals. 
The area being scarcely populated, most villages of the irrigation scheme were newly created 
starting from the 1920s, and populated through various waves of forced and voluntary 
immigration from different regions in Mali and Burkina Faso (van Beusekom, 2000; 
Filipovich, 2001; Seebörger, 2003). Since the revitalization of the irrigation scheme, new 
immigrants keep coming, and the population in the area has grown from barely 5,000 families 
in the early 1970s to about 35,000 now (Office du Niger, 2006; Seebörger, 2003). Even 
though ethnic homogeneity was established in every village when settlers moved in, the high 
turnover of plot holding in the early years, reallocation of plots after rehabilitation and 
continuous inflow of new farmers have mixed people with no common background within 
almost every village and even tertiary canal. Next, the economic growth triggered by the 
reforms went hand in hand with an economic differentiation between farmers. This 
differentiation has produced a considerable variability as to plot size, agricultural equipment, 
access to credit and availability of family labor (Jamin, 1994). To this adds a growing number 
of farmers that are outsiders to the village (so-called non-resident farmers). A few live in 
another village nearby, but most of them live in one of the small towns within the area of the 
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irrigation scheme. Some even reside outside the irrigation scheme and have their land 
cultivated by wage laborers. For many non-residents, rice farming is often only a secondary 
activity. In the rehabilitated parts of the irrigation scheme, they comprise some 10 to 40 % of 
the farmers (Jamin and Doucet, 1992). In addition, even though illegal, leasing out plots for 
just one growing season has become quite common. Coulibaly and Bélières (2004) report that 
about 20 % of farmers lease out (a part of) their plot, and in total, leaseholders cultivate 7 % 
of the irrigated surface. Most leaseholders are also non-residents. 
There exists a considerable antagonism between farmers and the central management. The 
Office du Niger was created by the French colonial power to supply France with cotton. The 
dam and irrigation infrastructure were built by forced laborers, and in a first phase, farmers 
were settled by force or with false promises. Extreme hard work and tough living conditions 
made many early settlers flee the irrigation scheme and mortality because of disease and 
exhaustion was extremely high. Only from the 1960s, farmers started to migrate voluntarily 
from their native land to the Office du Niger, often because of the drought ravaging the Sahel. 
Furthermore, until the reforms, farmers depended completely on the central management 
while they had very limited bargaining power (Davidse et al., 1984). Nearly all decisions on 
production and marketing of the crop were taken at the level of the central management, 
reducing farmers to mere laborers (van Beusekom, 2000; 2002). At the end of the growing 
season, farmers were obliged to sell their crop to the central management at a pre-set price, 
with the “Economic Police” exerting tight control. The lucrative business of rice processing 
was again the monopoly of the central management. Next, many farmers ran up debts toward 
the central management, who had again a monopoly on credit (de Wilde, 1968; Kroon, 1979). 
The land question is a last delicate point. In the irrigation scheme, farmers cannot own any 
land, because it belongs to the Malian state. Most farmers only hold an annual land title that 
provides exclusive usufruct rights1. This land title is automatically renewed and in practice 
can be passed to heirs, as long as the water fee is duly paid (Jamin and Doucet, 1994). Since 
the early 1990s, farmers can obtain a “Permis d’Exploitation Agricole”, which is an 
indeterminate contract passable to heirs but only a handful of farmers have obtained until now 
(see Box 8). Given their powerful position, the central management possessed a considerable 
authority over farmers (Kroon, 1979). This authority erodes progressively since the reforms, 
but still affects the relation between the management’s agents and farmers.  
                                                 
1 Because of the strict division of labor common in the area, rice cultivation is a male business, and almost all 
plot holders are men. The very few women who hold a land title by and large belong to the group of non-resident 
farmers and have another job. As a rule, they relay on wage laborers to actually cultivate the plot.  
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2.3 Stakeholder analysis of water management 
The stakeholder analysis aims to identify the different stakeholders, their objectives and 
mental models concerning water management. It follows the theoretical framework developed 
by van Noordwijk et al. (2002) outlined in Figure 1.1. The analysis is limited to the tertiary 
level, which is the focus of this study. Particular attention goes to collective action, which 
farmers were assumed to establish after IMT. The stakeholder analysis is the result of semi-
structured interviews with selected key-informants that took place in 2003 (see Appendix 3). 
As such, 22 functionaries from all levels of the hierarchy of the central management were 
interviewed, 43 farmers and 10 leaders from civil society in the study area, representing a 
farmers’ syndicate, a federation of farmer organizations, research centers and local NGOs. 
Results were validated and adjusted in 2004 through a study on farmers’ perceptions of water 
management (Bastiaens, 2005). In this study, discussion groups with different stakeholders 
were held. By running a participatory diagnostic of water management in 2006 (Colin and 
Petit, 2007), a second validation was achieved. Three stakeholder groups are considered:  
• Farmers, who have to take the actual management decisions either individually or 
collectively with the group of farmers sharing a tertiary block;  
• The central management of the Office du Niger, which tries to influence farmers’ 
management decisions through training and sensitization and promotes the regulations 
stipulated by the negotiated contract. In the scope of this dissertation, the central 
management will in addition represent the Malian state, whose objectives it pursues 
following the negotiated contract (Office du Niger, 2005); 
• International donors, who exert considerable influence on both the central management 
and farmers indirectly by setting the policy agenda, and directly through projects on water 
management. International donors’ opinion counts heavily, as they finance most of the 
new irrigation infrastructure1. 
All groups are diverse. In particular, the central management contains officials with desk jobs 
at the headquarters or the directorates, but also field staff in direct contact with farmers. The 
analysis therefore only reflects general tendencies. 
What unites all stakeholders is the production of irrigated rice, which they want to 
maximize under given constraints. Rice production is however instrumental to several other 
                                                 
1 To give just a few examples, the USA will spend 234.6 million dollars over the next five years to develop 
16,000 ha of newly irrigated land through its Millennium Challenge Corporation. The French ‘Agence française 
de Développement’ has approved a budget of 10 million euros on its coming PADON project, which aims to 
improve water management and will also develop newly irrigated land.  
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objectives. For farmers, it is a question of securing a livelihood for their families. As 
alternative economic opportunities present themselves, it might become a more or less 
important part in the portfolio of various sources of income. In contrast, the central 
management has a regional or even national perspective. Its objectives are on the one hand to 
combat rural poverty by raising farmer incomes and on the other hand to establish national 
food security and to export surplus production to neighboring countries (Office du Niger, 
2005). International donors support these objectives, but their concerns extend beyond the 
Malian national interests. In particular, they take into account the actual and potential water 
users in up- and downstream countries of the Niger River. 
 
Labor                                                           Collective labor input             
Management  tertiary intake
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WaterRice
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Capital Land  
Figure 2.5 Production factors mobilized for rice cultivation 
 
For rice production, several production factors are mobilized (Figure 2.5). Regarding these 
production factors, the different stakeholders appear to have diverging interests and priorities, 
translating in different strategies. In irrigated agriculture, water is a primary production factor. 
Up until today, during the main growing season, water is abundant in the Niger River and the 
irrigation network does not present structural bottlenecks. Irrigated land on the other hand is 
limiting, and stakeholders therefore want to maximize rice production per hectare. Farmers 
also consider labor as an important production factor. They value it highly since it comes at 
the cost of time available for other economic activities or leisure. With respect to water 
management, labor has a collective and an individual component. Collective water 
management tasks include adjusting water supply to the tertiary block to aggregate demand, 
allocating water among individual farmers, maintaining tertiary infrastructure and 
coordinating the cropping calendar. These tasks demand collective action by devising and 
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monitoring rules and organizing joint activities. Individual water management tasks consists 
in supervising irrigation, maintaining contour dikes of rice basins and land leveling among 
others. In times of water temporary supply problems or for farmers with a disadvantageous 
plot location, monitoring and negotiating access to water increase individual labor input 
(Figure 2.5). Collective action might alleviate this extra labor input by regulating water 
allocation but requires sufficient social capital.  
Technological innovation through the introduction of improved rice varieties and 
transplanting techniques made an important production increase possible (Jamin and 
Coulibaly, 2002). Capital (to buy fertilizer, sowing seed, equipment, etc.) is also crucial for 
production and at present a limiting production factor for many farmers (see Box 5). Given 
the huge untapped irrigation potential, the central management’s main strategy to increase 
total rice output is however an expansion of the irrigated area (see Map 2.3), for which 
improving irrigation efficiency at the tertiary level is indispensable. The central management 
considers strengthening collective labor input as the key factor to increasing efficiency. 
Reasoning from its own mental model, it wants to promote a fully-fledged collective action 
for water management. In a first step, they concentrate on infrastructure maintenance. The 
presence of up to 2 m high weeds in the tertiary canals is perceived as an obstruction of the 
water flow inducing losses. It comes across as a strong and very visible indicator of current 
poor levels of collective action. International donors, who are concerned about water and 
infrastructure conservation as a matter of principle, very strongly support this position. 
So far, the expansion plans have not yet been communicated to farmers, who consequently 
are not aware of the coming pressure on water. Furthermore, even though the expansion of the 
irrigated area will benefit future farmers who will gain access to an irrigated rice plot, those 
already in place will in principle not get extra land, and hence have no stake in the expansion. 
Consequently, they are not concerned about irrigation efficiency. On the contrary, the 
presently unrestricted and demand-driven water delivery under the current minimal water 
management strategies results in over-irrigation and thus low efficiency, but it makes 
irrigation easy. Under the current conditions, farmers can irrigate when they want and with 
the quantity desired. In their eyes, the level infrastructure maintenance is sufficient as long as 
it does not hinder this easy irrigation. What might motivate farmers to increase irrigation 
efficiency is the fact that over-irrigation might provoke drainage problems. But given the 
‘communicating vessels’ aspect of the drainage system, the positive impact of a farmer’s 
efforts dissipates throughout the irrigation scheme, and as such does not provide the necessary 
incentives to individual farmers or even farmer groups at tertiary level.  
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The central management would like to increase its grip on water management at the 
tertiary level, so that it can actively pursue its strategies and objectives. Here, they meet 
opposition from both international donors and farmers. International donors strongly believe 
that, if they possess the necessary social capital, farmers will be better at water management 
than the central management is. Consequently, they constantly push for farmer autonomy and 
count on the set up of Water Users Associations and extension and training campaigns to 
increase social capital. Farmers on the other hand fiercely defend the demand-driven water 
supply and even rise against any short-term supply disruption, as they consider easy irrigation 
an acquired right. They furthermore want to preserve their independence at the tertiary level, 
as it allows them to devote their labor as they think best.  
The discrepancy in strategies and objectives of water management lies at the heart of the 
current conflict between farmers, the central management and international donors. Within 
their margins available, each stakeholder tries to impose their strategies on the others (Figure 
2.6), and accuses themof the perceived failures. For the reasons mentioned in section 2.1 
(Problem setting of the case study), this research supports the idea that irrigation efficiency at 
the tertiary level should be increased. At the same time, it wants to take into account the 
different stakeholders’ interest. Therefore, the trade-off between water, collective action and 
individual water management practices is the focal point of this research. Relations among 
these variables are investigated in depth and it is explored how the social and institutional 
context influences the trade-off. The results of the analysis then serve as a basis during the 
design of the tools and guidelines to support farmers’ water management.  
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Figure 2.6 Outline of relations among the various stakeholders 
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PART I 
ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATION AND 
PERFORMANCE OF WATER MANAGEMENT 
 
Summary 
From the stakeholder analysis, it appeared that while the central management wants to 
increase irrigation efficiency through fully-fledged collective action, farmers value the latter 
only when it favors easy irrigation. Part I of this dissertation analyzes the impact of 
management on performance in the real world. A field study is conducted which investigates 
current farmers’ water management practices after IMT, performance levels and possible 
connections between both. Results indicate that with water availability being abundant, 
farmers can avoid the need for cooperation by maintaining a constant over-supply of water. 
As a result, irrigation problems are rare, even though they exist in tertiary blocks with an 
uneven topography. In those cases, allocation rules can effectively solve irrigation problems. 
Lacking the necessary social capital, some farmer groups however do not succeed in 
establishing them. Minimal water management strategies result in low irrigation efficiency at 
the tertiary level, which is estimated at about 60 %. It has been shown that collective action at 
the intake of the tertiary blocks can improve irrigation efficiency with 14 %, which will be 
necessary as the irrigation scheme expands further and water becomes scarce. Furthermore, 
the over-supply of water is one of the major causes of the recurring drainage problems in the 
irrigation scheme, which incur an increase in production costs and a decrease of both quantity 
and quality of harvested rice. Maintenance of tertiary irrigation and drainage canals, as well as 
the dispersal of planting dates, is currently the focal point of interventions by the central 
management. Results however indicate that they do not influence performance significantly, 
which shows that a thorough analysis remains necessary for setting the problem statement 
right. The analysis leads to certain recommendations to guarantee the sustainability of the 
irrigation scheme’s expansion. They concern targeting the interventions and propose a mix of 
incentives to improve water use, accompanied by measures of sensitization and capacity 
building. 
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Chapter 3  
Irrigation performance at the tertiary level: 
Adequate water delivery through over-supply 
Abstract1 
The hydraulic performance of irrigation in the Office du Niger in 1995 is compared with the 
situation nearly ten years later (2004). Major physical rehabilitations and economic and 
institutional reforms carried out from the 1980s onwards succeeded in making a success story 
of the Office du Niger. This chapter analyzes the irrigation performance at the tertiary level in 
the light of the interventions implemented and current water management practices using the 
performance indicators proposed by Molden and Gates. The interventions succeeded in 
establishing a good adequacy of water supply (0,95 for 1995 and 0,91 for 2004), thus creating 
the necessary conditions for boosting rice production. Because of the minimal management 
strategies of farmers and water guards, efficiency is however low and shows no sign of 
improving between 1995 (0,52) and today (0,59). Dependability and equity are also poor 
according to Molden and Gates’ criteria, but given that water supply is generally adequate, 
these indicators appear less relevant. An alternative calculation procedure is proposed for 
situations where water is not scarce. Results of the adapted indicators show satisfactory levels 
of dependability and equity. Measures aimed at increasing efficiency will inevitably be costly, 
but are redeemed justified. Indeed, even though water is not a limiting factor during the main 
growing season until today, this is to change soon as the irrigated surface will be strongly 
expanded. In addition, increased irrigation efficiency might help to solve the recurrent 
drainage problems that trouble the harvest in the Office du Niger.  
                                                 
1 This chapter is adapted from: Vandersypen, K., Bengaly, K., Keita, A. C. T., Sidibé, S., Raes, D., and  
Jamin, J.-Y. (2006). Irrigation performance at the tertiary level in the rice schemes of the Office du Niger (Mali): 
Adequate water delivery through over-supply. Agricultural Water Management, 83, 144-152. 
3.1 Introduction 
In the frame of the reforms of the Office du Niger, rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructure 
was accompanied by a thorough reorganization of water management procedures. Hydraulic 
performance of irrigation, which was judged extremely low, was then expected to improve on 
all accounts. Before the interventions, water distribution was supply-driven. Water was 
conveyed to the canals following an irrigation schedule established by the central 
management. Water guards employed by the central management informed farmers when 
their block would be served and farmers were then required to irrigate their plots with the 
water available. Because of inadequate information about water requirements of different 
areas and incompetence in establishing the irrigation schedule by the central management, this 
system did not work well and created water shortages for whole areas. In addition, control 
over the water supply was virtually impossible: all canal intakes were non-modular and 
measurement structures for calculating flow rates did not exist. Besides, the specific water 
demand of the area to be served was unknown since information on the cultivated surface was 
unavailable. The management’s strategy was therefore to supply a maximum of water to the 
scheduled canals and to evacuate the excess through the drainage system (Bastiaansen et al., 
1984). Even so, irrigation problems persisted on a large proportion of the irrigated area. First, 
the irrigation network was extensively degraded and large conveyance losses diminished the 
amount of water delivered to the field. Second, the land surface was badly leveled and higher 
parts had inadequate access to water. This effect was further intensified by the inexistence of 
a rotation system between field canals within the tertiary block, so that a high number of 
farmers usually irrigated simultaneously and the water level in the tertiary canals remained 
low (Bastiaansen et al., 1984).  
Water management was thus a major impediment to agricultural production while being 
extremely wasteful. The interventions of the international donors therefore intended to both 
improve the conditions for rice production and rationalize water use. They comprised three 
elements. First, a rehabilitation of the irrigation infrastructure was to establish full water 
control through land leveling, restoration of the irrigation network and installation of more 
sophisticated intake structures. Accompanying guidelines and procedures for operation of the 
infrastructure were supplied along with the rehabilitation. Second, in order to better match 
supply with demand, water distribution was shifted from a supply driven system to a demand 
driven system in which all secondary canals are permanently filled. Depending on whether the 
intake of the tertiary canal is locked, farmers can now either open the intake of the tertiary 
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canal themselves, or communicate their water demand to a water guard who will open the 
intake of the tertiary canal accordingly. Then, at every level of the canal system, the total 
demand of the downstream canals is satisfied. To further improve the demand-driven system, 
each tertiary canal is supposed to be represented by a canal chief, whose task is to collect and 
communicate the future water demand of his fellow farmers to the water guard (van Keulen 
and Hamel, 1997). Finally, as part of IMT, water management within the tertiary block is 
entirely left to farmers (Touré et al., 1997). As such, they can now decide independently on 
water allocation. 
The transition to success of the Office du Niger would not have been possible without 
genuine improvements in water management. Several studies conducted in the 1990s 
demonstrate on the other hand that hydraulic efficiency at the tertiary level remains 
unsatisfactory (Konaté, 1991; Bengaly, 1995; Hamel et al., 1996, Ouvry and Marlet, 1999). 
Those studies however provide an incomplete picture since they do not take into account 
adequacy, dependability and equity of water delivery that might explain the success of the 
interventions on other domains. Therefore, this chapter assesses hydraulic performance during 
the main rice-growing season and at the tertiary level in the Office du Niger by using the 
performance indicators proposed by Molden and Gates (1990), which include all four aspects 
mentioned above. The performance of 1995, just after the reforms, is compared with the 
situation in 2004, 9 years later. Results are then analyzed in the light of the interventions 
implemented in the irrigation project and current water management practices. Finally, some 
recommendations are formulated. 
 
3.2 Materials and methods 
Characteristics of the samples of tertiary canals 
Data from 1995 and 2004 are collected on samples of tertiary blocks selected independently 
from each other. The 2004 sample contains 36 tertiary blocks and is composed in the frame of 
this dissertation to evaluate farmers’ organization and performance of water management. 
From that sample, 24 blocks from two administrative zones (Niono and N’Debougou) with a 
sufficiently complete data set are selected. The blocks belong to six secondary canals, divided 
into several independent hydraulic units through control structures. The sample contains 13 of 
those units with no more than three blocks in each. Furthermore, within this sample, both the 
Retail and Arpon type of infrastructure figure (see Table 2.1 for a description of the 
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characteristics of both types). The 1995 sample was constructed in the scope of a study on 
irrigation efficiency by Bengaly (1995). It contains 20 tertiary blocks, all of which are of the 
Retail type and situated in the Niono zone. The sample contains 14 independent hydraulic 
units from 5 secondary canals, with once again no more than three blocks per unit. None of 
them overlaps with the blocks from the 2004 sample. Table 3.1 summarizes the characteristics 
of both samples. Differences in irrigated surface and number of farmers on the canal are not 
necessarily representative for the type of infrastructure. 
 
Table 3.1 Summary characteristics of the samples of tertiary blocks 
Particulars 1995  2004  
  Retail  Arpon  Total 
Number of tertiary blocks in the sample 20 12 12 24 
Number of independent hydraulic units in the 
sample 
14 6 7 13 
Number of secondary canals in the sample 5 3 3 6 
Average surface of the tertiary blocks (ha) 26 (13) 15 (10) 25 (12) 20 (11) 
Average length of the tertiary canals (m) 1024 (489) 707 (281) 977 (288) 842 (276)
Average number of farmers in the tertiary 
blocks 
18 (15.1) 8 (3.2) 9 (4.8) 9 (3.8) 
Average design flow rate of the tertiary 
canals (l/s/ha) 
2.40 (0.49) 2.59 (0.99) 1.99 (0.23) 2.29 
(0.89) 
Source: land register of the Office du Niger 
Figures between parenthesis show standard deviation 
 
Performance indicators 
The performance indicators proposed by Molden and Gates (1990) are adequacy (PA), 
efficiency (PF), dependability (PD), and equity (PE): 
 otherwise1pandQQif
Q
Q
pwithp
R
1
T
1P ARD
R
D
A
T R
AA =≤=


= ∑ ∑  (1) 
 otherwise1pandQQif
Q
Q
pwithp
R
1
T
1P FDR
D
R
F
T R
FF =≤=


= ∑ ∑  (2) 
 ∑ 


=
R R
D
TD Q
Q
CV
R
1P  (3) 
 ∑ 


=
T R
D
RE Q
Q
CV
T
1P  (4) 
The indicators compare the volume of water required (QR) with the water delivered (QD) 
of a certain subregion (R) during a certain period (T). CV is the coefficient of variation. 
Adequacy assesses whether the amount of water delivered meets the requirement. When 
delivery exceeds requirements in a certain period, it is considered fully adequate. Efficiency is 
a measure for the excess of water delivered in comparison with the requirements. A delivery 
of less than the required amount is thus considered fully efficient. Dependability expresses the 
degree of temporal variability of irrigation delivery compared to requirements. It thus assesses 
whether adequate water quantities arrive at the required time and place. Equity is a measure 
for the spatial uniformity of water deliveries and shows the fairness of water delivery across 
delivery points. Since dependability and equity are expressed by a coefficient of variation 
(CV), the lower the value, the higher the dependability and equity. In addition, an alternative 
calculation procedure for dependability and equity of water delivery is proposed that might 
better suit situations where water is not scarce, as is the case in the Office du Niger. This 
procedure introduces a maximum threshold of one for the ratio of QD over QR when water 
delivery is fully adequate (as for the calculation of adequacy) so that variation in over-supply 
is eliminated in the indicator: 
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Spatial averages are weighted against the surface of the tertiary blocks in order to take into 
account their relative importance. For this study, the subregion (R) consists of the total area 
covered by the sampled tertiary blocks. Tertiary blocks belonging to the same hydraulic unit 
are however not independent and are consequently replaced by their weighted average, so that 
the 1995 sample has 14 observations and 2004 sample 13. The period (T) covers 5 months of 
the rainy season (June to October), which corresponds to the main growing season. Since 
water can be stored in the rice basins, excess delivery at one moment compensates for 
shortage of delivery on a previous moment. Therefore, water requirement and delivery are 
calculated over intervals of one month. Differences between samples and types of 
infrastructure were tested with one-way ANOVA tests. Since equity is calculated as the 
coefficient of variation over tertiary blocks, samples cannot be compared statistically. 
 
Water requirement (QR) 
The water requirement of paddy rice is composed of evapotranspiration from the rice basins 
(ETrice), water used for land preparation (PREP) and the water added to establish a water layer 
in the field (LAYER) to improve paddy growth and improve production conditions 
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(Anbumozhi et al., 1998). The evacuation of this water layer for harvesting allows 
furthermore for alkalinity control (N’Diaye and Guindo, 1998; van Asten et al., 2004).  
The evapotranspiration is obtained by multiplying the reference evapotranspiration (ET0) 
with a crop factor (kc). Reference evapotranspiration is calculated using the Penman equation 
(Doorenbos and Pruitt, 1977), which corresponds best to measured evapotranspiration levels 
in the Sahel region (Raes et al., 1995). A crop factor of 1.2 for paddy rice is applied 
(Hendrickx et al., 1986). Land preparation, which includes plowing and/or harrowing, 
requires 1500 m³/ha for land soaking and establishing a small water layer under good 
management conditions and on level fields (Hendrickx et al., 1986). Farmers carry it out once 
at the onset of the growing season (Jamin, 1994) at about 25 to 30 days before transplanting. 
The day before transplanting, they add a water layer of 50 mm, which they increase to 
100 mm after 25 days and to 150 mm after 70 days. Rainfall that is effectively stored in the 
rice basins (Peff) meets a part of the crop’s water need and can be fully subtracted from the 
irrigation requirement. In the region, all rainfall on a transplanted surface is considered 
effective (Hendrickx et al., 1981). Finally, Molden and Gates allow for conveyance and 
percolation losses downstream of the considered delivery point. In the design of the irrigation 
infrastructure, losses of about 25 % of the irrigation requirement were taken into account at 
the level of the tertiary block (Bastiaansen et al., 1984; Sogreah, 1982; AHT International, 
1997). Losses caused by seepage in canals and deep percolation are almost negligible in the 
region because of the low permeability of the soil and the fact that the water table almost 
reaches the soil surface during the rainy season (Hendrickx et al., 1986). The 25 % increase 
can thus be considered as conservative. The water requirement per hectare for a certain period 
at the intake of the tertiary canal is computed as: 
 (ETrice + PREP + LAYER - Peff)  1.25 [m³/ha] 
Daily meteorological data are obtained from the Direction National de la Météorologie 
regional offices in Niono and Ségou. Finally, the transplanted and harvested surfaces as well 
as the surface of nurseries were monitored for each of the tertiary blocks throughout the 
growing season. 
 
Water delivery (QD) 
Flow rates at the intake of the tertiary canals are not routinely recorded. In the scope of the 
1995 and 2004 studies, the instant flow rates at the intake of the canals from the samples were 
measured daily during the growing season and considered constant for that day. This is 
justified because with irrigation continuing 24 hours out of 24, the opening of intakes usually 
remains unchanged throughout the day (Office du Niger, 1990). Furthermore, fluctuations in 
water levels of the secondary canal have little impact on the intake flow rate in Retail type 
intakes, which use baffle modules. Errors could be more important in the case of the semi-
modular sliding gates of the Arpon type intakes and are estimated at five to ten percent of 
delivered daily volumes. Nevertheless, fluctuation of the upstream water level being non-
systematic, errors are assumed to level each other out. Flow rates were recorded from the 
beginning of June until the end of October, covering the bulk of the main rice-growing 
season. 
 
3.3 Results and discussion 
3.3.1 Irrigation performance 
Adequacy and Efficiency 
Results show that the total water requirement from June to October varies little among the 
tertiary blocks and between the years and are around 9000 m³/ha (Table 3.2). The variations 
in ETrice + PREP + LAYER and effective rainfall are due to differences in the evolution of the 
planted surface of the tertiary blocks. When comparing (Figure 3.1) the irrigation requirement 
(QR) with the volumes delivered (QD), it is obvious that deliveries exceed requirements on a 
seasonal basis in every block, except for two (one in each sample). At a monthly basis as well, 
requirements of the sampled tertiary blocks are generally covered by deliveries, translating 
into an adequacy indicator of 0.95 for the 1995 sample and 0.91 for the 2004 sample (Table 
3.3 and Figure 3.2), which is judged ‘good’ by the standards put forward by Molden and 
Gates (1990). In general, water management in the Office du Niger thus succeeds in 
establishing good conditions for rice production. In contrast, the efficiency reaches only 0.52 
and 0.59 for the 1995 and 2004 samples respectively, judged ‘poor’ by Molden and Gates 
(1990). Losses are due to excess water delivery in the tertiary canals compared to demand and 
excess application to the fields. As a result, irrigation water flows directly to the drainage 
system through (i) the overflows in the tertiary canal, (ii) the outlet towards the drainage 
system of the field canals and (iii) breaches in the dikes contouring the rice basins. 
Consequently, the excellent adequacy is achieved by massive over-supply.  
In the light of the interventions described, a striking result of the 1995 and 2004 data is 
that they were successful in providing adequacy of water delivery while having insufficient 
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impact on efficiency. In reality, the chief accomplishments were the restoration of the 
irrigation network and land leveling. Most of the water delivered to the canals at the head of 
the system now reaches the tertiary blocks and thanks to land leveling, areas difficult to 
irrigate have become rare. Moreover, the failures of the irrigation schedule are eliminated, 
since all secondary canals are now permanently filled. In contrast, the interventions hardly 
make a difference as to water management. First, water control is still incomplete. Guidelines 
and procedures for operation, such as the surface controlled per water guard and presence of 
the latter in the field are not followed in practice. Water guards furthermore lack the proper 
training for their job. As a result, operation of the irrigation network is inadequate. Moreover, 
with measurements of flow rates in primary and secondary canals being irregular, and with no 
measurements at the intakes of tertiary canals, knowledge on supplied volumes is still 
incomplete. 
 
Table 3.2 Average water requirement and delivery (m³/ha) from June to October 
Water requirement and 1995 2004 
delivery  Retail Arpon Total 
ETrice(1) + PREP(2) + LAYER(3) 9730 10 257 10 074 10 138 
Peff(4) 2914 2723 2937 2862 
QR(5) 8520 9417 8922 9096 
QD(6) 17 601 21 983 14 253 16 966 
(1) Evapotranspiration from the rice basins 
(2) Water used for land preparation 
(3) Water added to establish a water layer in the field 
(4) Rainfall that is effectively stored in the rice basins 
(5) Volume of water required 
(6) Volume of water delivered 
 
Table 3.3 Summary of performance indicators 
Performance indicator 1995 2004 Results from one-way ANOVA 
tests for differences between 
  Retail Arpon Total Years Types 
Adequacy (Eq. 1) 0.95 0.95 0.89 0.91 F1,18 = 0.000 
p = 0.996 
F1,11 = 2.094 
p = 0.176 
Efficiency (Eq. 2) 0.52 0.47 0.65 0.59 F1,18 = 0.251 
p = 0.622 
F1,11 = 6.949 
p = 0.023 
Dependability (Eq. 3) 0.78 0.67 0.72 0.71   
Dependability1 (Eq. 5) 0.08 0.12 0.21 0.18 F1,18 = 0.332 
p = 0.571 
F1,11 = 1.414 
p = 0.259 
Equity (Eq. 4) 0.63 0.47 0.59 0.54   
Equity1 (Eq. 6) 0.11 0.10 0.16 0.14   
1 using an alternative calculation procedure introducing a maximum threshold of one for the ratio of QD 
over QR when water delivery is fully adequate 
 
Second, the demand driven system gives rise to the same supply strategies as before. 
Procedures on communication about future water demands between farmers and their canal 
chief, and then between canal chiefs and water guards are not followed. Conseuqently, water 
guards keep canals constantly at maximum capacity in order to be able to fulfill on the spot 
demands. To this adds the fact that tertiary canals are often over-dimensioned, both for 
practical construction reasons and in order to allow for flexibility in the water supply. 
Whereas the peak requirement of the paddy fields is calculated at 1.5 l/s/ha (Bastiaansen et 
al., 1984), design flow rates of tertiary canals are rather around 2 to 2.5 l/s/ha. This ample 
water availability might ensure a good adequacy of water supply, but also gives rise to losses 
in the tertiary canals. Indeed, excess supply over demand and favors excess application since 
farmers have no economic incentives to use water more efficiently. The water fees they pay 
are based on the cultivated surface and independent of volumes consumed. Third, with 
farmers being responsible for water management within the tertiary block, water distribution 
functions mostly in absence of coordination (Chapter 4). This system can be sustained thanks 
to the abundant supply, once again leading to conveyance losses and excess application. 
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Figure 3.1 Total water requirement and delivery for the sampled tertiary blocks from June to October in 
1995 and 2004 
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Figure 3.2 Adequacy and efficiency of water delivery in 1995 and 2004 
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Dependability and equity 
The total water delivery with respect to requirement varies considerably among tertiary blocks 
(Figure 3.1) and within the blocks over the months. This results in indicators of 0.78 and 0.71 
for dependability and 0.63 and 0.54 for equity for the 1995 and 2004 samples respectively. 
Such results are far beyond the thresholds accounting for ‘poor’ (0.25 for dependability and 
0.2 for equity). Nevertheless, since adequacy is excellent for almost all tertiary blocks 
throughout the growing season (Figure 3.2), the indicators do not imply that water supply is 
unreliable or unfair but rather present a measure of the temporal and spatial variability in 
over-supply. As such, the results suggest that characteristics and events proper to the tertiary 
blocks might explain the over-supply. Further research might shed light on the causes of these 
differences and help to improve performance.  
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Figure 3.3 Dependability of water delivery (Eq. 3 versus Eq. 5) in 1995 and 2004 
 
When using the alternative calculation procedure, dependability is however 0.08 for the 
1995 sample and 0.18 for the 2004 sample. Equity then amounts to 0.11 and 0.14 respectively 
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(Table 3.3 and Figure 3.3). Performance is thus judged ‘fair’ (indicators between 0.11 and 
0.20) or even ‘good’ (indicators lower than 0.10) according to Molden and Gates’ criteria 
(1990), which corresponds better to the reality of the study area. These results confirm that 
currently, water management is satisfactory for most of the tertiary blocks and most of the 
time. The adapted indicators will be used for further analysis in the remainder of this chapter. 
 
3.3.2 Evolution of performance between 1995 and 2004 
The 1995 and 2004 growing season are compared for the Retail type of infrastructure only. 
Results show a status quo as to irrigation performance. Indeed, differences in adequacy, 
efficiency and dependability between the 1995 and 2004 sample are not significant (one-way 
ANOVA: F1,25 = 1.142, p = 0.295, F1,25 = 1.722, p = 0.201 and F1,25 = 2.829, p = 0.105 
respectively), and values for equity are quite close (Table 3.3). Since the reforms were just 
completed in 1995, it is reasonable to assume that performance would improve as farmers and 
water guards come to understand better their new roles and responsibilities over the years. 
Instead, it seems that they have hardly changed their habits. With adequacy, dependability and 
equity of water delivery being satisfactory, and with no incentives to rationalize individual 
water consumption, they have no reason to take the trouble to improve efficiency as well. 
Many farmers nevertheless complain about drainage problems (Keita, 2003). Most areas in 
the irrigation project have no natural drainage outlet, and drainage water is conveyed to 
depressions in the desert (Hendrickx et al., 1986). These depressions fill up with the excess of 
water delivered to the area, so that drainage of the rice basins at harvest becomes virtually 
impossible (Van der Walle, 1982). As a result, production costs increase and rice quality 
reduces. No direct link exists though between the efficiency of water delivery and drainage 
problems at the level of an individual plot or even a tertiary block. Since the drainage network 
has no regulating structures, the different drainage canals function as communicating vessels. 
Consequently, the lowest plots are the ones to suffer most from a saturated drainage system, 
regardless of their own efficiency or that of their tertiary block. In contrast, it can be expected 
that adequacy would deteriorate as the irrigation network degrades gradually. This has not yet 
happened, even though the rehabilitation was carried out 10 to 25 years ago on the majority of 
the tertiary blocks. Maintenance, even if often judged quite poor, has thus been satisfactory as 
to ensure a good adequacy of water delivery, mainly thanks to the over-dimensioning of 
tertiary canals. 
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3.3.3 Irrigation performance for different types of infrastructure 
The 2004 sample shows no significant differences for adequacy and dependability of water 
delivery between the two types of infrastructure (one-way ANOVA: F1,11 = 2.094, p = 0.176 
and F1,11 = 1.414, p = 0.259 respectively). The adequacy of the Arpon type tertiary blocks is 
0.89 (‘fair’), which falls just below the threshold of 0.90 (accounted as ‘good’) proposed by 
Molden and Gates (1990), whereas the adequacy of the Retail type tertiary blocks reaches 
0.95 (‘good’). Similarly (Table 3.3), dependability for the Arpon type is 0.21 (‘poor’), which 
lies just beyond the 0.11-0.20 range (accounted as ‘fair’), whereas the Retail value is 0.12 
(‘fair’). Values for equity are quite close for the two types of infrastructure (0.16 for Arpon 
and 0.10 for Retail). On the other hand, efficiency is significantly higher for Arpon (0.65) 
than for Retail (0.47) (one-way ANOVA: F1,11 = 6.949, p = 0.023). Yet, the baffle modules 
(Retail type) offer greater control over the inflow than the semi-modular sliding gates used in 
the Arpon type and should allow a better efficiency. The minimal management strategy from 
both farmers and water guards however annihilates possible advantages of one over the other. 
Furthermore, the smaller design flow rate of most Arpon type tertiary blocks might reduce 
water losses and excess application. The results for adequacy and dependability suggest that 
the higher efficiency for the Arpon type is rather achieved through an inadequate supply to the 
tertiary blocks of this type in the sample during one or more months. With the intake being 
farmer-operated, the cause must either lie in a limited water availability at secondary level, or 
the use of water from drainage canals, as is observed in some lower lying tertiary blocks from 
the sample. In general terms, it can be stated that under current management conditions, the 
type of infrastructure has no impact on performance. Box 3 discusses the merits of the 
rehabilitation more generally. 
 
3.3.4 Improving irrigation performance 
In view of the expansion of the irrigation scheme, national and international competition for 
water and the recurring drainage problems, increasing irrigation efficiency will be necessary 
(Chapter 2). By comparing the irrigation efficiency at different levels in the irrigation project, 
Vandersypen et al. (2005) have shown that the tertiary level accounts for 26 % of total water 
losses. As in the calculation of water requirements, inevitable losses are already included, 
they correspond exclusively to management losses and could be reduced to zero. With the 
conveyance efficiency of the head works, primary and secondary canals remaining equal, an 
expansion of the irrigated surface with 20,000 hectares would be possible without an increase 
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in total water consumption. This estimate can even be considered conservative, because the 
new irrigated areas will use the existing head works, whose losses are quite independent of 
volumes transported. 
 
Box 3 Does rehabilitation make sense? 
There has been a long-standing debate on the merits of the Dutch versus the French approach to 
rehabilitation (see Table 2.1). The Dutch used the cheaper Arpon-type of infrastructure, and 
emphasized farmer participation and learning. The French used the more expensive Retail-type and 
focused on intensification of rice production. To achieve this, fields were laser-leveled. Whereas the 
French approach resulted in a sudden jump in production, the difference in yield per hectare between 
the two approaches disappeared over the years (IOV, 1992). Indeed, farmers in areas rehabilitated by 
the Dutch gradually copied techniques introduced by the French and leveled their fields. Even the 
merits of rehabilitation as such can be questioned, since yields in not rehabilitated areas are also 
catching up. According to data of the central management, average yields in 2005 were 6.4 t/ha for 
rehabilitated areas and 5.8 t/ha for not-rehabilitated areas. As water control is incomplete in these 
areas, farmers have to irrigate more carefully. Nevertheless, they are not necessarily demanding 
rehabilitation. Anecdotic evidence suggests that the central management even uses rehabilitation as a 
threat to make farmers maintain tertiary infrastructure. While yields are nearly as high, the water fee in 
not-rehabilitated areas is only 85 % of the full price. Yet, the debate can even be carried further. On 
the edge of the irrigation scheme, farmers have constructed illegal outlets on irrigation and drainage 
canals to irrigate plots, the so-called “hors-casiers”. According to the same 2000 census, yields in 
those areas average 3.9 t/ha. This demonstrates that farmers are willing and able to upgrade or 
develop irrigation hardware when they are convinced of the benefits. This makes it a perfect argument 
to promote the participatory construction of infrastructure. Although this is the new approach in the 
Office du Niger, experiences so far are intriguingly rather disappointing (see Box 11). 
 
For improving efficiency at the tertiary level while maintaining the good adequacy, 
dependability and equity of water delivery, investment in water management is required. First, 
more and better-trained water guards will be needed to establish full water control in the 
irrigation network. Second, farmers, tertiary canal chiefs and water guards ought to be incited 
to implement existing or improved procedures for matching water supply with demand, so 
that no water is delivered without being used by the farmers. Third, farmers must be 
motivated not to demand or use more water than required by their crops. The difficulty here is 
that at individual level, there will be no advantage of the increased effort of negotiating water 
supply and monitoring irrigation. Providing incentives based on actual water deliveries comes 
however at a cost. It requires measurement structures and regular monitoring by water guards. 
Moreover, measuring delivery to individual plots is virtually impossible with field intakes 
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being shared among several farmers. Incentives that play at the collective level of a tertiary 
block put more pressure on farmer groups to distribute water equitable between their plots. 
Until now, farmers have shown little inclination towards organizing and coordinating water 
distribution, and the big risk is therefore that higher efficiency at the tertiary level will imply 
irrigation problems of certain plots within the tertiary block. Consequently, such incentives 
cannot go without serious investments in the functioning of these farmers groups. 
Unfortunately, recent efforts to organize farmers around maintenance of the tertiary 
infrastructure have bore meager results up until today. 
So, any serious attempt in improving the efficiency at the tertiary level while maintaining 
the good levels for the other performance indicators is likely to increase the cost of rice 
production at the Office du Niger. The increased rice production as a result of the expansion 
of the cultivated area and the reduction of drainage problems at harvest might however justify 
the extra cost of improving efficiency at the tertiary level, while sustaining the good 
adequacy, dependability and equity.  
 
3.4 Conclusions 
International donors have invested in the Office du Niger from the 1980s onward with the 
purpose of making it profitable and boosting its rice production. Until then, the inadequacies 
of water management led to water shortages for certain areas as well as vast losses. The 
donors imposed a series of interventions that included a physical rehabilitation of the 
irrigation network and management reforms, making water supply demand-driven and 
establishing farmers’ participation in management decisions. The evaluation of the impact of 
the interventions on water delivery performance revealed that adequacy of water delivery is 
good, but efficiency remains poor. The dependability and equity as calculated with the 
alternative procedure are satisfactory.  
The physical rehabilitation of the irrigation network and the fact that water is made 
permanently available in the whole network made the irrigation delivery service excellent. On 
the other hand, the system is managed with minimal effort from both farmers and water 
guards. There is no evolution in performance between 1995, when interventions were just 
completed, and 2004, showing that incentives to improve water management are absent. 
Furthermore, the minimal management strategies cancel out possible advantages of different 
types of infrastructure as to irrigation performance.  
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A systematic over-supply is possible because water is no limiting factor during the main 
rice-growing season. Large conveyance losses and excess application within the tertiary block 
are a matter of course. As a result, the drainage system is almost perpetually saturated, 
making drainage of fields at harvest difficult. Drainage problems of an individual field 
however rather result from its location in the system than its level of water consumption, thus 
creating no incentive to use water more rationally. Consequently, it can be expected that 
despite persistent drainage problems caused by over-supply of water, improving irrigation 
efficiency remains difficult as long as water is abundant. Current levels of water consumption 
are however unsustainable given the rapid expansion of the irrigated area of the Office du 
Niger. Improving efficiency while maintaining good levels for adequacy, dependability and 
equity will require costly investments in water management. An effective water control 
demands more and better-trained water guards, who communicate regularly with farmers and 
canal chiefs in order to coordinate water delivery with demand. Most importantly however, 
farmers must be motivated not to demand more water than necessary. Providing incentives for 
water saving inevitably demands a tighter control of consumptions and should be 
accompanied by a reinforcement of farmers groups so that water within the tertiary block is 
distributed in a fair and efficient way. 
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Chapter 4  
Sustainability of farmers’ organization of water 
management  
Abstract1 
In the Office du Niger irrigation scheme, water allocation and maintenance at the tertiary 
canal level were left to farmers. In this chapter, their ability to resolve collective action 
problems through devising, monitoring and enforcing rules is diagnosed through a 
questionnaire survey with 89 farmers on 59 tertiary canals from five villages. Results show 
that rules are devised only on 30 % and 24 % of the canals for water allocation and 
maintenance respectively. Moreover, there is often no consensus on rules among farmers, and 
monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms are absent. This results in individualistic behavior 
causing problems concerning water allocation and maintenance for respectively 20 % and 
43 % of the interviewed farmers. Ineffectiveness of peer pressure and farmers’ incomplete 
mentality shift towards assuming collective responsibility are impediments to successful 
organization of water management. With water supply being abundant and the infrastructure 
recently rehabilitated, organization of water management at the tertiary level is however not 
always required in order to avoid problems. On the other hand, the current state of affairs is 
not considered sustainable, as the irrigated area will strongly expand and irrigation 
infrastructure ages with time. Measures of sensitization and group empowerment 
accompanying the process of management transfer will therefore be desirable. 
 
                                                 
1 This chapter is adapted from: Vandersypen, K., Keïta, A. C. T., Kaloga, K., Coulibaly, Y., Raes, D., and Jamin, 
J.-Y. (2006). Sustainability of farmers’ organization of water management in the Office du Niger irrigation 
scheme in Mali. Irrigation and Drainage, 55, 51-60. 
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4.1 Introduction 
IMT makes farmers collectively responsible for water management in (part of) the irrigation 
scheme. In order to overcome the collective action problems typical of collective irrigation 
schemes, such as overuse of water and underinvestment in maintenance, they need to devise 
certain rules that promote the collective interest. However, farmers are not necessarily in a 
good position to assume these responsibilities, and the socio-cultural and historical setting do 
not always facilitate a smooth transition. First, it requires a radical mentality shift from 
farmers who until then were in a purely dependent position in relation to the central 
government (Shah et al., 2002). Second, it demands social capital, which consists of trust, 
common rules, norms and sanctions and feelings of connectedness (Pretty, 2003). The 
historical legacy and socioeconomic and institutional setting of the Office du Niger present 
several constraints that might complicate successful farmers’ water management. A first 
constraint is that until the reforms, they had no experience whatsoever with water 
management. Nearly all decisions on production and marketing of the crop were taken at the 
level of the central management, reducing farmers to mere laborers (van Beusekom, 2000). 
This has created a state of dependency, depressing entrepreneurial spirit and implying that all 
knowledge and institutions for water management have to be created from scratch (Shah et 
al., 2002). A second constraint comprises the heterogeneity of the population of the Office du 
Niger as to socio-cultural background, endowments and interest. It is often assumed that 
differences in socio-cultural background reduce the social capital of a group, and as such 
reduce the potential for cooperation (Pretty and Ward, 2001). Keita (2003) points out that in 
the Office du Niger, differences in endowments and interests cause farmers’ priorities and 
capacities to diverge and as such complicate cooperation. The third constraint concerns the 
absence of formal organizations of water management at the tertiary level, which might imply 
an extra barrier to cooperation (Ostrom, 1992; Meinzen-Dick et al., 2002). WUAs are set up 
at the village level but are not fit to deal with the cooperation of farmers on the separate 
tertiary canals. Recent efforts to fill this void by creating tertiary level WUAs bore meager 
results up until today (Chapter 7).  
The objective of this chapter is therefore to diagnose farmers’ organization of water 
management at the tertiary level, focusing on two principal activities of water management: 
water allocation and maintenance. For both activities, the rules in use and their ability to 
resolve possible collective action problems are assessed. Subsequently, the impact of the type 
of infrastructure on the rules is examined. Next, the chapter looks at the possible impediments 
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to successful farmers’ organization of water management. Finally, some conclusions and 
perspectives are formulated. 
 
4.2 Reform of water supply and canal maintenance 
As explained in Chapter 3, since the reforms, all secondary irrigation canals are continuously 
filled and water supply is demand-driven. Taking turns in irrigation is only necessary between 
field canals of the same tertiary block. Indeed, the rehabilitated irrigation infrastructure is 
designed such that not all field canals on a tertiary canal can be served simultaneously with an 
adequate flow rate. In the irrigation manuals supplied along with the rehabilitation, engineers 
prescribe that water allocation should follow a fixed rotation scheme between individual field 
canals on a weekly basis. It is however left to farmers to implement this rule in practice or to 
organize water allocation in some other way. 
As to maintenance, farmers used to pay every year a guarantee for the tertiary 
infrastructure, which would be reimbursed when they carried out the maintenance of their 
canal. Otherwise, the central management would use the money to pay a third party for 
carrying out the maintenance. In practice however, for decades neither did farmers the 
maintenance work themselves, or did the management employ others to do it instead. This 
resulted in advanced degradation of canals, as they filled up with aquatic weeds and debris 
and their banks crumbled. Upon restructuring, this system was abandoned and now, farmers 
are simply required to carry out maintenance themselves. Organization and monitoring of this 
task are also left to farmers. The unlined irrigation canals of the Office du Niger are 
vulnerable to weed growth and deterioration of the canal bed. Regular maintenance consists 
of removing aquatic plants from the canal and keeping the banks clear. It should be performed 
once or twice per growing season. Maintenance that is more thorough requires a dredging of 
the canals and is necessary every two or three years. This chapter focuses on the organization 
of regular maintenance. 
 
4.3 Materials and methods 
Sample 
This study is a part of a broader research on strategies of water management at both the plot 
level and the level of the tertiary canal. The research took place in three of the administrative 
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zones (Niono, N’Debougou and Molodo), which contains the research population. For reasons 
of convenience, a two-stage sampling method was used. First, five villages were selected and 
then in each village, about 20 farmers were picked out at random. For the purpose of this 
study, farmers being alone on a tertiary canal were left out of the sample, which now contains 
89 farmers from 59 tertiary canals. The villages are quite similar as to total number of 
families, number of tertiary canals and average plot size of the farmers. Table 4.1 shows 
summary statistics about the villages. The sample villages were chosen such that four 
different methods of rehabilitation are represented, plus an area that has not yet been 
rehabilitated, and can be considered representative. The Retail-type as described in Table 2.1 
contains three sub-types with each some specific characteristics shown in Table 4.2.  
 
Table 4.1 Summary statistics of the study villages and samplea 
Particulars Name of village 
 Coloni Foabougou Banisiraela Siengo Siby 
Type of infrastructure Retail Arpon KfW World Bank Not-
rehab. 
Administrative zone Niono Niono N’Debougou N’Debougou Molodo
Total number of secondary canals 1 2 1 1 3 
Total number of tertiary canals 33 34 29 31 42 
Total number of tertiary canals in the 
sample 
12 15 11 12 9 
Total number of farmers in the village 263 194 145 162 126 
Total number of farmers in the sample 20 20 19 19 11 
Average plot size in the village (ha) 2.1 3.1 3.4 2.4 2.9 
Average number of farmers per tertiary 
canal in the sample 
9 10 10 11 4 
Average proportion of non-resident 
farmers per tertiary canal in the sample 
18% 30% 12% 19% 5% 
a Source: survey data, land register of the Office du Niger irrigation scheme 
 
Data collection and analysis 
The bulk of the data for this study are drawn from a questionnaire survey on strategies of 
water management at the tertiary level. The questionnaire contained a structured list of open 
questions in which farmers were asked to describe and evaluate the organization of water 
allocation and maintenance of the tertiary canal. The interviews further assessed difficulties 
related to water allocation experienced by other farmers of the tertiary canal, so that a 
diagnosis at the level of the tertiary canal could be made. When farmers answered that they 
experienced collective action problems with water allocation or maintenance, a follow-up 
question asked what they could do in order to alleviate those problems or prevent them from 
occurring. Another question, asked to all farmers, assessed which solutions they thought 
would work in order to improve farmers’ water management in general. For detailed 
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information on the questionnaire survey, see Keita (2003). Content analysis was used to 
analyze the questionnaire and categorize answers (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Additional 
information was gathered through field observations and informal discussions with farmers, 
water guards and functionaries of the central management. Data on group characteristics at 
the level of the tertiary canals were obtained from the land register of the Office du Niger and 
water guards. The survey was conducted from June to October 2003.  
 
Table 4.2 Overview of differences in design and operation of the various types of infrastructure 
Type of infrastructure Properties 
Original Retail Tertiary intakes over-dimensioned with respect to peak water demand 
KfW A multiple of 7 field canals per tertiary canal in order to facilitate water 
allocation following a weekly rotation 
World Bank No specific features 
 
Data analysis was performed at two levels. Rules-in-use were analyzed at the level of the 
tertiary canal (n = 59). When more than one farmer of a particular tertiary canal was 
interviewed, information was pooled and uniformized. The experience of problems was 
analyzed at the individual level (n = 89). Descriptive statistics are generated for the sample, 
and extrapolated to the research population based on respectively the total number of tertiary 
canals and farmers per type of infrastructure within the three zones under study. Relations 
between the application of rules and the experience of problems were assessed with Pierson 
chi-square tests. The same test was used to appraise differences between types of 
infrastructure regarding occurrence of rules and experience of problems.  
 
4.4 Results and discussion 
Rules on water allocation 
Results show that on only 30 % of the tertiary canals from the sample, clearly defined water 
allocation rules are devised (29 % of the research population). Farmers mentioned a variety of 
rules in the interviews, such as a rotation between upstream and downstream groups of field 
canals and preferential access to water for plots that are difficult to irrigate. A fixed rotation 
scheme between individual field canals on a weekly basis is rarely applied. The application of 
rules is often flexible and frequently discontinued in periods of low water demand. On the 
other 70 % of the canals, farmers did not establish rules on water allocation, so that everyone 
can irrigate at any moment. Informal consultation between farmers however sometimes takes 
place in order to limit the number of farmers irrigating simultaneously or to prevent conflicts.  
 71
Next, 20 % of the interviewed farmers reported to have personally experienced regular 
problems due to fellow farmers’ behavior (17 % of the research population). These problems 
fall into three categories. The first category consists of fellow farmers impeding the water 
flow during irrigation, such as the closing of the gates of field canals or the tertiary canal. 
Farmers would then be obliged to continue irrigation later on or to guard their plots 
continuously while irrigating in order to prevent those actions. The second category comprises 
the violation of rules by fellow farmers, causing one’s irrigation program to be disturbed. A 
final category applies to farmers with plots that are difficult to irrigate and for which some 
coordination between farmers is necessary but impossible to achieve.  
Further tests show that no association exists between the application of rules and the 
experience of problems (Table 4.3). Indeed, rules are often not devised even when problems 
do occur, and moreover establishing rules is no guarantee for solving problems. A diagnosis 
at the level of the tertiary canal further clarifies these results (Table 4.4). Clearly defined rules 
on water allocation are useful as they enhance the predictability of the water supply as to 
quantity and timing (Ostrom et al., 1993). However, when water supply is plentiful with 
respect to demand and access is easy for all plots, the probability that irrigation activities of 
different farmers will hinder one another is small. Flooded rice has the additional advantage 
that water can be stored in the basins, so that the timing of irrigation matters less. From the 
interviews, it appeared that on 83 % of canals without rules, none of the farmers experiences 
any problems. In that case, there is indeed no need to establish rules. Possible problems are 
easily resolved through informal consultation. However, on 17 %, establishing rules would 
have been useful at least for some farmers, but did not succeed. On the other hand, the 
establishment of clearly defined rules is no guarantee for avoiding difficulties. Of the canals 
with rules, only about half are successful in avoiding collective action problems. In the other 
cases, existing rules cannot avoid those, most often due to violation by some farmers. Indeed, 
formal monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms lack completely on all canals and there is no 
person or structure with the authority to establish them.  
 
Table 4.3 Association of the experience of problems with the application of clearly defined rules 
related to water allocation at the level of individual farmers 
Experience of problems Total Application of clearly defined rules 
Yes No  
Yes 26 % (8) 74 % (23) 100 % (31) 
No 16 % (9) 84 % (49) 100 % (58) 
Total 17 72 89 
Pierson chi-square value = 1.384; df = 1 
Significance = 0.239 
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Table 4.4 Association of the experience of problems with the application of clearly defined rules 
related to water allocation at the level of the tertiary block 
Experience of problems Total Application of clearly defined rules 
Yes No  
Yes 44 % (8) 56 % (10) 100 % (18) 
No 17 % (7) 83 % (34) 100 % (41) 
Total 15 44 59 
 
Rules on maintenance 
Rules on maintenance concern timing and effort required from each farmer. Most frequently, 
individual farmers clean a section of the canal bordering their plot. The size of this section is 
then defined based either on equal effort of all farmers, or in proportion to the size of the plot 
on the canal. In rare cases, farmers maintain the whole irrigation canal collectively. The 
timing of maintenance can be one particular day or a period of days defined according to the 
cropping season. It is important that maintenance is done in the same period on the whole 
canal. Indeed, the parts of the canal not yet maintained are a bottleneck for the downstream 
parts, and serve as a source for aquatic plants to reinvade the whole canal. Both rules are thus 
complementary. On 24 % of the tertiary canals from the sample, rules are devised on both 
aspects (27 % of the research population). On another 61 %, only rules on the effort required 
by each farmer are devised (59 % of the research population). It appeared however from the 
interviews that when comparing answers of farmers from the same tertiary canal, there is 
often no consensus on the concrete arrangements prescribed by the rules. When no rules are 
applied, decisions on whether and when to carry out maintenance are left to individual 
farmers.  
Next, 43 % of farmers from the sample (equally 43 % of the research population) are 
dissatisfied about maintenance because the time spread of maintenance by different farmers is 
too big, or because of shirking by fellow farmers. Hence, even though rules are more frequent 
for maintenance than for water allocation, more farmers are dissatisfied on the topic. Since 
fellow farmers frequently shirk their maintenance duties, they have to either carry out the part 
of those farmers in addition to their own, or suffer the consequences of insufficient 
maintenance. In the latter case, they moreover see the result of their own efforts dissolved 
since neighboring canal parts are not maintained. Many farmers said to be discouraged by this 
and therefore stopped maintaining their own part. Especially non-resident farmers are accused 
of systematically shirking their maintenance duties and as such discouraging others. It must 
be noted however that farmers have often a different perception of the importance of regular 
maintenance, especially since it has little impact on flow rates in the short term when 
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infrastructure is recently rehabilitated. For that reason, some farmers are dissatisfied, even 
though the maintenance level is sufficient in the view of others and vice versa.  
 
Table 4.5 Association of the experience of problems with the application of clearly defined rules 
related to maintenance 
Farmers’ dissatisfaction Total Application of clearly defined rules  
Yes No  
On both timing and effort required 16 % (4) 84 % (21) 100 % (25) 
On effort required only 53 % (28) 47 % (25) 100 % (53) 
No rules 55 % (6) 46 % (5) 100 % (11) 
Total 38 51 89 
Pierson chi-square = 10.138; df = 2 
Significance = 0.006 
 
Farmers’ dissatisfaction is significantly related to the application of rules on maintenance 
(Table 4.5). More specifically, when rules on both timing of maintenance and effort required 
by each farmer are applied, fewer problems are cited. On the other hand, problems are about 
as frequent on canals with only rules on effort required are in use and canals with no rules at 
all. Again, further analysis of the interviews explains the results. As with water allocation, 
virtually no formal monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms are in place to enforce the rules 
in use. Instead, rules on the timing of maintenance have been abandoned when they were too 
often broken. This means that the rules remain in place in just those cases when maintenance 
is duly carried out by all farmers and everyone is satisfied. Creating rules on both timing and 
effort required will thus not guarantee more farmers satisfaction. On the other hand, rules on 
the effort required from each farmer remain more often in place, despite frequent violation. 
As stated above, this does not automatically lead to dissatisfactions since not all farmers 
attach the same importance to regular maintenance. In a limited amount of cases, farmers are 
dissatisfied about maintenance, without being able to establish rules.  
 
The impact of the type of infrastructure on farmers’ rules 
The type of infrastructure is significantly related with the occurrence of clearly defined rules 
on water allocation (Table 4.6). In particular, on canals of the KfW type (village Banisiraela), 
rules are more frequently applied than elsewhere and usually imply some weekly rotation 
schedule. Engineers of the KfW type wanted to facilitate the organization of a rotation 
schedule on a weekly basis by designing canals such that each has a multiple of seven field 
canals. Their strategy has been successful in the sense that it favors the establishment of rules 
on water allocation. However, no such link exists with farmers’ experience of problems, 
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which is more equally divided over the types of infrastructure (Table 4.6). This means that a 
particular layout of the irrigation infrastructure can indeed promote organization of water 
allocation, but cannot guarantee the success of this organization for solving collective action 
problems. Another noteworthy observation is the average scores of the Arpon type for both 
the occurrence of rules and farmers’ experience of problems. Whereas the other sponsors 
undertook a costly rehabilitation using expensive materials and machinery in order to allow a 
superior water control, the philosophy of Arpon was to work with cheap and locally 
constructed materials and have farmers participate in the rehabilitation works. In addition, 
they used tertiary canal intakes which farmers manipulate themselves. As such, they wanted 
to favor farmers’ sense of ownership and increase their command over water supply. Despite 
differences in philosophy and cost of the rehabilitation, there is an impact on neither the 
occurrence of rules nor farmers’ experience of problems. 
 
Table 4.6 Application of clearly defined rules and experience of problems on water dsitribution by type 
of infrastructure 
Application of clearly defined rules Experience of problems Type of 
infrastructure Yes No Total Yes No Total 
Original Retail 0 100 % (12) 100 % (12) 15 % (3) 85 % (17) 100 % (20) 
Arpon 40 % (6) 60 % (9) 100 % (15) 20 % (2) 80 % (16) 100 % (20) 
KfW 73 % (8) 27 % (3) 100 % (11) 21 % (4) 79 % (15) 100 % (19) 
World Bank 33 % (4) 67 % (8) 100 % (12) 26 % (5) 74 % (14) 100 % (19) 
Not rehabilitated 0 100 % (9) 100 % (9) 9 % (1) 91 % (10) 100  % (11)
Total 18 41 59 17 72 89 
 Pierson chi-square = 19.150; df = 4 
Significance = 0.001 
Pierson chi-square = 1.628; df = 4 
Significance = 0.804 
 
Table 4.7 Application of clearly defined rules and farmers’ dissatisfaction on maintenance by type of 
infrastructure 
Application of clearly defined rules Farmers’ dissatisfaction Type of 
infrastructure Timing 
+ effort 
Effort None Total Yes No Total 
Original Retail 0 83% (10) 17% (2) 100% (12) 95% (19) 5% (1) 100% (20) 
Arpon 13% (2) 67% (10) 20% (3) 100% (15) 35% (7) 65% (13) 100% (20) 
KfW 27% (3) 67% (7) 9% (1) 100% (11) 16% (3) 84% (16) 100% (19) 
World Bank 33% (4) 50% (6) 17% (2) 100% (12) 21% (4) 79% (15) 100% (19) 
Not rehabilitated 56% (5) 33% (3) 11% (1) 100% (9) 45% (5) 55% (6) 100% (11) 
Total 14 36 9 59 38 51 89 
 Pierson chi-square = 10.97; df = 8  
Significance = 0.204 
Pierson chi-square = 32.141; df = 4 
Significance < 0.001 
 
Differences in the application of rules on maintenance among the types of infrastructure 
are not significant (Table 4.7). It appears though that in the not rehabilitated type, rules on 
both timing and effort required for maintenance are relatively more frequent, which is still a 
striking result. Contrary to water allocation, rehabilitation of whatever type could not favor 
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the organization of maintenance, not even the Arpon type, which nonetheless tried to enhance 
farmers’ sense of ownership. On the other hand, farmers’ dissatisfaction differs significantly 
over the types, with particularly high levels for the Original Retail type (Table 4.7). These can 
be explained for a large part by the particular policy of the water guard operating in the 
corresponding village from the sample. In order to force farmers to take on their maintenance 
duties, he locks the intake of all tertiary canals where he redeems the maintenance level 
unsatisfactory at the beginning of the main rice-growing season, so that shirking by fellow 
farmers is always problematic. This policy is however not official nor common. It is neither 
representative for the type of infrastructure.  
 
Impediments to successful organization of water management 
Thanks to an abundant water supply and oversized canals, problems related to water irrigation 
and infrastructure maintenance are rather rare. When they do occur, it appears that many 
farmers groups have been unable to devise, monitor and enforce rules to resolve them. Some 
possible impediments to successful organization of water management at the tertiary level are 
investigated by looking at the strategies adopted by farmers in order to alleviate collective 
action problems or prevent them from occurring. Subsequently, farmers’ ideas to improve 
water management in general are discussed.  
With respect to water allocation, some farmers have adopted individualistic strategies to 
reduce difficulties. They include advancing or postponing the sowing and planting date with 
respect to their neighbors in order to spread irrigation requirements, lowering the rice basins 
or reshaping the irrigation infrastructure so as to divert more water to their plots. These 
individualistic strategies do not only come to a personal cost but also inflict additional 
problems on fellow farmers. Furthermore, they offer no solution to every problem, and none 
exists with respect to maintenance. Very few farmers (less than 8 % of those citing problems) 
said they tackle fellow farmers about the problems they create, even though they admit they 
do not always succeed in convincing them to change their behavior. Moreover, by doing so, 
conflicts often arise. Most farmers however say they can do nothing to solve their problems, 
since they have no influence over their colleagues and want to avoid conflicts (see Box 4). 
This leads us to a first possible impediment to successful organization of water management 
in the area. Peer pressure, which can be a very powerful enforcement instrument (Aggarwal, 
2000), is often ineffective. Especially non-resident farmers are immune to it, as they share no 
other activities with the farmers of the tertiary canal. 
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As to the general improvement of water management, only 14 % of the farmers considered 
more coordination of individual decisions and actions desirable. Another solution often 
proposed is that the central management defines and enforces individual responsibilities, not 
themselves. This is a remarkable result, since one of the main goals of the management 
reforms in the Office du Niger irrigation scheme was exactly to transfer responsibilities 
towards farmer groups. A second impediment might thus be the incomplete mentality shift 
towards assuming collective responsibility. 
 
4.5 Conclusions and perspectives 
Twenty years after the first reforms, farmers’ water management is still immature. Indeed, 
clearly defined rules on water allocation and maintenance at the tertiary level are difficult to 
establish when necessary, and once established difficult to enforce. Despite attempts of 
engineers to enhance organization and motivate farmers for water management tasks through 
specific methods of rehabilitation, the resulting type of infrastructure has little impact on 
farmers’ ability to devise, monitor and enforce rules to resolve possible collective action 
problems. Since water supply is abundant and the infrastructure recently rehabilitated in a 
large part of the irrigation scheme, the absence of organization of water management at the 
tertiary level does not necessarily lead to problems. Survey results have shown that some 
farmers on some tertiary blocks do have complaints about water allocation or maintenance, 
which shows that organization does not always arise spontaneously when needed. The amount 
of problems will probably multiply as water becomes scarce and the infrastructure 
deteriorates over time. The current situation is therefore not redeemed sustainable in the long 
term. 
The historical and socioeconomic conditions of the irrigation scheme do not favor 
collective action. Indeed, two major impediments seem to be the ineffectiveness of peer 
pressure among farmers and their incomplete mentality shift towards assuming collective 
responsibility. In order to cope with problems ensuing from the lack of coordination, farmers 
rather adopt individualistic strategies that come at a personal cost and often exacerbate fellow 
farmers’ problems. Measures of sensitization and group empowerment accompanying the 
process of management transfer will therefore be desirable. In part III of this dissertation, 
tools to support this process are presented. 
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Box 4 Conflicts on water management 
Social peace is an important value among farmers in the Office du Niger irrigation scheme and for 
farmers, “good” water management implies avoiding conflicts (Bastiaens, 2005). Therefore, the 
occurrence of conflicts on water management at a tertiary block level seemed an appropriate 
performance indicator. Farmers however do not easily report their involvement in a conflict, as it is 
considered embarrassing. Despite considerable attention to question wording (for example, “conflict” 
was replaced by the softer “misunderstanding”), a closed question survey to allow quantification 
underestimated the number of conflicts (see Appendix 2). In several other series of interviews, the 
subject was however addressed in a qualitative way, so that insights were gained on how and when 
conflicts arise. The immediate cause is mainly competition over irrigation water. In particular, the 
presence of topographic differences within a tertiary block complicates water allocation, as farmers 
whose plot lies in a depression can easily divert all available irrigation water. A supply crisis is another 
typical moment for conflicts. Some farmers react individualistically and close their irrigating neighbors’ 
field canal on the sly to secure more water. Some are even said to “steal water at night”, i.e. irrigate 
with water from a neighbor’s field. On tertiary blocks where such practices are commonplace, farmers 
sometimes camp for days or weeks in a row next to their plot to get enough water. Occasionally, 
conflicts escalate in violence. Too much water can also lead to conflicts. Negligent farmers leave their 
field canals ajar for several days, or irrigate with the drainage outlet open. As such, they might flood 
neighboring fields and fill the tertiary drain, exacerbating drainage problems.  
In the eyes of farmers, the root cause of conflicts lies in attitude: incomprehension, impatience, lack of 
respect and individualism, which they connect to farmers’ increasing liberty of action. Next, the 
absence of rules and hierarchy for water management make rights and obligations unclear, leaving 
room for disagreement. Nevertheless, conflicts appear to be rather rare. Farmers avoid them and 
rather swallow their fellow farmers’ individualistic behavior than tackle them about it. Moreover, on 
most tertiary blocks reigns an understanding between farmers that allows them to solve their problems 
reasonably. Most conflicts do not linger for long anyway. As one farmer reported: “A couple of days 
later, when water arrives again [after a supply disruption], everyone will be ashamed.” 
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Chapter 5  
Performance, prejudice and collective action 
Abstract1 
Increasing irrigation efficiency has always been high on the agenda of policy makers. Despite 
some ‘social’ experiments, whereby important parts of management were carried over to the 
farmer level, results often remained disappointing. This chapter explores why this came about 
for the case of the Office du Niger irrigation scheme. Since Irrigation Management Transfer, 
farmers are responsible for the tertiary level, but collective action for water management 
remains underdeveloped. From the stakeholder analysis, it appears that the central 
management wants to increase irrigation efficiency through fully-fledged collective action, 
whereas farmers value the latter only when it favors easy irrigation. In this chapter, the 
relation between collective action and performance is tested through a field study on a sample 
of 36 tertiary blocks. Results indicate that only collective action at the intake of the tertiary 
canal, currently implemented on less than a third of the tertiary blocks, increases irrigation 
efficiency. Collective action for water allocation is implemented within almost three quarters 
of tertiary blocks and effectively reduces irrigation problems. However, if they lack the 
necessary social capital, not all farmers can establish collective action when needed. Based on 
this analysis, the chapter proposes a mix of incentives and measures to resolve the conflict 
between farmers and the central management to their mutual benefit.  
 
5.1 Introduction 
The implicit assumption of Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) in the Office du Niger 
irrigation scheme was that, given the responsibility, farmers would automatically invest in 
                                                 
1 This chapter is adapted from: Vandersypen, K., Verbist, B., Keita, A. C. T., Raes, D., and Jamin, J.-Y. 
(Submitted). Performance, prejudice and collective action. Water Resources Management. 
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“rational water management” and establish the necessary organization to resolve collective 
action problems. With IMT, collective action was introduced on some tertiary blocks and for 
some aspects of water management. When it exists, it is organized in a very informal way and 
depends largely on farmers’ awareness of the benefits of collective action and the capacity of 
one or more group members to establish a consensus on certain rules or activities (Chapter 4). 
However, in most cases, the ample water availability has led to a situation without 
coordination of water supply and demand or the cropping calendar and poor infrastructure 
maintenance (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4). To promote collective action, the central 
management developed several projects with international donors to sensibilize farmers and to 
mould them in Water User Associations, albeit with limited success until now (Chapter 7).  
From the stakeholder analysis, we know that the failure of such policies is strongly linked 
with the divergence in objectives and strategies of farmers and the central management. In 
this chapter, the relation between collective action and performance is evaluated in the real 
world through a field study. Therefore, performance indicators are constructed reflecting 
stakeholders’ objectives as defined in the stakeholder analysis (Chapter 2). Combining an 
understanding of stakeholders’ objectives and strategies on the one hand, and real world 
relations on the other hand, it proposes recommendations for solving the conflict between 
stakeholders to their mutual benefit. As such, this chapter makes a plea for research taking 
part in the process of irrigation management in particular, and natural resources management 
in general, as it can play a beneficiary role by providing negotiation support to the various 
stakeholders. 
 
5.2 Materials and methods 
For the field study, variables were selected based on the stakeholder analysis and measured on 
a sample of tertiary blocks (see Chapter 3). A purposive sampling method was applied 
whereby nine villages were selected in the rehabilitated area of the administrative zones 
Niono and N’Debougou containing the complete range of old and recently rehabilitated areas. 
Summary data on the selected villages and samples taken are presented in Table 5.1. In each 
of the villages, four tertiary blocks were picked randomly, so that the total number of sampled 
tertiary blocks is 36. Together, they contain 299 plots. Data collection for the calculation of 
the indicators was done for the growing season of 2004. Triangulation methods were used to 
validate and complete data through informal interviews with 40 plot-holders from the sub-
 80
sample and regular observations on the field. Informal interviews and observations took place 
throughout 2004 and 2005. Associations between the variables are tested using Spearman 
correlation coefficients and one-way ANOVA tests. Statistical analyses were performed with 
the SPSS computer package. The following sections describe the calculation procedures and 
data collection methods for each of the variables. These variables concern (1) performance 
indicators corresponding to stakeholders’ objectives and (2) indicators for collective action. 
 
Table 5.1 Summary data on the selected villages and sample (Number between brackets represent 
data for the sampled tertiary blocks) 
Village 
Secon-
dary 
canal 
Number of 
tertiary 
blocks 
Irrigated 
surface (ha) 
Number of 
plot holders 
Number of 
plot holders 
per tertiary 
block 
Average 
plot size 
(ha) 
Moussa Werè KL0 26 (4) 479 (105) 94 (45) 3.6 (11.3) 5.1 (2.3) 
Kouyan 
Peguena KO1 8 (4) 150 (74) 81 
(28) 
10.1 (7.0) 1.9 (2.6) 
Coloni N1 33 (4) 621 (62) 263 (45) 8.0 (11.3) 2.4 (1.4) 
Médina G5 26 (4) 509 (113) 188 (49) 7.2 (12.3) 2.7 (2.3) 
Siguivoucé S6 25 (4) 653 (62) 203 (23) 8.1 (5.8) 3.2 (2.7) 
Fassun S8 17 (4) 300 (75) 103 (28) 6.1 (7.0) 2.9 (2.7) 
Medina-Coura B3 34 (4) 759 (58) 208 (20) 6.1 (5.0) 3.6 (2.9) 
Tiemedeli-Coura B5 34 (4) 451 (65) 208 (34) 6.1 (8.5) 2.2 (1.9) 
Kanasakko BE3 20 (4) 239 (49) 222 (27) 11.1 (6.8) 1.1 (1.8) 
Total for sample villages 223 (36) 4161 (663) 1570 (299) 7.0 (8.3) 2.7 (2.2) 
Total for rehabilitated area 
of Niono and N'Debougou 1042 20 736 6184 5.9 3.4 
 
Performance indicators 
Irrigation efficiency 
Irrigation efficiency (Pf) compares the volume of water required to the water delivered during 
a certain period at the level of the tertiary block. It measured using the indicator proposed by 
Molden and Gates (1990). Calculation methods are explained in Chapter 3.  
 
Agricultural production 
Agricultural production in tons of rice harvested per hectare is measured at plot level, from 
which a weighted average per tertiary block is calculated. Since farmers know the number of 
bags of paddy harvested on their field - one bag containing on average 75 kilos - agricultural 
production was assessed trough a questionnaire survey (see Appendix 2) on the total 
cultivated surface and the total number of bags harvested. Agricultural production was 
evaluated for the total number of plots within the sample of tertiary blocks. In the process of 
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harvesting, some of the rice is lost during transportation and threshing. This method thus 
probably implies an underestimation of agricultural production compared to the method 
applied by the central management, which samples unharvested rice. However, it is 
considered precise enough in the scope of a comparative analysis.  
 
Ease of irrigation 
With no flow measurement structures available at plot level, conventional irrigation 
performance indicators based on flow data are not suitable for measuring the ease of 
irrigation. An obvious alternative is to assess directly the opinion of farmers (Svendsen and 
Small, 1990). From the survey with 43 farmers in the frame of the stakeholder analysis (see 
Appendix 3), it appeared that the ease of irrigation from farmers’ perspective encompasses 
two distinct aspects. The first is the occurrence of irrigation problems, and the second is the 
application of strategies to mitigate those problems. For each of these aspects, different 
features can be distinguished, consisting in the various causes of irrigation problems and the 
various strategies respectively.  
Farmers were surveyed using a closed-question survey with scaled responses (see 
Appendix 2). The variable is derived from an overall assessment of the ease of irrigation, the 
occurrence of irrigation problems and the application of strategies to mitigate them. An 
overall assessment of the ease of irrigation was obtained through the question ‘Has irrigation 
been easy?’ accompanied by a three-point Likert answer scale (from ‘always’ = 1 to ‘never’ = 
3) (Likert et al., 1993). Next, both quantity (how often and how long) and intensity (degree of 
disturbance) of the inconvenience for each of the features composing irrigation problems and 
strategies applied were rated on a three-point Likert scale (from ‘high’ = 2 to ‘low’ = 0). Ease 
of irrigation is then computed as: 
scoreimalmax
ensityintquantity
assessmentOverallirrigationofEase i
∑ ⋅
+=  
and ranges from 1 to 4 with lower scores corresponding to irrigation being easier. The 
indicator at tertiary block level is an arithmetic average of individual scores. 
Ease of irrigation was evaluated for a sub-sample of 150 plots within the sampled tertiary 
blocks. Plots were selected randomly and at least one third of plots per tertiary block was 
sampled. Two trained interviewers administered the survey and contacted the responsible 
farmer for each plot of the sub-sample for a one-to-one interview. A first version of the 
questionnaire was developed in French and translated in the local language, Bambara, using 
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the translation-back-translation method (Brislin et al., 1973). This version was adapted after a 
testing phase using the techniques described in Foddy (1993). Several formulations of key 
questions were included in the questionnaire so that answers could be crosschecked for 
inconsistency. In eleven cases, inconsistencies were detected and these results from the 
questionnaire were excluded from further analysis. 
 
Indicators for collective action 
Coordination of the cropping calendar 
Coordination of the cropping calendar is evaluated by the standard deviation of transplanting 
dates. Through fortnightly monitoring of the transplanted surface, the transplanting date of 
each basin is estimated. Standard deviations are weighed against the surface transplanted for 
each date. This coordination would spread (and thus lower) peak demands over time when 
transplanting the rice into the paddy fields, while avoiding long intervals in transplanting for 
neighboring fields, as they might lead to conflicts between irrigation and drainage activities. 
 
Maintenance of tertiary infrastructure 
The maintenance level of tertiary irrigation canals is evaluated through fortnightly 
observations throughout the growing season. Farmers generally clean the canal section 
adjacent to their field independently from each other, so maintenance levels can differ 
considerable in time and space. Therefore, every canal section in between two field canals, the 
maintenance level was scored on a scale from 1 (good) to 3 (bad). Scores were then averaged 
for the canal and for the growing season to obtain a single result.  
 
Water allocation within the tertiary block 
Since most of the time, water availability in the tertiary canal covers aggregate irrigation 
demand, free access to water is the common practice. In periods of peak aggregate water 
demand or water crisis at the secondary level, rules are sometimes devised to coordinate water 
allocation and avoid crowding. In a more general way, on tertiary blocks where allocation 
rules are successfully applied, farmers accept the principle that their access to water can be 
restricted in favor of the common interest, which facilitates coordination of water allocation 
also outside periods of peak demand. On some tertiary blocks where rules on water allocation 
are not (effectively) applied, informal consultation to resolve irrigation problems on the spot 
is however commonplace. Through this consultation, temporary agreements can be made 
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between two or more farmers of a tertiary block regarding water allocation. Collective action 
concerning water allocation is therefore assessed through a categorical variable containing 
three ordered categories. The first category corresponds to the application of strict rules on 
water distribution, taking into account compliance and the availability of sanctions to ensure 
their effectiveness. The second category corresponds informal consultation being 
commonplace, leaving tertiary blocks with neither rules nor consultation in the third category. 
The indicator is evaluated through group discussions and crosschecked with informal 
individual interviews and regular observations on the field. Separate group discussions with 
three to six participating farmers took place per tertiary block. Discussions were led by the 
researchers using a flexible interview guide (see Appendix 3) and assisted by an interpreter. 
 
Coordination of water supply and demand at tertiary block level 
Coordination of water supply and demand at tertiary block level consists in adjusting water 
supply to the tertiary block at all moments to aggregate demand. When such coordination 
takes place, usually an influential farmer has taken the responsibility to collect information on 
water demand of fellow farmers. Next, he opens and closes the tertiary intake according to 
aggregate demand. Alternatively, farmers inform a responsible person on their irrigation 
activities, so that the latter can estimate the appropriate opening of the tertiary intake. The 
collective action indicator is a categorical variable indicating whether yes or no, coordination 
takes place and is based on results from group discussions (see Appendix 3), crosschecked 
with informal individual interviews and regular observations in the field.  
 
5.3 Results and discussion 
5.3.1 Results from the field study 
Descriptive statistics for the indicators of collective action and performance 
Table 5.2 presents descriptive statistics of the indicators for collective action and 
performance. Average irrigation efficiency is 0.59, a value that is considered low according to 
the standards put forward by Molden and Gates (1990). Variability in irrigation efficiency is 
however large, ranging from 0.23 to 0.87 and with a standard deviation of 0.18. Average 
agricultural production as reported by farmers is 3.9 t/ha, which is well below the objective of 
6 t/ha often suggested in project reports (Aw and Diemer, 2005). Rather than water, an 
inefficient input market (for fertilizer, pesticides, …) is blamed for these low yields (see Box 
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5). The standard deviation of average production at tertiary block level is only 0.7 t/ha, but 
hides the important variability in production between individual farmers: Agricultural 
production ranges from 0 t/ha (for two farmers whose crop was flooded and lost due to 
excessive water supply to their tertiary block) to 6.5 t/ha and shows a standard deviation of 
1.2. Ease of irrigation at tertiary block level has an average score of 1.5, implying that on 
many tertiary blocks, irrigation is always easy for all farmers. The variable has a standard 
deviation of only 0.5, indicating that when farmers are confronted with irrigation problems, it 
affects only a few per tertiary block. For the sample of tertiary blocks, no significant 
correlations exist among the three performance indicators. 
 
Table 5.2 Descriptive statistics of the variables (n = 36) 
Indicator Average St. Dev Min. Max. 
Irrigation efficiency - average [St. Dev] 0.59 0.18 0.23 0.87 
Average agricultural production - average (t/ha) 3.9 0.7 2.5 5.7 
Average ease of irrigationa  - average (t/ha) 1.47 0.46 1.00 2.79 
Standard deviation of planting dates - average (days) 18 6 6 32 
Tertiary infrastructure maintenanceb - average 1.62 0.35 1.00 2.06 
Water allocation within the tertiary block     
No consultation 18 %    
Informal consultation 53 %    
Strict rules 19 %    
Coordination of water supply and demand     
Yes 31 %    
No 69 %    
a Scores range from 1 (very easy) to 4 (very difficult)  
b Scores range from 1 (good) to 3 (bad) 
 
The period in which transplanting takes place on a tertiary block ranges from one to more 
than three months. In an extreme case, some fields were already being harvested while others 
were at the stage of being transplanted. On most tertiary blocks, transplanting takes place 
within two months, with often a peak during ten to twenty days. This translates in an average 
standard deviation of planting dates of 18 days (Table 5.2). Even though four fifths of the 
farmers transplant within the limits prescribed by the central management (Office du Niger, 
2005), this situation contrasts sharply with the period before IMT. Back then, all farmers of a 
village were obliged to start the growing season at the same date prescribed by the central 
management for practical reasons. In the stakeholder analysis, it was found that the central 
management as well as some farmers still consider this the norm. For them, the current 
situation appears quite bad. The average score for tertiary infrastructure maintenance is 1.62. 
For the central management, who wants to preserve canals in perfect conditions, only a score 
close to 1.0 would be acceptable. Current maintenance levels thus confirm their view of 
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neglect of maintenance. At 0.35, the standard deviation is rather small, with scores ranging 
from 1.0, for the perfectly maintained canals, to only 2.06, whereas the maximum score is 3.0. 
A good score for tertiary infrastructure maintenance does however not always reflect farmers’ 
efforts. Some canals have not yet been colonized by certain weeds, so that regular 
maintenance is not necessary. Rules on water allocation within the tertiary block are 
effectively applied on about one fifth of tertiary blocks from the sample, and on half of them, 
informal consultation is commonplace. On the other tertiary blocks, water allocation is not 
coordinated at all. Finally, on about one third of tertiary blocks, coordination at the tertiary 
intake takes place. No significant correlations exist among the indicators for collective action. 
 
Box 5 Causes of disappointing yields 
Even though irrigation problems are an issue for many farmers, they seldom result in water stress and 
yield decline. Currently, the biggest bottleneck for good yields are constraints in the input markets. 
Because of the scarcity of credit and shortage and high price of mineral fertilizer, many farmers cannot 
apply the required dose. Survey results1 indicate that three quarters of farmers were not satisfied with 
their production, and of those, more than 40 % reported a lack of fertilizer as the main cause of 
disappointing yields (Figure 5.1). The average production of this group was 3.6 t/ha, well below the 
total average of 3.9 t/ha. The magnitude of the fertilizer problem from farmers’ point of view was 
further demonstrated by their spontaneous remarks throughout and after interviews. Indeed, many 
asked to take note of the dysfunctional markets or report the problem to the central management. 
Compared with this, water management does not have a big impact on production. Flooding can 
cause serious yield loss, but is exceptional. Next, respectively 15 % and 10 % of farmers dissatisfied 
with yields cited drainage problems at harvest and water stress as main causes of disappointing 
yields. Still, they reported a production of 3.8 t/ha on average. Consequently, under the present 
circumstances, improving water management will not result in an increase of total output. Only when 
water becomes scarce, a direct link between water management and yields might appear. 
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Figure 5.1 Main cause of dissapointing yields as perceived by farmers (left) and average production 
according to farmers’ perception of the main cause of dissapointing yields (right) 
                                                 
1 The survey (see section 5.2 and Appendix 2) asked whether farmers were satisfied with their rice production, 
and if not, which was the most important cause of disappointing yields. 
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The relation between collective action and performance 
Average agricultural production is not significantly linked with any of the collective action 
variables, indicating that it does not make a difference for actual yields. Efficiency is linked 
only with coordination at the intake of the tertiary block (one-way ANOVA: F1,34 = 5.067, p = 
0.031). From Table 5.3 it becomes clear that for tertiary blocks with coordination at the 
intake, average efficiency amounts to 0.68, whereas on the other tertiary blocks, it is only 
0.54. Soil properties, topography and individual farmers’ practices should explain the 
remaining variation. Coordination of water demand at the tertiary blocks can thus 
significantly increase irrigation efficiency and as such allow an expansion of the irrigated 
area. Currently, such coordination takes place mainly on lower lying tertiary blocks risking 
drainage problems at harvest. As they may not be able to evacuate the water diverted to their 
tertiary block, they try to control the inflow. On a few tertiary blocks, the prestige of rational 
water use is the only motivation. 
 
Table 5.3 Effect of the coordination of water demand on irrigation efficiency 
Coordination of water supply and demand Number of tertiary blocks Irrigation efficiency 
No 25 0.54 
Yes 11 0.68 
Total 36 0.59 
 
Table 5.4 Influence of strict rules and informal consultation among farmers on ease of irrigation 
Water allocation within the 
tertiary block 
Number of tertiary 
blocks 
Average score for ease of 
irrigationa 
No consultation 10 1.77 
Informal consultation 19 1.36 
Strict rules 7 1.35 
Total 36 1.47 
a Scores range from 1 (very easy) to 4 (very difficult)  
 
Table 5.4 points to the fact that the more water allocation is regulated, the higher the score 
for ease of irrigation (one-way ANOVA: F1,33 = 3.184, p = 0.054). The immediate cause of 
irrigation problems is typically a temporary supply problem at the secondary level or the 
higher position of some plots, which makes them more difficult to irrigate. The root cause is 
however the absence of equitable allocation of the available water. Indeed, the rice crops’ 
water requirements are largely covered by supply on about all tertiary blocks. Furthermore, 
none of the farmers from tertiary blocks with strict rules on water allocation ever suffers from 
severe irrigation problems, indicating that rules do provide an effective solution. Solidarity 
and peer pressure provide the necessary incentives when water allocation is regulated, but is 
insufficient on some tertiary blocks where irrigation problems remain unresolved. 
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The maintenance level has no relation with irrigation efficiency or ease of irrigation. 
Consequently, the current perception of the central management on the importance of 
maintenance is probably based on prejudices rather than facts. It must be added that tertiary 
canals have been vastly over-dimensioned compared to peak water requirements for reasons 
of canal construction. The flow rate being the product of velocity and the canal’s wetted 
cross-section, a loss in velocity due to weed growth in the canal bed is thus negligible. 
Farmers’ motivation for maintenance is indeed related to avoiding weeds and pests rather than 
hydraulics. With time, the canal banks however also degrade, making it difficult to fill the 
canal to its design level to dominate more elevated parts of the tertiary block. This process is 
too slow to be already measurable only about ten years after rehabilitation. Similarly, 
stretching of the cropping calendar has no impact on efficiency or ease of irrigation. 
Consequently, there is no hydraulic basis for tightening the coordination of the cropping 
calendar as far as irrigation is concerned. Stretching of the cropping calendar has however 
been observed to increase the probability of drainage problems, which results in increased 
production costs and/or loss of production and rice quality. In the Office du Niger irrigation 
scheme, about 40 % of farmers are confronted with them (Chapter 6).  
 
5.3.2 Recommendations for solving the conflict between stakeholders 
Insights in the mental models of stakeholders and real world relations between collective 
action and performance can lead to solutions that take into account the concerns of both 
parties. Three recommendations stand out. First, efforts to promote collective action should be 
well targeted. The mental model of the central management is prejudiced by an idealistic view 
on how water management should be, which leads it to promote fully-fledged collective 
action on all aspects. They furthermore attach special attention to maintenance, as it is a very 
visible indicator of management. Maintenance is however not (yet) linked with irrigation 
efficiency or agricultural production. Since labor input is an important variable for farmers, 
efforts to promote collective action will be more successful when targeted at just the most 
effective variable. 
Second, incentives are needed for farmers to increase irrigation efficiency. Results from 
the field study show that significant improvements in irrigation efficiency can be achieved 
through collective action at the intake of the tertiary canal. Averting drainage problems can be 
a motivation, but is relevant for particular tertiary blocks only. Prestige is another driver and 
seems important enough within a few blocks. It will however not convince all farmers, 
especially as an increase in irrigation efficiency might limit the comfort level of irrigation and 
 88
jeopardize those farmers with less than optimally located plots within a tertiary block. If 
irrigation efficiency is to be increased, other drivers need to be explored in consultation with 
the farmer groups. Measures that can be discussed and negotiated between the farmer groups 
and the central management are e.g. physically limiting water supply to the tertiary block or a 
quota system with a progressive price level according to their water consumption, whereby 
irrigation above a certain threshold is charged higher. It should be furthermore explored how 
farmers can get positive incentives to increase irrigation efficiency and make the expansion of 
the irrigated area possible, e.g. reductions in overhead cost of the irrigation scheme could be 
passed on to farmers of a certain tertiary block by reducing their water fee as a function of 
their irrigation efficiency. Another positive incentive could be that farmers who obtain a very 
high irrigation efficiency can qualify for access to extra land in the to be developed area. It 
would still need to be investigated to what extent this incentive would be interesting enough 
for farmers and to what extent it can be justified towards would-be farmers on the waiting list 
for access to an irrigated plot. Measuring water delivery to individual plots is currently 
impossible due to the physical layout of the irrigation scheme. Incentives (positive and 
negative) will thus inevitably have to be applied at the collective level. 
Third, whatever the incentives put into place, farmers will need extensive training and 
extension. Indeed, they need to be made aware of the fact that the current situation of 
abundant water will cease to exist as the irrigation scheme expands further, but that they can 
avert the negative consequences of water scarcity by adopting the right practices to limit 
water loss and allocate water equitably. Next, training will be needed to familiarize farmers 
with these practices. Finally, in order to guarantee equitable water allocation among farmers 
when water will be scarcer, collective action on allocation should be promoted as well. Today, 
not all farmer groups succeed in engaging in collective action, even when irrigation problems 
occur. In those cases, farmers might be motivated to maintain the current over-supply of water 
to minimize irrigation problems, despite incentives for water saving. 
 
5.4 Conclusions 
In natural resources management in general, and irrigation in particular, policies to promote 
soil and water conservation do not always deliver the desired outcome. This chapter discusses 
the case of the Office du Niger irrigation scheme were IMT to farmers so far, has led to 
disappointing results in the eyes of the central management. Through the stakeholder analysis 
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elaborated in Chapter 2, it was possible to clarify the conflicting strategies of the central 
management and farmers. Results from the field study now allowed testing the relation 
between collective action and performance in the real world. It appeared that collective action 
at the intake of the tertiary blocks can improve irrigation efficiency with at least 14 %, but is 
limited to 11 out of 36 tertiary blocks as site-specific factors and prestige are the only drivers. 
Collective action for water allocation is much better developed (26 out of 36 tertiary blocks). 
Indeed, mitigating irrigation problems, it leads to direct benefits for at least some farmers on 
the tertiary block. Even when needed, some farmer groups however do not succeed in 
establishing collective action. It also became clear that some mental models were flawed. In 
particular, maintenance, currently an important indicator for the central management, is not a 
good predictor for low irrigation efficiency or rice production. Similarly, tightening the 
coordination of the cropping calendar will yield no benefits for irrigation.  
Only through a better insight in stakeholders’ objectives and the cause-effect relationships 
of water management, better policies can be designed that go beyond prejudice. As farmers 
try to maximize returns to labor input, increasing irrigation efficiency can be achieved if their 
efforts are rewarded. Consequently, if direct benefits are lacking, incentives should be put in 
place. The search for the appropriate incentives will require several iterations whereby 
stakeholders can learn from the actual results of policies and adjust their mental models. 
Being more neutral and unbiased, researchers could play a beneficial role in accompanying 
this process. 
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Box 6 Cultivating all year round 
Cultivating a second crop in the dry season is introduced as part of intensification. At first, certain 
tertiary blocks at the head of the secondary canals were assigned for double cropping, but as the 
practice became more accepted, farmers were allowed to grow a second rice crop or vegetables in 
their regular plots too. None of the 36 tertiary blocks from the sample described in Table 5.1 was 
originally destined for double cropping. Nevertheless, in about four blocks out of five, double cropping 
was practiced in 2005. Most of them combined rice with vegetables, the latter taking up around 15 % 
of the cultivated surface. Initially, short-cycle rice varieties were advised for the dry season. These 
varieties are sown in February and harvested in April to avoid the cooler months of December and 
January in which rice development slows down. Over the years, it became however popular to grow 
the same varieties as in the rainy season, which have to be sown as early as December. With the four-
month cycle stretched by the cool temperatures, harvest still takes place in April.  
From a short survey on the topic, it appeared that generally, farmers find that double cropping wears 
out the soil and might depress yields in the rainy season. Still, as it brings in some extra money to 
bridge the hunger gap striking at the start of the rainy season, it is considered favorable overall. The 
second rice crop implies however several negative externalities for neighboring farmers and is 
therefore a source of conflicts. Any delay in the harvest of the dry-season crop obviously hampers the 
planting of the rainy-season crop, which results in a dispersal of planting dates in the tertiary blocks. 
Consequently, periods for irrigation and drainage will then overlap. Furthermore, as tertiary irrigation 
and drainage canals are filled with water the whole year round, aquatic weeds proliferate more easily, 
increasing maintenance requirements. Finally, lateral seepage moistens neighboring fields, provoking 
weed growth and making land preparation a headache.  
Only the well-off farmers are able to cultivate a second rice crop. First, you have to be well equipped, 
as people are reluctant to rent out their ploughs and oxen to work the land still wet after the rainy 
season. In addition, credit is not available for the second crop and fertilizers are hard to find. A solution 
is to rent out the land just for the dry season. Increasingly, the second rice crop is grown on rented 
land by entrepreneurial types, who practice farming as an extra. These constraints do not apply for 
vegetable farming, which as a rule is done by women and young adults. Here, the bottleneck is the 
output market. With no or few transformation done in the area, all produce arrives simultaneously and 
fresh at the market, which is quickly saturated resulting in low prices. Another constraint on further 
development of double cropping is water. In March, when the peak irrigation requirements of the dry 
season are reached, water availability in the Niger River reaches a low. The past few years, the Office 
du Niger already withdrew the maximum amount of water allowed under international treaties. 
Extracting water from the shallow water table might be an option but has not yet been investigated.  
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Chapter 6  
Drainage problems in relation to water management  
Abstract1 
This chapter quantifies the impact of water management on the incidence of drainage 
problems in the Office du Niger irrigation scheme. The irrigation scheme faces perpetual 
drainage problems at harvest, which incur increased production costs as well as production 
and/or quality loss. The rice schemes discharge water into natural depressions and their 
filling-up poses an ultimate bottleneck to the disposal of drainage water. Results demonstrate 
that the principal causes of drainage problems are the saturation of the drainage system with 
excess irrigation water and the insufficient maintenance of the collector drains. Once the 
collector drain is no longer saturated, maintenance of the tertiary drains becomes important, 
while the disparity in harvest dates between adjacent fields always aggravates the drainage 
problem. Since the benefits of individual efforts often accrue to neighbors or are dissipated 
throughout the entire drainage system, water management practices related to drainage should 
be tackled at the collective level using Water User Associations as a platform. 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Inadequate drainage in irrigation schemes, and especially flooded rice schemes, is an 
important source of high groundwater tables, water logging, salinisation, and eventually yield 
loss (Smedema et al., 2000; Konukcu et al., 2006). Its root causes are insufficient drainage 
capacity on the one hand, and over-supply of drainage water on the other hand. Since most of 
the attention and funds usually go to irrigation, many irrigation schemes have deficient 
                                                 
1 This chapter is adapted from: Vandersypen, K., Keita, A. C. T., Coulibaly, B., Raes, D., and Jamin, J.-Y. 
(2007). Drainage problems in the rice schemes of the Office du Niger (Mali) in relation to water management. 
Agricultural Water Management, 89, 153-160. 
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drainage systems (Smedema and Ochs, 1998). Furthermore, current irrigation practices often 
imply excessive water use, which unnecessarily increases the volume of water to be drained 
beyond the system’s capacity (Wichelns, 1999; Datta and de Jong, 2002). The consequences 
of drainage problems are increasingly being acknowledged within the scientific community, 
but the focus remains very much on the technical relations between irrigation and drainage 
and their environmental consequences. However, in order to study drainage problems, its 
relation with water management practices has to be fully understood. This relation often has a 
social component, since the drainage facility is a public good. Indeed, it is costly to prevent 
farmers from discharging water in the drainage system, but everyone suffers the negative 
consequences of its saturation. Furthermore, many water management practices affecting 
drainage require cooperation between farmers. Coordination of the cropping calendar in 
flooded rice schemes and the use and maintenance of collective drainage infrastructure are 
typical examples. Water management practices at the collective level related to drainage have 
not yet been thoroughly studied. In order to formulate recommendations, the impact of water 
management practices on drainage problems is quantified in this chapter. 
The Office du Niger irrigation scheme faces structural drainage problems (de Wilde, 1967; 
World Bank, 1979; Van der Walle, 1982; Malé, 1991; Keita, 2003). Moreover, recent 
rehabilitation of the irrigation scheme did not solve them. As in many other irrigation 
schemes, an inadequate drainage system in combination with excessive use of irrigation water 
is the root cause of the drainage problem. Water being abundant, labor input for water 
management is minimized by maintaining an over-supply of water in comparison to demand 
(Chapter 3), resulting in an overall irrigation efficiency of about 25 % (Vandersypen et al., 
2005). At the onset of the main growing season, which coincides with the rainy season, the 
soil is soaked and a water layer is established in the rice basins. As a result, the groundwater 
table rises close to surface level, leaving little room for water storage. Consequently, all 
excess water is conveyed to the drainage system, which discharges in natural depressions 
outside the irrigation scheme. The area being quite flat, the slope of the drainage canals is 
limited and the discharge diminishes as the depressions fill up with drainage water (Van der 
Walle, 1982; Hendrickx et al. 1986).  
Besides the general risk of salinisation and alkalinization problems and water-borne 
diseases, there are also some direct effects for the fields suffering from drainage problems. 
Some already suffer from excessive flooding during the growing season, which negatively 
influences grain yield. Indeed, excessive flooding reduces seedling establishment after 
transplanting, diminishes tillering and induces adaptive strategies in the rice plants, such as 
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extreme aerenchyma development and stem elongation (Anbumozhi et al., 1998; Ito et al., 
1999). The drainage problem in the Office du Niger irrigation scheme is however most 
pronounced at harvest, when draining of the flooded fields before harvest is difficult or even 
impossible. At harvest, it is standard practice to deposit the harvested rice crop on the ground 
and sheave it a few days later. After several weeks of drying, the sheaves are assembled in a 
stack for threshing, using mobile threshing machines brought to the field. Depositing a 
harvested rice crop in wet or humid circumstances causes germination and/or considerable 
quality loss within a few days (Phillips et al., 1988; 1989; Soponronnarit et al., 1998). 
Consequently, when a field is harvested wet, the rice has to be evacuated to a dry place 
nearby, which involves a considerable higher labor input. In addition, day laborers, which are 
commonly hired at harvest to supplement family labor, demand up to 25 % more salary per 
day to compensate for the arduous work conditions. Next, the moisture content of rice 
harvested from a wet field being too high for storage, the rice needs to be dried. If not enough 
room is available near the field, threshing has to follow quite rapidly so that the paddy can be 
transported to the village for drying. Evacuation of rice from the field and threshing of wet 
rice involve grain loss. Furthermore, if drying is too slow, grain quality might still deteriorate 
as described above. If drying is too fast, milling yield reduces and the percentage of broken 
grains increases (Jodari and Linscombe, 1996; Imoudu and Olufayo, 2000). Drainage 
problems at harvest might have important financial consequences for farmers, both because of 
increased production costs and of a reduction in rice quantity and quality (see Box 7). 
The root causes of drainage problems should be tackled at the scheme level, but 
management practices at the tertiary level might nevertheless also increase their incidence. 
Since the Irrigation Management Transfer, farmers are now collectively responsible for water 
supply to the tertiary block, maintenance of tertiary infrastructure and coordination of the 
cropping calendar. In many tertiary blocks, free-rider problems and the absence of functional 
rules to coordinate activities result in over-supply of water to the tertiary block, neglect of 
maintenance and disparity of planting and harvest dates Chapter 4). These are in turn assumed 
to exacerbate drainage problems (Keita, 2003; Boeckx, 2004), even though their precise 
impact is not known. Indeed, up until today, water management practices in the Office du 
Niger, as well as other irrigation schemes, have largely been studied from the perspective of 
irrigation rather than drainage. The goal of this chapter is therefore to assess the impact of 
management practices on the incidence of drainage problems at field level using statistical 
analysis and to formulate recommendations for improved water management. 
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6.2 Materials and methods 
Drainage problems are studied at field level, the level of observation being the harvest unit. A 
harvest unit corresponds to several contiguous rice basins that belong to the same farmer and 
have the same planting and harvest date. A unit is considered to be confronted with drainage 
problems if, at the time of harvest, water remains in the basins as a uniform water layer or 
puddles covering at least 20 % of its surface. 
 
Table 6.1 Descriptive statistics for the determinants of drainage problems at harvest 
Variables Average St.Dev Min. Max. Average if drainage 
problem occur 
     No Yes 
Harvest date 2/11 18 days 15/8 31/12 5/11 25/10 
Maintenance collector drain  30 %    35 % 20 % 
Disparity in harvest date with 
neighboring fields  
43 %    34 % 58 % 
Maintenance level tertiary drain (score 
from 1 (good) to 3 (bad)) 
2.20 0.39 1.00 3.00 2.80 2.24 
Proportion of the tertiary block surface 
being drained in the same 10 days (%) 
34 21 1 100 36 31 
Excess irrigation during the decade 
before harvesting (m³/ha) 
133 695 -1068 3876 156 92 
Size of the harvest unit (ha) 0.91 0.80 0.08 11.87 0.94 0.84 
Type of infrastructure       
Arpon type 40 %    35 % 47 % 
Retail type 60 %    65 % 53 % 
Year       
2004 42 %    38 % 49 % 
2005 58 %    62 % 51 % 
 
 
The independent variables used to explain the incidence of drainage problems concern the 
root causes at scheme level, water management practices at the tertiary level and 
characteristics of the measurement. The following sections explain how each of the 
independent variables is operationalized. Descriptive statistics of the independent variables 
are shown in Table 6.1. Apart from the independent variables included in the statistical model, 
several other aspects might influence the incidence of drainage problems. First, the drainage 
network functions as communicating vessels, so tertiary blocks situated in depressions, and 
within each tertiary block low lying fields, naturally have more difficulties with drainage than 
other tertiary blocks and fields. Second, the water layer to be drained at harvest varies 
considerably from one field to another, depending on farmers’ water management strategies 
and land leveling (Klinkenberg et al., 2000). Third, farmers confronted with drainage 
problems often apply mitigating strategies, such as finishing irrigation early in order to let 
water evaporate from the field, prolonged drainage and postponing the harvest date beyond 
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the end of the growing cycle. Since these factors might affect the incidence of drainage 
problems considerably, the statistical model does not try to predict drainage problems as 
closely as possible. It is rather constituted as an explanatory model from which 
recommendations for improved water management can be deduced. 
 
Factors at scheme level 
(i) Saturation of the drainage system. The central management records the water levels in the 
Niono-Grüber drainage system monthly (Figure 6.1). The evolution in water level can be 
assumed analogous for the other drainage systems, since all of them are confronted with the 
same problems. When water levels are too high, the drainage system becomes saturated as it 
is no longer possible to evacuate water from the fields. The water level in the collector drain 
is highly variable throughout the growing season. It reaches its peak in September, and then 
drops steadily to its minimum level in January. The harvesting period coincides with this peak 
in September and the subsequent steady drop in the water level. While an exceptional unit 
might already be harvested in August, harvesting generally sets off in September and 
continues until the end of December. The harvest date within the year is thus used as a proxy 
for saturation of the drainage system. To facilitate the interpretation of results, the date is 
converted to a number starting from one for the date on which the first unit is harvested. 
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Figure 6.1 Average monthly water level of the Niono-Grüber collector drain throughout the year 
(period: 1997 to 2005) 
 
(ii) Maintenance level of the collector drain. The collector drains in the Office du Niger 
irrigation scheme are in a notoriously bad shape. Only one of the bigger drains (the Niono-
Grüber drain) has been rehabilitated between the growing seasons of 2004 and 2005. A 
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dummy variable is used with a value of one for units pertaining to the Niono-Grüber drainage 
system after rehabilitation, and a value of zero otherwise. 
 
Management practices at the tertiary level 
(i) Disparity in harvest date. With water being permanently available, farmers determine their 
cropping calendar independently. Economic incentives and constraints resulted in a 
considerable disparity in planting and harvest dates within most tertiary blocks and even 
between neighboring fields. As field canals are used for irrigation as well as drainage, this 
disparity can have a direct impact on the incidence of drainage problems at harvest because of 
conflicts between irrigation and drainage and lateral seepage. Since for irrigation, the water 
level in the canals has to be superior to the field water level and vice versa for drainage, the 
two cannot occur simultaneously. Irrigation is generally considered more important than 
drainage and will thus get the priority (Bastiaens, 2004). In addition, depending on water 
management practices, field canals are often kept full if a water layer is present in some of its 
downstream fields. Consequently, drainage is not only impeded for the other fields, but lateral 
seepage from the canal might actually add water to them. Lateral seepage might also occur 
when adjacent rice basins still maintain a water layer. Usually, rice basins are drained about 
ten days before harvesting. A dummy variable is used that gets a value of one if none of the 
adjacent fields is harvested at least ten days later and a value of zero otherwise. 
Disparity in harvest dates does not have to result automatically in drainage problems. 
Indeed, much depends on water management practices at plot level. First, reinforcing the 
contour dikes of the rice basins can control much of the lateral seepage. However, given the 
high prevalence of rats and other burrowing animals, this is a time-consuming task demanding 
quasi-permanent vigilance. Second, the depth of the water layer in the adjacent fields 
determines the rate of seepage and the risk of breaches in the contour dikes. Third, an 
improved use of the field canals can avoid much of the conflicts between irrigation and 
drainage. Good water management practices are however rarely implemented, since their 
benefits accrue mostly to the neighbors of those who apply them. 
(ii) Maintenance of the tertiary drain. The unlined drainage canals are vulnerable to weed 
growth and deterioration of the canal bed and banks. Maintenance of the drainage canal 
involves cleaning the canal of weeds and if necessary, dredging its bed and reinforcing its 
banks. It usually takes place during the weeks before harvest, but is often neglected. Neglect 
of maintenance diminishes the capacity of the tertiary drains, forming a bottleneck for 
evacuation of drainage water to the secondary drains. In addition, farmers usually clean the 
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part adjacent to their fields independently from each other, so that maintenance levels for the 
same drain can vary considerably in time and space. A variable is constructed for the 
maintenance level of the tertiary drain based on the average score of the different canal 
sections on the day of harvest of the unit. Scores range from 1 (good) to 3 (bad). 
(iii) Excess irrigation at tertiary block level. Excess irrigation water at the tertiary block 
level has to be evacuated to the drainage system. With the drainage system constituting of 
communicating vessels, the impact of excess irrigation is dissipated over the entire drainage 
system. However, excess irrigation water has to be evacuated first through the tertiary drain, 
which can cause temporary congestion. Excess irrigation is assessed during the ten days 
before harvest of the unit and is calculated as: 
=
Water 
supplied to the 
tertiary block 
+ -
Excess 
irrigation 
water
Rainfall on 
the cropped 
surface
Evapotranspiration 
in the tertiary block
[m³/ha] 
 
Since some of the excess water might be stored in the rice basins, or previously stored 
water might be drained during the ten days under consideration, the variable gives only an 
indicative value. For calculation procedures of the water requirement and water delivery, refer 
to Chapter 3. Almost all fields are harvested before the end of November. Afterwards, both 
water requirements and water supply to the tertiary blocks approach zero and excess irrigation 
water was put to zero.  
(iv) Concentration of harvest dates at tertiary block level. While disparity in harvest date 
of adjacent fields can cause drainage problems, a concentration of harvest dates at tertiary 
block level results in a peak of drainage water, which might cause congestion in the tertiary 
drain. Therefore, the proportion of the tertiary block being drained during the ten days before 
harvest of the unit is another variable that needs to be considered. 
The degree of saturation of the drainage system might have a considerable impact on the 
relation between some of the management practices and the incidence of drainage problems at 
harvest. In particular, excess irrigation water and concentration of harvest dates at tertiary 
block level are expected to be significant especially when evacuation of drainage water from 
the field is hampered by a congested collector drain, since they will aggravate existing 
problems. On the other hand, maintenance of the tertiary drain is expected to have an impact 
only when the collector drain is no longer saturated. Indeed, the tertiary drain can only 
evacuate the quantity the secondary drain and eventually collector drain are able to absorb. In 
order to take into account the level of saturation of the collector drain, the three variables for 
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management practices at the tertiary level listed above are analyzed in interaction with the 
month in which harvesting took place. Since only a couple of units were harvested in August, 
this month is lumped together with September. Each variable is thus split into four variables, 
which have their specific value during one month, and a value of zero during the other 
months. 
 
Characteristics of the measurement 
(i) Size of the harvest unit. Larger harvest units are expected to have a lower incidence of 
drainage problems. Indeed, size is positively correlated with consolidation of the harvest unit, 
so that edge effects, such as lateral seepage, are reduced. However, since the size of the 
harvest unit depends much on the shape and size of the rice plot, it is therefore not considered 
as a management practice that can be controlled by the farmer. 
(ii) Type of infrastructure. In the rehabilitated part of the irrigation scheme, two types of 
infrastructure can be distinguished: the Arpon type and Retail type (Chapter 2). In the Arpon 
type, the tail end of the tertiary irrigation canal is linked directly to the tertiary drain of the 
adjacent block through an overflow structure. Excess irrigation water in the tertiary canal that 
does not discharge in field canals is transferred to the neighbors. This system does not give 
much incentive to avoid over-use. In the Retail type, the overflow structures in the tertiary 
irrigation canals are connected to the field canals. Nevertheless, it was shown that water use in 
tertiary blocks of the Arpon type is more efficient in comparison to the Retail type due to the 
smaller dimensions of the tertiary intake (Chapter 3). 
(iii) Year of the observation. Since the degree of saturation of the collector drains can vary 
from one year to another, the year of the observation is also introduced as a variable.  
 
Sample, data collection and statistical analysis 
The harvest units pertain to a sample of 36 tertiary blocks from nine secondary canals and 
four drainage systems within the rehabilitated area (see Chapter 3). Data collection was 
repeated for the 2004 and 2005 growing season. Since harvest units in 2004 and 2005 usually 
do not coincide spatially, and the value of the independent variables can differ considerably 
between the two years, they are considered independent measurements. Measurements from 
the same tertiary block are however not independent, since factors not included in the model, 
such as topographic level of the block, might affect the incidence of drainage problems in all 
of its harvest units. The tertiary blocks being a random sample within the population, the 
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coefficients of the tertiary block effect are assumed normally distributed around a population 
mean (Diez Roux, 2002). The sample structure is presented in Table 6.2. 
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Map 6.1 Detailed map of the Niono and N'Debougou zones with indication of the drainage systems 
 
The harvest units from the sample were monitored weekly, during which the drainage 
condition was observed and the harvest date obtained from farmers present at the field or 
estimated. The size of harvest units was calculated using the land registry of the Office du 
Niger. The maintenance level of the tertiary drain was monitored fortnightly throughout the 
growing season.  
The dependent variable being a binary variable indicating whether yes or no a harvest unit 
was confronted with drainage problems, a binary logistic regression model is used (Thomas, 
1997):  
εTBEXβ...Xββ
P1
Pln kk221 +++++=


−  
where P the probability of encountering drainage problems (1 = yes; 0 = no), P/(1-P) is the 
odds ratio and its natural logarithm the logit. X2 to Xn are the variables described in section 
2.2, β1 to βn the model coefficients and ε the error term. A multilevel model was fitted using 
SAS GLIMMIX. The tertiary block effect (TBE) was controlled for by using a random 
intercept model with varying intercepts for each of the tertiary blocks from the sample (Diez 
Roux, 2002). For the dummy variables, the model coefficients are calculated by comparing 
each of the categories to a reference category. Model coefficients are translated in the change 
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in probability for a unit increase in the independent variables. In the case of the continuous 
variables, the change in probability can be calculated for any range of change, assuming the 
logit is linear in the variables (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989). 
 
Table 6.2 Sample structure 
Number of harvest units in the sample Drainage system Number of tertiary blocks 
in the sample 2004 2005 Total 
Niono-Grüber 20 338 447 785 
Siebougou 4 101 135 236 
Kouia 4 67 92 159 
Dina 8 117 190 307 
Total 36 623 864 1487 
 
6.3 Results and discussion 
37 % of harvest units and 34 % of the total surface of tertiary blocks from the sample were 
confronted with drainage problems at harvest. Among the variables of the characteristics of 
the measurements, only the size of the harvest unit is significant (Table 6.3). Both the 
variables at scheme level, i.e. harvest date (the proxy for saturation of the collector drain) and 
maintenance of the collector drain, are highly significant (p < 0.001). Starting from the second 
decade of November, when the water level in the collector drain is about halfway between its 
maximum and minimum, the average probability of drainage problems is only 18 % (Figure 
6.2). Furthermore, a delay of 20 days in the cropping calendar corresponds to a decrease in 
probability of drainage problems of 15 % (Figure 6.3). About the same decrease is attained 
when the collector drain is properly maintained (Table 6.3). Most farmers currently blame the 
central management for their drainage problems because of the poor condition of secondary 
and collector drains (Keita, 2003). While this is indeed an important factor, the saturation of 
the drainage system due to the over-supply of irrigation water is of equal or even more 
importance. Given that the filling-up of the natural depressions, which are the only drainage 
outlet for the irrigation scheme, poses an ultimate bottleneck, limiting the quantity of drainage 
water would be the single most effective solution to the drainage problem. This can be 
achieved by improving irrigation efficiency. Here, the central management and farmers share 
responsibility, as both are involved in the operation of the irrigation network and apply 
minimal water management strategies in doing so (Chapter 3).  
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Table 6.3 Results of the multilevel logistic regression model predicting the probability of drainage 
problems at harvest 
Variable Sig. 
Odds 
ratio 
% change in 
probability 
Harvest date 0.000*** 0.964 -1 
Maintenance of the collector drain (if not maintained) 0.011* 1.757 14 
Disparity in harvest date with neighboring fields (if no disparity) 0.003** 0.651 -9 
Maintenance level tertiary drain in interaction with month - September 0.551 0.794 -5 
October 0.294 0.758 -6 
November 0.747 1.085 2 
December 0.014* 2.580 23 
Excess irrigation during the decade before harvesting in interaction 
with month - September 0.100 0.999 0 
October 0.134 1.000 0 
November 0.394 1.000 0 
December 0.936 1.000 0 
Proportion of the tertiary block surface being drained in the same 10 
days in interaction with month - September 0.141 0.946 -1 
October 0.317 1.007 0 
November 0.751 0.999 0 
December 0.717 0.985 0 
Size of the harvest unit 0.008** 0.772 -6 
Type of infrastructure (if Retail) 0.159 1.417 8 
Year (if 2004) 0.097 1.322 7 
Constant 0.000*** 31.406 
* Significant at the 5 % level 
** Significant at the 1 % level 
*** Significant at the 0.1 % level 
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Figure 6.2 Variation of the probability that drainage problems occur at harvest (bars) and the water 
level in the Niono-Grüber collector drain for each 10-day period in 2004 and 2005 (lines) 
 
These strategies originate from the abundant availability of water, which makes inefficient 
irrigation possible without risking water shortages. Consequently, farmers and managers have 
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to be convinced of the relation between the practice of over-supply of water for irrigation and 
drainage problems at harvest. Efforts of individual farmers to reduce over-supply are 
dissipated through the entire drainage system, which reduces the incentives to provide these 
efforts. The issue should thus be tackled at the collective level. Water Users Associations and 
the so-called Joint Committees that unite farmers and Office du Niger staff could provide the 
necessary platform. In the Office du Niger, Water Users Associations are being set up at 
tertiary block level, for which at a later stage, umbrella organizations will be created at 
secondary and primary level. Joint Committees already exist for decision-making on 
maintenance and land allocation, but not yet for water management. The irrigation scheme’s 
historical path has however lead farmers to consider the water resource as an open access 
regime, where fellow farmers cannot be held accountable for problems they incur on others 
(Chapter 7). Consequently, cooperation among farmers to achieve a common goal is socially 
difficult to establish (Chapter 4). Tackling the issue of over-supply will thus require a 
mentality shift. 
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Figure 6.3 Change in probability that drainage problems occur for (a) various delays in cropping 
calendar and (b) increase in average maintenance level in December 
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Among the variables for the management practices at the tertiary level, the disparity in 
harvest dates with adjacent fields and the maintenance level of the tertiary drain are 
significant. Maintenance has a significant impact in December only, when the collector drain 
attains its minimum level, but only a few fields are harvested. A reduction in the average 
score for maintenance of one, decreases the probability of drainage problems with more than 
20 % (Figure 6.3). The effect in the other months is much smaller and furthermore not 
significant. Maintenance of the tertiary drain is now the primary focus of sensitization 
sessions and capacity building aiming at improving water management practices at the tertiary 
level. As long as the collector drain remains saturated, this measure does however not make 
much sense. 
Avoiding a disparity in harvest dates of more than ten days with adjacent fields has a 
considerable impact throughout the period of harvesting (Table 6.3). Coordination of the 
cropping calendar is however difficult to establish. Many aspects are involved in choosing a 
cropping calendar and most farmers think it should be an individual decision (Keita, 2003). 
Disparities even exist between harvest units belonging to the same farmer. Given the large 
impact on the incidence of drainage problems at harvest on the one hand, and the difficulty in 
coordinating harvest dates on the other hand, water management practices at plot level should 
be the focus of attention. Again, since the farmers that provide most of the effort are not the 
ones who will benefit from them, it should be a matter of tertiary level Water Users 
Associations. 
Even though not significant, the results for the proportion of the tertiary block being 
drained during the same ten days as the harvest unit and excess irrigation during the decade 
before harvesting are counterintuitive. Indeed, the average proportion is larger for harvest 
units without than for those with drainage problems. This might be because a large proportion 
of the tertiary block being harvested in the same period implies less irrigation and thus creates 
favorable circumstances for mitigating strategies such as allowing water to evaporate from the 
field in stead of draining. Regarding excess irrigation at tertiary block level, the value is also 
higher for units without than with drainage problems. A possible explanation is that tertiary 
blocks in depressions that are regularly confronted with drainage problems might suspend 
irrigation altogether in an early stage. This might explain the negative values for excess 
irrigation. The degree of excess irrigation might thus be a consequence of drainage problems 
rather than a cause. 
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Box 7 Drainage problems and rice quality 
Many farmers in the Office du Niger irrigation scheme relate drainage problems with a deterioration of 
rice quality (Keita, 2003). In order to asses this relation, paddy samples were collected in fields with 
and without drainage problems. In total, 51 samples of at least 3 kg were collected in 2004 and 2005, 
preferably the day of threshing. The period in between harvesting and threshing, in which the 
harvested rice might have been put into sheaves to dry, was not controlled for. Seed moisture was 
measured with a humidimeter immediately after the collection of the sample (taking an average of 3 
measurements) and then, the samples were spread out to dry in the shade. Subsequently, the 
samples were cleaned and milled using the same village mill for all of them. The rice samples were 
then classified according to their quality, taking into account their variety. Class 1 contained rice of 
very good quality, meaning the grains were white and long. Class 2 resembled class 1, but contained 
more broken grains. Rice of class 3 was less white and had mostly broken grains, but its quality was 
still acceptable. Rice of class 4 and 5 would be difficult to market, with respectively opaque and 
discolored grains being mostly broken. Only 14 samples were classified in class 4 or 5, and as their 
low quality probably resulted from a particular incident, they were excluded from further analysis. 
Results are presented in Figure 6.4 and Table 6.4. 
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Figure 6.4 Boxplots of seed moisture after threshing in function of drainage problems at harvest (left) 
and rice quality class (right) 
 
Table 6.4 Association of drainage problems at harvest with rice quality 
Drainage problem at harvest
1 2 3 Total
No 71% 29% 0% 100%
Yes 20% 33% 47% 100%
Total 30% 32% 38% 100%
Rice quality class
 
 
Given the small sample size, results should be interpreted with care. It seems however that good 
drainage conditions can indeed avoid quality loss related to excessive moisture. Harvesting under wet 
conditions increases the probability that the rice is still humid. Furthermore, quality loss appears 
unavoidable for very humid paddy samples (humidity above 20 %). Drying harvested rice before 
threshing might save rice quality but offers no guarantee. Drying conditions might still influence final 
quality considerably, but were not monitored during this survey.  
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6.4 Conclusion 
Inadequate drainage in irrigation schemes is a growing concern because of consequences on 
agricultural production and on the environment. While most of the research on water 
management focuses on irrigation, this chapter discusses the topic from the angle of drainage. 
Since a large part of the solution consists in water management practices at the collective 
level, their impact on drainage problems is quantified so that recommendations can be 
formulated. 
Drainage problems at the time of harvest are widespread in the Office du Niger irrigation 
scheme, and incur increased production costs as well as production and/or quality loss. The 
rice schemes discharge water into natural depressions and their filling-up poses an ultimate 
bottleneck to the disposal of drainage water. For the 2004 and 2005 main growing seasons, on 
about one third of the surface area, it was impossible to evacuate water from the field for 
harvesting. Statistical analysis of the incidence of drainage problems at field level confirms 
that the principal causes of drainage problems in the Office du Niger irrigation scheme are the 
saturation of the drainage system with excess irrigation water and insufficient maintenance of 
the collector drains. Once the collector drain is no longer saturated, maintenance of the 
tertiary drain becomes important, while the disparity in harvest dates of neighboring fields 
always contributes to the drainage problem. Except for maintenance of the collector drain, 
which is the responsibility of the Office du Niger, the solution largely consists in improving 
farmers’ water management practices. The latter depends on two preconditions. First, farmers 
have to be convinced that drainage problems at harvest are caused not just by the diminished 
capacity of the collector drain, but partly by their own doing when they over-use irrigation 
water. Second, since the benefits of an individual’s efforts often accrue to neighbors or are 
dissipated through the entire drainage system, water management practices related to drainage 
should be tackled at the collective level. The Water Users Associations currently being set up 
in the irrigation scheme could provide the necessary platform.  
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PART II 
ANALYSIS OF THE SOCIAL FORCES BEHIND 
FARMERS’ WATER MANAGEMENT 
 
Summary 
Social relations between water users, their attitude toward the water resources and irrigation 
infrastructure, and the legitimacy of formal and informal leaders are all social forces that 
shape the daily practice of water management. Any intervention is subject to them and 
considering them would greatly increase their effectiveness. Part II of this dissertation 
investigates these social forces behind water management. Without aiming to be exhaustive, it 
scrutinizes two issues of particular importance. First, Water Users Associations (WUAs) 
could provide a much-needed platform to institutionalize collective action. Despite 
considerable efforts to introduce them, informal patterns of decision-making on water 
management remain dominant. To be more effective, WUAs should therefore adopt some 
crucial features of informal decision-making, including light and flexible procedures and the 
involvement of village leadership. Indeed, in the Office du Niger irrigation scheme, as in 
many other African publicly funded irrigation schemes, new authorities are hard to establish. 
Involving existing sources of authority, usually present at village level, has been observed to 
strongly favor the performance of WUAs. Second, recent socio-economic evolutions might 
thwart efforts to promote collective action through sensitization and training of farmers. 
Indeed, the economic success of the reforms have created many employment opportunities 
outside rice farming, and there exists a clear trend of farmers diversifying their sources of 
income. This trend results in the increasing employment of wage laborers who are assigned 
the task of water management. It appeared that wage laborers are less motivated for collective 
action. As they are furthermore excluded from existing patterns of information transfer, the 
training and sensitization sessions should explicitly consider them as a target group.  
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Chapter 7  
Formal and informal decision-making on water 
management at village level 
Abstract1 
Water Users Associations (WUAs) are all too often considered a panacea for improving water 
management in irrigation schemes. Where grassroots movements are absent, they are usually 
imposed on farmers by national governments, NGOs and international donors, without fully 
considering existing forms of organization. This also happened in the Office du Niger 
irrigation scheme, where after a partial Irrigation Management Transfer WUAs were created 
to fill the resulting power vacuum. This chapter demonstrates that, despite active efforts to 
organize farmers in WUAs, informal patterns of decision-making remain dominant. Given the 
shortcomings of these informal patterns, WUAs could provide a much-needed platform for 
institutionalizing collective action, on the condition that farmers accept them. Therefore, 
WUAs should adopt some crucial characteristics of informal patterns of decision-making, 
while avoiding their weaknesses. First, making use of the existing authority of village 
leadership and the central management can improve the credibility of WUAs. Second, 
allowing flexibility in procedures and rules can make them more appropriate for dealing with 
collective action problems that are typically temporary and specific. On the other hand, 
formalizing the current pattern of conflict management and sanctioning might enhance its 
sphere of action and tackle the current absence of firm engagement with respect to some 
informal management decisions. In addition, WUAs should represent and be accountable to 
all farmers, including those residing outside the village community.  
                                                 
1 This chapter is adapted from: Vandersypen, K., Keita, A. C. T., Coulibaly, Y., Raes, D., and Jamin, J.-Y. (In 
Press). Formal and informal decision-making on water management at village level. A case study in the Office 
du Niger irrigation scheme in Mali. Water Resources Research. 
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7.1 Introduction 
In the context of Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT), Water Users Associations (WUAs) 
are being promoted as the center of decision-making on water management. The configuration 
of water management can take a wide variety of forms, which can be broadly divided in two 
categories. In the first category, WUAs are responsible for water management of the whole 
irrigation scheme. Nevertheless, they can delegate operation and maintenance of the main 
system to professional staff. In the second category, a central agency (private or government) 
is responsible for main-system operation and maintenance, whereas WUAs are responsible for 
water management at sub-systems, typically tertiary level (Groenfeldt and Svendsen, 2000; 
Hearne, 2004). WUAs do not arise spontaneously in most cases, but are imposed on farmers 
in a top down way by national governments, NGOs and international donors (Jamin et al., 
2005). Early experiences, which mostly took place in Asia, learnt that farmers should set the 
rules and regulations of WUAs. Moreover, WUAs should involve local decision-makers in 
their set-up and build upon existing organizational capacity (Meinzen-Dick and Reidinger, 
1995; Maganga et al., 2004). Implementing agencies however frequently neglect these 
recommendations and the result is that many WUAs remain merely legal constructs (Sokile 
and van Koppen, 2004). Existing forms of organization are strongest in indigenous irrigation 
schemes, where water management is shaped by customary law and embedded in the social 
and economical structure of society (Diemer, 1990; Watson et al., 1998). One of their 
prominent features is the strong involvement of village leadership in water management. Even 
in larger indigenous irrigation schemes, leaders of sub-units ultimately give account to the 
village leadership (Adams et al. 1994; Norman, 1997). In government-run irrigation schemes, 
decades of farmers’ dependency on the central agency have crippled their organizational 
capacity (Shah et al., 2002). Nevertheless, some informal patterns of decision-making on 
water management at farmers’ level might have emerged.  
The Office du Niger irrigation scheme is a classic example of the above-described 
evolution. Some years after IMT, WUAs were created to fill the power vacuum left by the 
IMT. This chapter demonstrates that despite active efforts to formally organize farmers in 
WUAs, informal patterns of water management remain dominant. Given the flaws of these 
informal patterns, this represents a missed opportunity. This argument is built through an 
institutional analysis of both formal and informal centers of decision-making on water 
management. Institutions in this chapter are understood as ‘humanly devised constraints that 
shape human interaction’ (North, 1990). The difference between formal and informal 
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institutions is not clear-cut. ‘Formal’ is defined as following fixed procedures (mostly written 
down in statutes) and molded in an organization backed by the legal system (in this context a 
WUA), while ‘informal’ means following customary norms and habits and based on 
conventions (Onibon et al., 1999). In principle, both formal and informal institutions can 
effectively solve collective action problems, even though establishing formal organizations 
might give the necessary impetus in groups already willing to cooperate (Meinzen-Dick et al., 
2002). Moreover, formal institutions are generally complemented with informal ones. As 
such, the same formal institutions applied by groups with different informal ones, might 
produce different outcomes (North, 1990).  
The analytical framework used in this chapter draws in part from the framework proposed 
by Ostrom (1990; 1993). In summary, it states that users do or do not support institutional 
change, depending on the trade-off of expected costs and benefits. These in turn depend on 
social norms, users’ internal discount rate and situational variables, such as characteristics of 
the user group and resource and the socio-economic environment. From that, design 
principles can be deduced for successful institutions. While these design principles might be a 
necessary condition for institutions to work, they are certainly not a sufficient condition. 
Institutions must therefore be understood in their historical and socio-cultural context 
(Cleaver, 1999; Steins and Edwards, 1999). In particular, this context has shaped social 
relations among users, their attitude toward the resource and the legitimacy of formal and 
informal leaders. Understanding informal institutions can contribute to designing better ways 
for implementing institutional change, for example by including representation of informal 
and accountable leaders (Ribot, 1996; Wester et al., 2003).  
 
7.2 Fieldwork methodology and data analysis 
Fieldwork on farmers’ water management and performance was conducted in 2004 and 2005 
in 9 villages from the Niono and N’Debougou zones (see Map 2.2). Data for this study result 
essentially from qualitative research methods. At village level, two series of focused 
interviews (Flick, 1998) with village leaders took place (see Appendix 3). In the first series, 
the village history and social composition were discussed. A second series assessed the 
functioning of WUAs and informal patterns of water management at the village level. Table 
7.1 presents key statistics on the sample villages. Next, a sample of 36 tertiary blocks was 
constructed for an in-depth study, by picking out four tertiary blocks within each village (see 
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Chapter 3). Group interviews for each of the tertiary blocks were conducted, in which 
decision-making, communication and coordination on water management were addressed 
using a structured, open question interview guide. Information obtained through the 
interviews was then complemented by frequent observations of water management activities 
on the field and informal discussions with farmers of the studied tertiary blocks (22 in total) 
on their principles of conduct regarding water management.  
 
Table 7.1 Key statistics on the sample villages 
Village Population Number of 
tertiary canals 
Location in the irrigation 
scheme 
Zone 
Médina-Coura 2821 34 Top end position N’Debougou 
Tiemedely-Coura 2811 34 Middle position N’Debougou 
Kanassako 2471 29 Middle position N’Debougou 
Médina 3473 40 Middle position Niono 
Moussa-Wèrè 1123 18 Tail end position Niono 
Peguena 1005 10 Top end position Niono 
Coloni 3150 33 Top end position Niono 
Suigui-Vocè 1403 25 Tail end position N’Debougou 
Fassun 2189 17 Tail end position N’Debougou 
 
Table 7.2 Key characteristics of the sample of tertiary canals 
 Surface (ha) Number of farmers Proportion  
of non-residents (%) 
Number of leaseholders
Mean 18.4 7.9 14 1 
Minimum 6.6 2 0 0 
Maximum 48.3 19 56 6 
 
Table 7.2 gives key characteristics of the sample of tertiary canals. A frequent presence in 
the villages, together with the researchers’ attachment to a popular local research center that 
provided highly valued technical assistance, allowed the development of a relationship of 
trust. Such a relationship is essential for obtaining information on taboo issues such as 
conflicts and illegal practices. Village interviews were made enjoyable for all participants by 
offering tea, which created a relaxed atmosphere and allowed to extend considerably the 
interview without loss of concentration of both interviewers and respondents. Content 
analysis was used to analyze empirical data (Miles and Huberman, 1994). In order to further 
scrutinize empirical data, triangulation methods were used (Baxter and Eyles, 1997). First, 
data were discussed in expert interviews with key-informants in the study area, such as local 
researchers, Office du Niger officials and leaders from the farmers’ syndicate. Next, the 
researchers participated in various project evaluation meetings and information sessions on 
WUAs organized by the central management. A last source of information consisted in 
official and informal reports on water management and WUAs developed by researchers and 
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national and international experts solicited to design, implement and evaluate WUAs in the 
irrigation scheme. 
 
7.3 Centers of decision-making in the Office du Niger 
Before reforms, the central management had a monopoly on virtually every sphere of 
decision-making, thereby erasing most traditional forms of organization (Magasa, 1978; 
Schreyger, 1984). One of the very few surviving customary institutions is the village 
chieftainship. The moment of their creation, the villages in the Office du Niger irrigation 
schemes established a village chief, usually was the male family head of one of the first 
settled families. Since before reforms, the traditional duties of the village chief, such as 
management of the village territory, housing and administration, were in the hands of the 
central management, their sphere of action was severely reduced. Nevertheless, they managed 
to take the lead role in conflict management at the village level through informal jurisdiction 
and are generally recognized and respected by the villagers. Table 7.3 shows the dates of 
creation of the sample villages and describes the origin of the population. Downsizing the 
central management led to its responsibility being reduced to water and land management. 
The other competences were transferred to existing and newly created centers of decision-
making. The judiciary responsibilities were transferred to the Malian national level, and the 
registry office, public security, education and health were handed over to the prefectures and 
communes. Communes are the lowest formal level of government and are generally compiled 
of several villages (Hellevik, 2004). The role of the village chief is now administratively 
formalized. Indeed, even though villages are not a separate administrative level, they are an 
important entity for consultancy and conflict resolution within the commune (Hellevik, 2004).  
With the liberalization of crop production and marketing, village cooperatives have been 
created in the 1980s to manage agricultural input supply and processing and marketing of 
production, which before were also in the hands of the central management. The cooperatives 
were meant to be economically profitable, with earnings invested in social infrastructure such 
as schools and health centers. Consequently, successful cooperatives were able to play an 
important role in decision-making at the village level. Generally, the village chief or one of 
his counselors took a lead role in the cooperative as its president or secretary, so that strong 
ties between the two have developed (Traoré and Spinat, 2002). 
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Table 7.3 Origin of the population and functioning of the village cooperative for the sample villages 
Village Date of
creation 
  Origin of the population Functioning of village cooperatives 
Médina-Coura 1955 Dominant group (Minianka) originating from the same region and installed 
by force, complemented by a group of mixed ethnicity 
In difficulty, involved in a village dispute 
Tiemedely-Coura 1965 Mixed population originating from different regions in Mali and installed 
both voluntarily and by force 
Functional, good relation with competing 
cooperative 
Kanassako (*) Dominant group of original inhabitants, complement by relative recent 
newcomers 
Successful 
Médina 1940 Mixed population originating from different regions in Mali and installed 
voluntarily 
In difficulty, involved in a dispute with the 
village chief 
Moussa-Wèrè 1959 Mixed population of inhabitants of existing nearby villages and immigrants 
from other regions in Mali, installed both voluntarily and by force 
Bankrupt, competing cooperative also 
bankrupt 
Peguena 1937 Dominant group of mixed ethnicity but originating from the same region, 
complemented by a group originating from different regions, relatively few 
recent newcomers 
In difficulty, good relation with competing 
cooperatives 
Coloni 1937 Mixed population of inhabitants of existing nearby villages and immigrants 
from other regions in Mali, installed both voluntarily and by force 
In difficulty, bad relation with competing 
cooperatives 
Suigui-Vocè 1940 Nearly homogeneous population originating from the same village in 
Burkina Faso, relatively few recent newcomers 
Bankrupt, replaced by functional 
cooperative  
Fassun 1962 Dominant group (Bambara) originating from the same region and installed 
voluntarily, complemented by a group of mixed ethnicity 
Functional, good relation with competing 
cooperative 
(*) The village existed before the irrigation scheme was constructed 
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Box 8 The realm of the Office du Niger 
The Office du Niger has often been described as a state within the state, and even though much has 
changed since the reforms, the area still carries many tokens of the profound impact of the irrigation 
scheme on everyday life. When you cross the Markala dam over the Niger River, the many billboards 
showing maps of the canal network make quite clear that you enter the Office du Niger’s realm. The 
dam could be considered as the entrance gate. In the early days, farmers who violated the central 
management’s rules were literally thrown out. The farmer and his family, with their few sticks of 
furniture, were put on a chariot and dumped on the other side of the Markala dam (Magasa, 1978). 
Inside the scheme, one of the first villages you will meet is actually called “Point A”, after the gigantic 
sluice gates at the head of the three main hydraulic axes. Even though each village has a proper 
name, many are nicknamed after the nearby secondary canal or the kilometer point used by 
topographers. For example, no one knows the actual name of “N10”, and asking the direction to “le 
kilomètre 36” makes perfectly sense. A few farmers actually add the cadastral number of their plot to 
their name so you will know exactly who they are. Roads to travel in the area simply follow canals, 
which are the center of peoples’ lives. Concrete stairs made in their banks are filled all day long with 
woman and girls doing laundry or the dishes. Children play in them with self-made rafts and boats. At 
dusk, men go there to take a bath and clean their motorbikes and cars. Occasionally, an exposed thief 
is thrown in a canal with hands and feet cuffed. Young and old go fishing and the area supports a few 
hamlets of Bozo fishermen that were attracted by the irrigation scheme’s many canals. Small boys 
bring goats and cows to drink and during the dry season, hundreds of thousands of heads of cattle 
pass through the irrigation scheme on their way from north to south to sip a drink. Living in the Office 
du Niger irrigation scheme once meant destitution and oppression, but now it can be a reason of pride 
and a source of wealth. Much of the cattle herded through the irrigation scheme by Peulh herdsman 
actually belong to residents of the Office du Niger. When people visit relatives, they take a few bags of 
rice with them as telling presents. Chiefs in the hierarchy of the central management are still very 
much considered chiefs, although they lost much of their power. They are still treated with 
consideration and are bound to do the opening speech at traditional dance evenings and to cut the 
tape of the new school. 
 
The success of the village cooperatives is variable. Already in the 1990s, the majority of 
cooperatives faced financial problems, often caused by mismanagement and corruption 
(Traoré and Spinat, 2002). Moreover, the cooperative leaders are often accused of favoritism, 
which prejudiced their legitimacy in the view of villagers (Yung and Tailly-Sada, 1992). In 
response, groups of farmers created independent cooperatives. Ensuing competition often led 
to tensions at the village level and the development of opposing factions, although in the 
course of years, the opposing groups came to terms in most of the villages. On the other side, 
successful cooperatives often strengthened the social cohesion of the village. Table 7.3 gives 
an overview of the functioning of the village cooperatives for the sample villages. According 
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to a study by PCPS (2002) that analyzed the functioning of village cooperatives, this figure is 
quite representative for the irrigation scheme. 
Even though water management is still the competence of the central management, a 
partial transfer to farmers has taken place. This transfer has been more complete towards the 
lower levels of the hierarchic canal network. The central management of the Office du Niger 
bears the sole responsibility for water management at the primary canal level. At the 
secondary level, farmers participate in decision-making in Joint Committees. At the tertiary 
level, water management is entirely left to farmers (Touré et al., 1997). Certain regulations, 
elaborated in a three-yearly contract negotiated between the Malian state, the central 
management and farmers’ representatives, limit farmers’ liberty of action (Couture et al., 
2002). The regulations prescribe the maintenance of the tertiary infrastructure, the cropping 
calendar and cultural practices to intensify rice production. They further stipulate farmers’ 
obligation to limit water use and practice double cropping on designated plots. There were 
however no structures to monitor compliance with these regulations, so that a certain anarchy 
and inability to solve collective action problems quickly became apparent. As a response, 
WUAs were created by donor-funded projects, designed to form the center of decision-
making on water management at the tertiary level. 
 
7.4 Decision-making on water management 
7.4.1 Water Users Associations at the village level 
In 1996, a first project established WUAs at the village level, the so-called ‘Comités Paritaires 
de Partiteur’ (CPP). Institutionally inserted in the village cooperative, they are actually not 
composed of farmers, but of tertiary canal chiefs. At every tertiary block, one of the farmers is 
elected as chief and acts as the representative for the tertiary block, while implementing 
decisions taken by the CPP. The CPP contains two or more canal chiefs, elected by the 
general assembly of the village cooperative, in addition to the water guard and an official of 
the Office du Niger. One of the tertiary canal chiefs is appointed as head of the CPP. The 
duties assigned to the CPP are to assure water delivery to the tertiary blocks through a 
hierarchical system of communication between farmers, canal chiefs, the head of the CPP and 
the water guard. Further, it should plan and monitor tertiary infrastructure maintenance 
(Sogreah/Bceom/Betico, 1999; CEFE Consultants, 2000; CDP, 2004). Next, the CPP backs 
up the canal chiefs in implementing and monitoring its decisions and regulations on water 
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management. The basis of authority for canal chiefs and the CPP is their power to sanction 
rule-breaking farmers by proposing their eviction from their plot to the Joint Committee on 
Land Management (Sogreah/Bceom/Betico, 1999). Lastly, the CPP should provide a platform 
for conflict settlement on water management issues and should be the official point of contact 
at the village level for the central management.  
To date, the CPPs have been seldom effectively established (CDP, 2004). In most of the 
villages throughout the irrigation scheme, the posts of canal chief and head of the CPP are 
filled, but meetings do not take place and none of the CPPs assigned functions is carried out. 
As to the canal chiefs, group discussions revealed that all but one of the tertiary blocks from 
the sample have one, even though not all farmers are aware of it. This finding is confirmed by 
a survey of 127 farmers in 11 villages by Bastiaens (2005), where 32 % of the interviewed 
farmers reported that they have no canal chief. Since a complete list of the canal chiefs exists 
at the central management of the irrigation scheme, it can be assumed that the respondents are 
not aware of the presence of a canal chief. Another 10 % of respondents stated that their canal 
chief does not take on any of his assigned functions. Furthermore, decisions by the canal chief 
are often not respected, which makes his function largely meaningless. 
The prime reason for the lack of adoption of the CPP is the absence of direct benefits it 
offers. Indeed, the ample and flexible water supply allows farmers and the water guard to 
circumvent the need for communication by keeping the secondary canal continuously at full 
capacity (Chapter 3). Regarding planning and monitoring tertiary infrastructure maintenance, 
the procedures, including obligatory meetings of which written records should be kept, are 
considered too heavy. The proportional equivalence between benefits and costs, one of the 
design principles for successful institutions, is thus violated (Ostrom, 1993). Furthermore, 
patterns of conflict management and information transfer already existed. Embedded in the 
social structure of the village, they have a natural authority that the artificially created CPPs 
lack (see further details below). Indeed, where strong informal institutions de facto exercise 
certain powers, new formal institutions are often unable to take these over and remain 
ineffective (Onibon et al., 1999). The second reason is the inherent flaw that a WUA 
operating at the village level is not fit to deal with specific water management issues that 
might arise on a particular tertiary block. This lack of fit between the boundaries of the 
resource and the community to whom powers have been transferred has often thwarted 
institutional change (Cleaver, 1999). 
Nevertheless, some individual CPP heads have assumed a role in water management, if 
not the intended role. In four out of the nine sample villages, they pass on information 
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between farmers and the water guard and are the mouthpiece of farmers vis-à-vis the central 
management. Apart from that, they are often called upon to substitute for the water guard 
when the latter is absent, a task that is not among their official competences. These CPP 
heads’ authority is based on their good relationship with the village chief and/or president of 
the cooperative, who in fact delegate water management tasks to them and lend them their 
authority. For example, as it has been observed in the Peguena village, the head of the CPP 
can be one of the advisers of the village chief, and is thus part of the chieftaincy. As such, the 
village leadership plays a vital role in the performance of these individual CPP heads. The 
importance of village leadership for collective action in this region has been pointed out by 
Vedeld (2000). The functioning of the village cooperative might be another decisive factor. In 
four out of five sample villages with the CPP head playing no role at all, the village 
cooperative is in difficulty or went bankrupt (Table 7.4). This observation reveals an 
institutional flaw. The village cooperative being the anchor for the CPP, it is not clear what 
should happen when the cooperative no longer exists. On the other hand, the CPP has never 
functioned in these villages, regardless of what happened with the village cooperative. Rather 
than a causal relation between the two, probably a third factor, such as the strength of village 
leadership, is responsible for both.  
Canal chiefs, who operate at tertiary block level, have little substance as well. Several 
issues are unfavorable to the authority of the canal chiefs. First, the election process of the 
canal chiefs was often flawed. The survey by Bastiaens (2005) showed that in only 53 % of 
the cases, the farmers of the tertiary block elected the canal chief freely, while in 37 % of the 
cases, Office du Niger agents appointed the chief either directly, or indirectly by putting 
forward stringent selection criteria. Second, the sanctioning system that should back up the 
canal chief is absent, given that the CPP are not functional, violating another of the design 
principles for successful institutions (Ostrom, 1993). A last and more fundamental reason, as 
revealed by the informal interviews with farmers and village chiefs, is the fact that most 
farmers find it difficult to accept the authority of a fellow farmer. Indeed, the very idea of 
electing a canal chief between their peers was imposed on them. The role of culture -in this 
case posing a constraint on institutional development- has often been underestimated while 
promoting management transfer (Cleaver, 1999). Nevertheless, some individual canal chiefs 
still managed to establish a personal authority concerning water management. This authority 
is largely based on their conviction of its importance and facilitated by their strong personality 
and frequent physical presence on the tertiary block. In the villages of the case studies, on 
average one quarter of canal chiefs are reported to possess such qualities.  
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Table 7.4 Association of the actual role of the head of the CPP with the functioning of the village 
cooperative 
Actual role of the CPP Functioning of the 
village cooperative The head of the CPP exercises 
(part of) his assigned role 
The head of the CPP plays no role at all 
Functional or 
successful 
2 Tiemedely-Coura, Kanasakko 1 Fassun 
In difficulty or- 
bankrupt 
2 Médina-Coura, Peguena 4 Medina, Moussa-Wèrè, Coloni, 
Suigui-Vocè 
Total 4  5  
 
7.4.2 Water Users Associations at the tertiary level 
Since 2002, in view of the lack of adoption of CPPs, new WUAs with competences on tertiary 
level water management are being set up at the level of each tertiary block. The ultimate 
objectives are ambitious. First, they want to support collective action for water management 
by offering a formal structure. The WUA will put forward an internal code that 
institutionalizes water management rules. The code can provide sanctions for rule breaking 
that are legally enforceable (BRL Ingénierie, 2004). Second, the tertiary level WUA will form 
the basis for bottom-up representation in federations that will take on water management 
responsibilities currently assigned to the central management of the irrigation scheme. The 
ultimate goal is to arrive at an exclusively farmer-managed irrigation scheme (CDP, 2004). 
However, in a first step, the competences of these WUAs, called ‘Organisations d’Entretien 
du Réseau Tertiaire’ (OERT), are restricted to maintenance. They do not replace existing 
village level CPPs, as the latter have much more complete competences on water 
management. The articulation between the two remains unclear though. For the time being, 
both will coexist without being linked to one another. So far, none are very active, and there is 
no competition between them. In addition, most of the time, the canal chief is also president 
of the OERT. It can be expected that when umbrella organizations for OERTs are created, the 
heads of the CPPs will be incorporated in a similar manner.  
The set-up of OERTs, intended to promote farmers’ participation, paradoxically excludes 
their involvement. The internal code, designed by the implementing agency (a local NGO), is 
identical for all of them. It states that membership of an OERT is determined through 
ownership of a plot on the tertiary block and is mandatory. Like the CPPs, OERTs have a 
rather heavy formal structure. They are chaired by a president and have two divisions for a 
total of six active members, among which are a treasurer and a secretary. The code provides 
for at least two meetings a year on maintenance programming, of which written records are to 
be kept. It stipulates furthermore that members should make financial contributions, which are 
administered in a deposit and used for maintenance works.  
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The success of OERTs cannot yet be fully assessed. From the experience of the first 
OERTs, some early conclusions can however be drawn. First, most farmers are convinced that 
OERTs are useful and find they facilitate collective action for maintenance (Etz, 2005; 
Bastiaens, 2005). However, only a handful of OERTs created are actually functional, and 
even then, most of the formal aspects of the organization are systematically disregarded. The 
position of the president and active members is mostly filled in, but official meetings do not 
take place, no written records are kept (80 % of farmers in the area are illiterate), and very 
few OERTs collected financial contributions (CDP, 2004; Etz, 2005). Its principal merit lies 
in the fact that a formal platform for collective action is created, which is recognized by all 
farmers of the tertiary block. Three reasons for its relative success can be identified. First, 
information and sensitization sessions have improved farmers’ comprehension of the 
responsibilities assigned to them during reforms. Second, OERTs explicitly bring together all 
farmers of a tertiary block, which generates a sense of group membership. Third, farmers 
appreciate the aspect of self-regulation established through the OERTs, in particular the fact 
that they can decide themselves when and how to maintain tertiary infrastructure (Etz, 2005). 
On the other hand, two important features might jeopardize the future of OERTs. First, the 
heavy structures and procedures for operating OERTs absorb much energy during their set-up 
and hinder rather than facilitate their functioning. Furthermore, the organizations’ basis of 
authority is very weak, since sanctions provided in the internal code do not go beyond blame. 
Once again, one of the fundamental design principles for successful institutions is being 
violated (Ostrom, 1993). Currently, OERTs can only be successful when they are supported 
by a consensus of all members, and obstinate rule breaking has already led to the collapse of 
some OERTs. Even with material sanctions, there would have to be an effective mechanism 
to enforce them. Legal backing by the judicial system, as currently intended, might not be 
effective, since it implies a huge psychological barrier for most farmers. Indeed, many 
farmers reported to feel insecure or even humiliated in front of officials given the knowledge 
and education gap that usually exists between them.  
 
7.4.3 Informal patterns of water management 
Decision-making on water management 
Two important and related principles shape decision-making. First, it is considered a matter of 
individual farmers; so collective rules that institutionalize consultation and coordination are 
rare (Chapter 5). The leading perception is indeed that when every one implements water 
management correctly, possible collective action problems are avoided (Bastiaens, 2005). 
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Second, in principle, access to water cannot be denied and maintenance duties cannot be 
imposed by fellow farmers. This principle results from the combination of prevalent 
egalitarian norms and the absence of customary law. Indeed, since the Office du Niger was 
constructed by the colonial power and during decades, decision-making was done exclusively 
by the central management, customary law regulating access and use of natural resources does 
not apply to the irrigation scheme. IMT has thus resulted in an open-access regime, a process 
comparable to the nationalization of natural resources where the state does not have the 
capacity to effectively manage the resource in the field (Ostrom, 1990). 
In practice, farmers’ decision-making is motivated by personal principles that are shaped 
by a trade-off between the common interest and personal costs, benefits and constraints. 
Regarding the cropping calendar, coordination of planting dates should avoid conflicts 
between irrigation and drainage at the end of the cropping season. Its cost, which consists of 
communication and observation of each others’ farming activities, is small, especially for 
farmers residing in the village, where the start of the cropping season is a topic of casual 
conversation. However, the main motivation is the economic benefit from anticipating the 
planting date in order to benefit from the higher price for early harvested rice (Coulibaly et 
al., 2002). Second comes the availability of workers and farming equipment, which limits 
farmers’ freedom of choice regarding the start of the growing season (Keita, 2003).  
As to the opening and closing of tertiary and field canal intakes, the common interest is 
not to overuse water or disturb fellow farmers’ irrigation activities. The cost consists in 
information gathering on ongoing irrigation activities. Since most farmers are not present on 
the field during irrigation, this implies that all field intakes need to be checked, which is 
considered a time-consuming task. In contrast, when several farmers are present at the same 
time, informal exchanges on irrigation activities have been witnessed.  
Maintenance is motivated above all by the fact that the aquatic weeds growing in the 
irrigation and drainage canals offer a habitat for the ravagers of the rice crop, such as rats and 
granivorous birds. In addition, degradation of the canal bed leads to leakages and frequent 
overflowing resulting in excess flooding of the rice fields. Since canals are over-dimensioned, 
decreasing water flow and storage capacity only becomes critical in case of long-term neglect. 
On most of the tertiary blocks, the agreement is that every farmer maintains the sections of the 
irrigation and drainage canals adjacent to his plot. The cost is in the first place labor input, but 
maintenance has a direct benefit by reducing damage by the ravagers of the rice crop.  
The trade-off can result in more or less individualistic behavior, depending on how heavy 
the common interest is weighed. Individualistic behavior has been noted to proliferate easily, 
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when farmers acting for the common good feel betrayed by the others. Ensuing collective 
action problems then remain unresolved and often lead to frictions. On the one hand, the 
presence of influential and motivated farmers on the tertiary block, can promote principles 
based on the common interest, which was confirmed in about all of the in-depth interviews 
with village leaders. These farmers are often, but not necessarily, canal chiefs. When they are, 
farmers of the tertiary block have formalized their de facto authority when the function of 
canal chief was created. On the other hand, when no one already possessed this authority, the 
appointment as canal chief could not establish it. 
Even though individual decision-making is the rule, for specific events such as acute water 
shortage or a large breach in the canal banks, farmers of a tertiary block can engage in 
temporary coordination of activities. To that end, informal meetings are convened on the spot 
where rules are agreed upon or activities are organized to cope with the situation. 
Participation is voluntary in principle, but can be pushed through peer pressure. The leading 
characteristics of ensuing coordination are that it is spontaneous, ad hoc and specific to the 
situation. Interviews however revealed that not all farmers groups manage to coordinate 
activities, even for short periods. On about one third of tertiary blocks from the sample, it is 
every man for himself in all situations. Most of these tertiary blocks have slid towards this 
chaotic situation because some farmers defected on rules or agreements. Without a functional 
monitoring and sanctioning system, they could do so unpunished, which eroded trust and 
incited individualistic reflexes (Chapter 4). Once these attitudes prevail, it is difficult to 
reintroduce coordination (Cleaver, 1999). Spontaneous collective action is thus not 
guaranteed to arise when needed. 
 
Conflict management 
In case of conflict on water management issues, a mediator is often called upon to make a 
decision. Conflict management follows pre-eminently informal patterns and passes through 
different steps. In a first step, the mediator is an influential farmer of the tertiary block, who 
may or may not be the canal chief. For 29 of the 36 tertiary blocks studied, most conflicts are 
settled at this level. For the other tertiary blocks, or when no agreement could be reached, an 
influential person at the village level is contacted. In seven of the nine villages of the case 
study, that person is the village chief. The village chief can either take a decision himself 
(5 villages), or call upon someone he judges more competent on the matter, such as the water 
guard, to whom he lends his authority (2 villages). Decisions taken at this level are normally 
followed. The village chief derives his authority from the respect that villagers grant him and 
from popular consent. Consequently, he has to act in the common interest of the village if he 
wants to maintain this authority. In general, this authority over non-resident farmers is much 
weaker or even inexistent. In the case the village chief does not interfere with conflicts on 
water management, another influential person at the village level is sought, such as the 
president of the village cooperative or the water guard. The following step is the central 
management of Office du Niger, even if it is not formally competent to settle these matters. 
This step is only taken in the case of serious and persistent conflicts. The central management 
is generally seen as a neutral agent and its decisions are respected, but it does not dispose of 
fixed procedures for conflict settlement, which makes its officials reluctant to get involved. In 
an ultimate step, which implies an even greater barrier, the conflict might be reported to the 
police or judicial system where a formal decision is pronounced. Up until today, WUAs do 
not play a role in conflict management, even though their leaders might be involved as a 
private person because of their personal authority. 
 
Information transfer 
No less than conflict management, information transfer follows informal patterns. Three 
levels of information transfer on water management are distinguished. The first concerns 
information on water management decisions at tertiary block level, where information 
gathering is an individual matter and is done through observations and personal contacts. 
Centralization of information does not take place. The next level concerns information 
transfer between farmers and the water guard regarding water supply and demand at the 
tertiary canal intake. Current strategies are to reduce the need for information transfer by 
maintaining an excess supply in the canals (Chapter 3). When information transfer does take 
place, it concerns specific demands of individual farmers and is done either directly or 
through the canal chief or head of the CPP. Centralization of information by the canal chief, 
as was originally intended, seldom occurs. The third level regards information transfer 
between farmers and the central management, which implies surpassing the village level. In 
general terms, the village chief is the pivot of information entering or leaving the village, and 
this is no different for water management. When farmers need to contact the central 
management, they go and see the village chief, who sends an intermediary to the central 
management. Likewise, when the central management wants to circulate information among 
farmers, they contact the village chief, who convokes a meeting to pass on the information.  
Formal pattern of information transfer designed in the scope of WUAs at the village level 
is thus completely disregarded (Figure 7.1). Informal patterns in use nevertheless show 
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several flaws. First, at the first and second level, information transfer is not institutionalized, 
meaning that (1) there is no rule which says that information should be shared and (2) there 
are no predetermined routes to circulate information which increases the probability that 
someone is not reached. Consequently, information transfer is incomplete at these levels. 
Next, at the third level of information transfer, non-resident farmers form a missing link, since 
they are out of touch with village level events. Their not being informed often creates 
frustration for both the non-residents themselves, for example when they are not informed on 
a temporary cut in water supply, and for others, when non-residents do not follow certain 
instructions they are not aware of. 
 
Canal Chief 
or president OERT
CPP Water Guard 
Village 
Chief 
Water 
Guard 
FarmerFarmer
Office
du Niger
Office
du Niger
Village level
Tertiary canal level
Central Management level
Individual level Farmer FarmerFarmer Farmer
 
Figure 7.1 Formal (left) and informal (right) patterns of information transfer 
 
Finally, in villages where the village chief is involved in a dispute between different 
factions, he can no longer be the pivot of information transfer, as is the case in Médina and 
Medina-Coura. When the central management is aware of the situation, they often try to 
contact various leaders within the village, which in itself is a time consuming task. Even then, 
the information might not reach some farmers, creating frustration as described above. 
Informal patterns of information transfer are thus incomplete and vulnerable to disruption. As 
such, they are an excellent example of how informal institutions are not necessarily better 
than the proposed formal ones (Cleaver, 1999). It rather illustrates that a power transfer from 
local informal but strong institutions to a new legality is hard to achieve when the informal 
institutions are completely sidetracked (Onibon et al., 1999; Ribot, 1996). 
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7.5 Recommendations to improve the success of WUAs in the 
Office du Niger 
In the Office du Niger, WUAs were set up to fill the power vacuum left by IMT but did not 
live up to expectations. First, they lack sanctioning mechanisms to make them credible. 
Second, by providing heavy procedures, costs of the WUAs are disproportionately high with 
respect to benefits. Third, the socio-cultural reality, in itself the result of the irrigation 
scheme’s historical track, has been disregarded. In particular, the fact that farmers do not 
accept the authority of fellow farmers for water management underlines the need of external 
sources of authority. Meanwhile, decision-making on water management continues to follow 
existing informal patterns. These are rather successful concerning conflict management, but 
show considerable deficiencies in coordinating decision-making and information transfer. In 
this context, WUAs could give the necessary impetus for strengthening water management, 
given that farmers effectively adopt them. Indeed, when all farmers of a tertiary block are 
involved in the WUA, it offers a much-needed platform for institutionalizing collective 
action.  
In view of the analysis of the role of WUAs and informal patterns of decision-making in 
water management, several recommendations can be formulated to improve the success of 
WUAs.  
1. Structures and procedures of WUAs should be kept as simple as possible. In addition, 
their objectives should respond to actual needs. These lie essentially in institutionalizing and 
facilitating information transfer reaching all farmers and enhancing collective action when 
problems occur. Activities of WUAs should thus be allowed to be spontaneous and specific to 
the situation, and formal structures should merely facilitate these activities. This implies that 
the internal code is drawn up by the members of the WUA and provides necessary flexibility 
and legitimacy for ad hoc agreements.  
2. In order to enhance their legitimacy, support of village leadership -in particular the 
village chief- should be considered. In this way, WUAs will be able to take advantage of 
existing patterns of conflict management, which are mostly effective. This support can be 
obtained by convincing village leadership of the importance of WUAs, and the importance of 
their involvement. Separate meetings with village authorities are thus needed before 
establishing the WUAs. Next, village authorities should be involved during the set-up of 
WUAs, for example, by asking them to preside at the set-up meeting, together with the 
extension agent in charge.  
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3. A water tight sanctioning system is needed, considering the growing presence of 
farmers and leaseholders that are non-resident farmers and fall outside the sphere of influence 
of the village chief. Farmers should thus be incited to provide financial or other sanctions 
when infractions are observed. When disputes over sanctions arise that cannot be solved 
within the WUA or at the village level, the WUA should be able to appeal to the central 
management for final settlement. The latter should then be able to appeal to fixed procedures 
for conflict settlement. 
The mechanism currently promoted, which involves the judicial system, is considered to 
imply too large a barrier for ordinary farmers to be effective. The central management 
however is closer to farmers while possessing the necessary authority. Given the current trend 
toward devolution of water management, this might seem as a step backwards. However, 
considering that on the moment of IMT, no customary or other forms of organization at 
farmers level were in place, it might be premature to completely discard it. 
 
7.6 Conclusions 
In irrigation schemes around the globe, WUAs are being created to replace the central 
management as the center of decision-making on water management. The importance of user 
participation and the involvement of informal institutions are recognized in theory. In 
practice, WUAs are however often imposed on farmers in a top down way, bypassing existing 
informal patterns of decision-making. Consequently, many WUAs do not fulfill their intended 
role. From the Office du Niger case study, several lessons can be learned.  
First, the involvement of existing sources of authority is indeed crucial for new legalities 
to work, especially in situations where authority is hard to establish. In the Office du Niger, 
and more generally in an African context, the village level provides such a source of 
authority. In this study, it was observed that performance of WUAs is strongly linked with the 
support of the village chieftaincy. Another important source of authority is the central 
management, which WUAs are nevertheless meant to replace. Indeed, in irrigation schemes 
where customary leadership has been stunted for decades, the central management might still 
be considered the only legitimate leader even after management transfer. In that case, 
collaboration between the central management and WUAs might be more useful than a model 
of antagonism. This implies that national governments, NGOs and international donors that 
usually promote WUAs should be prepared to give priority to existing informal principals of 
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governance and centers of authority, even when they contradict their own principles of 
democratic representation. 
Second, informal decision-making on water management is not always fully understood, 
which makes it impossible to take it into account. Active farmer participation in the design of 
WUAs provides part of the answer. However, there is also a role for researchers to 
accompany the creation WUAs to make local realities explicit. As such, they can facilitate the 
dialogue between farmers and the policy level.  
 
Box 9 The multiple users of the irrigation scheme 
The land, water and infrastructure of the Office du Niger are destined to irrigated agriculture. In 
practice, there are many other users besides farmers. At the tertiary block level, herdsmen and 
fishermen are the most important ones. Herdsmen water their herds in the tertiary canals and feed 
them on weeds and rice stubbles of fallow fields. They furthermore use the roads on the dikes to 
transport their cattle. In doing so, they often damage the canals and contour dikes, fostering water 
losses through leaks and breaches. Fishermen stretch their nets across the tertiary canals and 
sometimes open canal intakes in order to create a water flow. As such, they contribute to the excess 
water supply.  
So far, their role is not formally recognized, and they have no responsibilities or liabilities towards 
farmers or the central management. Consequently, the externalities created by herders and fishermen 
are born by the farmers only. As the irrigation scheme is generally considered as an open-access 
regime, farmers feel they cannot deny the right of entry to their tertiary block. In addition, herders and 
fishermen form highly variable groups whose members are difficult to identify. They do not 
systematically use the resources of the same tertiary block and are often outsiders to the village. As 
such, they are unknown to each other and to the farmers and village chiefs have little or no authority 
over them. This situation often leads to grudges and conflicts. These might further gain in amplitude as 
incentives are created for increasing irrigation efficiency. It will therefore be necessary to start a 
dialogue between the representatives of the different user groups in order to clearly define the rights 
obligations for each of them. 
  130
 131
Chapter 8  
The prospects for farmers’ water management: 
motivation for collective action  
Abstract1 
The present chapter studies the prospects for farmers’ water management based on their 
motivation for collective action using empirical data. The study is based on a statistical 
analysis of empirical data from the Office du Niger irrigation scheme, where Irrigation 
Management Transfer made farmers responsible for water management at the tertiary level. 
This transfer was part of a broader reform package, which has opened up economic 
opportunities. The study shows that farmers are diversifying their income at the expense of 
agricultural activities and rice farming in particular. This trend brings along an increased 
employment of wage laborers, who have water management among their tasks. It appears 
however that wage laborers are far less motivated to cooperate with fellow farmers, which 
might jeopardize the prospects for farmers’ water management. Based on the analysis, some 
policy recommendations are formulated. 
 
8.1 Introduction 
As a result of Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT), farmers need to establish collective 
action to deal with their common responsibilities. The success of collective action for the 
management of Common Pool Resources, such as collective irrigation schemes, depends on 
the trade-off between costs and benefits at the level of the user group and individual users 
                                                 
1 This chapter is adapted from: Vandersypen, K., Bastiaens, L., Traoré, A., Diakon, B., Raes, D., and  
Jamin, J.-Y. (In Press). The prospects for farmers’ water management: motivation for collective action in the 
Office du Niger irrigation scheme (Mali). Irrigation and Drainage. 
(Ostrom, 1992). At the group level, this trade-off is determined by the characteristics of the 
resource, the user group and institutional arrangements (Dayton-Johnson, 1999). Social norms 
and values, such as reciprocity, trust and fairness, also play a role as they can favor 
cooperation (Ostrom, 2000). At the individual level, the trade-off between perceived costs and 
benefits influence users’ motivation to participate in collective action. This can be attributed 
to economic dependence on the CPR (Adhikari et al., 2004), understanding and knowledge 
about the CPR (Baticados, 2004), and social and demographic characteristics such as age, 
gender, class and economic position (Futemma et al., 2002). This chapter investigates the 
socio-economic determinants of farmers’ motivation for collective action for the Office du 
Niger irrigation scheme. 
Until today, water in the Office du Niger is not scarce during the main growing season. 
Still, collective action for water management can be useful or even necessary. Firstly, 
coordination at the intake of the tertiary canal avoids over-supply of water to the tertiary 
canal. An over-supply increases the risk of breaches and overflows in the tertiary canal, 
leading to excessive flooding of rice fields. Next, excess water saturates the drainage system, 
causing drainage problems at harvest. Second, allocation rules avoid irrigation problems after 
a disruption of water supply at the secondary level (Chapter 5). The importance of collective 
action will furthermore increase with time. The Office du Niger has started an impressive 
expansion, aiming to more than double the irrigated area by 2020. As water will become 
scarce, coordination of supply and demand at the intake of the tertiary canal will be necessary 
to increase irrigation efficiency. Until today, collective action at the tertiary block level seems 
difficult to establish in the irrigation scheme (Chapter 4). As farmers adjust to their new 
responsibilities, a mentality shift towards assuming collective responsibility for water 
management might take place. This will favor the trade-off between costs and benefits of 
collective action at the group level. In order to stimulate this process, continuing efforts aim to 
enhance collective action by means of sensitization and information sessions on the one hand, 
and institution and capacity building on the other hand. Recent dynamics might however 
thwart this evolution through their negative influence on the trade-off at the individual level. 
Indeed, during the 1990s, economic reforms and technical improvements in rice farming 
contributed to a considerable rise in farmers’ purchasing power (Mariko et al., 2000). The 
ensuing economic expansion has increased non-agricultural employment, for example in retail 
trade and artisanship. Many plot holders are diversifying their sources of income at the 
expense of agricultural activities and in particular rice farming. For some, rice farming 
becomes a secondary occupation. Furthermore, the expansion of the irrigated area, together 
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with a decrease in plot size to promote intensification of rice production, has opened up land 
for new beneficiaries. Many of these already have a job outside agriculture, often as staff 
members of the central management or civil servants, and consider rice farming a secondary 
occupation. This evolution is expected to jeopardize the prospects for farmers’ water 
management. Indeed, plot holders who diversify their sources of income at the expense of rice 
farming reduce their stake in their rice plot. Therefore, it is assumed that they might become 
less interested in water management, and consequently less motivated for collective action. 
Furthermore, they are expected to rely more on seasonal wage laborers substituting family 
labor, when the latter concentrate on other activities. The latter are in turn also expected to be 
less motivated for collective action for water management. 
In order to gain insight in the determinants of motivation for collective action, these 
effects are evaluated using survey data. The analysis proceeds in the following steps: First, the 
socio-economic determinants of farmers’ interest in rice farming are assessed. Since interest 
in rice farming is expected to influence interest in water management, it is added to the list of 
socio-economic variables to predict interest in water management. Next, the impact of the 
determinants and interest in rice farming and water management on farmers’ motivation for 
water management and the employment of seasonal wage laborers are evaluated. Finally, the 
motivation for collective action of farmers and seasonal wage laborers are compared. 
 
8.2 Methods 
Data are drawn from a questionnaire survey on farmers’ attitudes towards water management 
conducted in 2004, which is described in detail in Bastiaens (2005). The survey covered 11 
villages from the Niono, Molodo and N’Debougou zones. 150 plot holders were selected 
randomly from the pay roll for water fees and were contacted with the help of the village 
chief, fellow farmers and other key informants. 48 plot holders from the sample are non-
resident farmers of which 24 plot holders were not known by the informants and could not be 
contacted. A trained interviewer administered the interviews. The questionnaire was presented 
to the person who is responsible for the actual cultivation of the rice plot within the family, 
called chief of operation, as indicated by the plot holder. The chiefs of operation are usually 
the plot holders themselves or an adult (male) family member. In a follow-up survey 
conducted in 2005, the same interviewer presented the questionnaire to fifty-one wage 
laborers employed by the plot holders from the 2004 survey. For detailed information on the 
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follow-up survey, see Traoré (2006). The questionnaire was constructed in French and 
translated into Bambara using the translation-back-translation technique (Brislin et al., 1973). 
After a testing phase, several questions were reformulated to improve respondents’ 
understanding. Closed questions were used to allow for statistical analysis. Crosschecking 
answers to specific questions allowed the detection of inconsistent responses. As such, 
twenty-six cases were eliminated from the sample of plot holders, setting their final sample 
size at 100. The average responses to key questions on farmers’ attitudes of the twenty-six 
eliminated cases did not differ significantly from the remaining sample averages of 100 cases. 
 
Table 8.1 Sample characteristicsa 
Particulars Chiefs of 
operationb 
Seasonal wage 
laborersb 
Office du Niger 
averagec 
Size of the rice plot (ha) 3.5 (2.7) - 2.6 (-) 
Number of persons living from the farm 13 (7.4) - - 
Employment of > 4 family workers 40% - - 
Principal activity is rice farming 44% - - 
Non-resident farmers 21% - 33% 
Village within the Office du Niger area 12%  18% 
Town within the Office du Niger area 9% - 10% 
Outside the Office du Niger area 0% - 5% 
Member of a cooperative 88% 25% 71%d 
Non-executive member 63% 7% - 
Executive member 25% 18% - 
Age (years) 43 (12) 30 (12) 49 (15) 
Number of generations     
First generation 18% - - 
Second generation 75% - - 
Third generation 7% - - 
Position of the plot    
Top end position 30% - - 
Middle position 35% - - 
Tail end position 35% - - 
a Numbers between brackets represent standard deviations 
b Survey data 
c survey of 2571 plot holders in 33 villages (Bélières et al., 2003) 
d Only village cooperatives, excluding Economic Interest Groups (GIEs) and farmers’ syndicates 
 
Sample characteristics are presented in Table 8.1. Non-resident plot holders, and 
particularly those living outside the Office du Niger irrigation scheme, are underrepresented 
in the survey sample. For non-resident plot holders, rice farming is more often a secondary 
activity (Bélières et al., 2003). It is furthermore expected that non-resident plot holders 
employ more seasonal wage laborers and are less motivated for collective action for water 
management. Judgments based on the survey sample should thus be interpreted with care. 
Differences in average age of chiefs of operation from the survey sample (average = 43 years) 
and plot holders in the total research population (average = 49 years) can be partly attributed 
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to the fact that chiefs of operation who are not plot holder are generally younger (average = 
30 years; n = 11). The statistical analyses are based on the binary logistic regression model 
and Pearson Chi-square test. The analyses are performed using the SPSS computer package. 
 
8.3 Socio-economic variables 
The socio-economic variables used in the statistical models are related to the current 
economic dynamics in the Office du Niger irrigation scheme. This section explains how they 
have been operationalized and selected. Table 8.1 presents summary statistics for the 
independent variables. 
 
Farm size 
Farm size contains three distinct aspects: (1) plot size, (2) number of persons living from the 
farm, and (3) number of family members working at the farm. It is expected that the larger the 
farm, the larger the farmer’s stake in rice farming, which in turn is assumed positively related 
to interest in rice farming and water management and motivation for collective action. The 
average plot size has decreased from over ten hectares in the early 1970s to about two 
hectares nowadays. There are several reasons for this sharp decline. First, in order to stimulate 
intensification of rice farming, a reduction in plot size accompanied rehabilitation of the 
irrigation infrastructure (Aw and Diemer, 2005). Next, in the second and third generation, 
many families divided the farm between the heirs, further reducing plot size (Keita, 1998). 
Moreover, in view of the considerable pressure on irrigated land in the Office du Niger, the 
average plot size in newly developed areas is often less than a hectare (CEFE Consultants, 
2004). The trend of reducing plot size is thus expected to persist in the foreseeable future, 
with a possible negative impact on interest in rice farming and water management and 
motivation for collective action. Regarding the employment of wage laborers, if they 
supplement family labor, it is assumed that they are employed more frequently on farms with 
a large plot size. On the other hand, if wage laborers substitute family labor, they are expected 
to be found more frequently on farms with a small number of family workers. The plot size is 
indicated on the pay roll for water fees and was verified during the survey. The number of 
persons living from farm income and the number of family members working at the farm 
were furthermore assessed during the survey. Many respondents appeared to have 
considerable difficulties counting the number of family members working at the farm 
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precisely, especially when many family members contributed. Indeed, the family labor force 
is not stable throughout the growing season. Instead of a quantitative variable, it was chosen 
to use the more robust dummy variable assessing whether yes or no, more than four family 
members work at the farm. 
 
Dependence on rice farming 
In the Office du Niger irrigation scheme, virtually all farmers have diversified their income, 
mostly in vegetable farming, livestock or trading (Bastiaens, 2005). The survey assessed on 
which of these activities (1) the chief of operation spends most of his time, and which 
(2) generates most income at the family level. The assumption is that when other sources of 
income require more time for the chiefs of operation, they will be less interested in rice 
farming and water management and less motivated for collective action. Likewise, having less 
time available for rice farming, they are assumed to employ more often wage laborers. The 
main source of income is expected to influence above all motivation for collective action: the 
less a farmer’s income depends on the collective resource, the less he is expected to be 
motivated for collective action (Ostrom, 1992). A second indicator for dependence on rice 
farming and assessed in the survey is the family’s place of residence. As they do not interact 
in daily life outside rice farming, non-resident farmers are less subject to peer pressure from 
their colleagues, which might reduce their motivation for collective action. In addition, some 
of the non-resident farmers live in one of the small towns in which most commercial activities 
within the area of the irrigation scheme are concentrated. These farmers have more 
opportunities to opt out of rice farming than farmers living in a village have and are therefore 
assumed to be less interested in rice farming and water management and even less motivated 
for collective action. Furthermore, given the distance that separates them from their plot, they 
are expected to employ more wage laborers. The place of residence is assessed during the 
survey and compared to the village nearby the plot. 
 
Membership of a cooperative 
In the process of economic liberalization in the irrigation scheme in the 1980s, international 
donors created village cooperatives to manage agricultural input supply, and processing and 
marketing of production. Because of mismanagement, about one third of these cooperatives 
went bankrupt and ceased to exist. Meanwhile, groups of farmers have autonomously created 
so-called Economic Interest Groups (GIEs) to replace or compete with existing cooperatives, 
and in the sample villages, either a village cooperative, GIE or both are present. Members of a 
cooperative are assumed more inclined towards collective action, since they already cooperate 
in other circumstances. This should be even more the case for executive members, i.e. those 
who hold a position in the cooperative such as president, secretary or treasurer. In the survey, 
membership of a cooperative, and the position in it were assessed. As the vast majority of 
cooperatives are farmer organizations, membership might furthermore imply strong 
involvement in rice farming, translating in a higher interest in rice farming and water 
management. 
 
Demography 
Two demographic variables were assessed during the survey: the age of the chief of operation 
and whether his father or grand father already was a farmer in the Office du Niger (translated 
in first, second or third-generation farmer). Younger people are expected to be more open to 
alternative economic opportunities and therefore less interested in rice farming and water 
management. Furthermore, popular consent has it that they are less courageous for working 
on the field, which might further reduce their interest in water management and collective 
action and increase the probability to employ wage laborers. Regarding generation, it is 
assumed that second and especially third-generation farmers are more firmly rooted and 
experienced in rice farming and water management and therefore more likely to be interested 
in it. Since their interaction with fellow farmers is extended over the generations, they are in 
addition assumed more motivated for collective action.  
 
Position of the plot  
The position of the plot on the tertiary canal is expected to have an impact especially on 
farmers’ motivation for collective action. A crucial aspect of collective action is gathering and 
sharing information about ongoing irrigation activities at the tertiary block. Since tertiary 
canals are about 750 to 1,000 m long, and most farmers are not present on the field during 
irrigation, this is a time-consuming task and therefore costly (Chapter 7). Thanks to their 
central position, information gathering and sharing is easier and thus less costly for farmers 
whose plot is located in the middle. They are therefore expected to be more motivated for 
collective action than their colleagues at top end or tail end plots. 
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Selection of variables 
Because of the presence of correlations within the group of socio-economic variables, a 
selection was carried out in order to obtain a final set for statistical analysis. First, the three 
variables of farm size are strongly positively correlated. Since plot size and the variable 
assessing the number of family members working at the farm are expected to have a different 
effect on the employment of wage laborers, both are kept as variables, while the number of 
persons living at the expense of the farm is excluded. Next, the place of residence is strongly 
related to membership of a cooperative. Indeed, virtually all of the resident farmers are 
members, while only two thirds of non-resident farmers are. Since membership of a 
cooperative is expected to have a specific effect on motivation for collective action, it is 
selected as a variable and place of residence is not. Lastly, regarding the dependence on rice 
farming, chiefs of operation who spend most of their time on rice farming usually derive also 
most of their income from it. Because the combined effect is expected to be stronger than the 
effect of the individual variables, a dummy variable for the main activity is used with value 
one if both are true and zero otherwise. The dummy variable is in turn related to plot size, 
with values of one being more frequent for larger plots. Both are however kept as variables 
because they are considered to contain supplementary information. Contrary to what might be 
expected, generation and age are not significantly related. Indeed, farmers continue to settle in 
the irrigation scheme since the early 1940s, so that some first generation farmers are still 
relatively young, and some third generation farmers might already relatively old. Contrary to 
what might be expected, generation and age are not significantly related. Indeed, farmers 
continue to settle in the irrigation scheme since the early 1940s, so that some first generation 
farmers are still relatively young, and some third generation farmers might be relatively old. 
 
8.4 Results from the statistical models 
8.4.1 Interest in rice farming 
Interest in rice farming is measured by asking chiefs of operation in which activity they would 
invest additional time and money. Responses are categorized in a dummy variable with a 
value of one if the respondent opted for rice farming and zero otherwise. Since the maximum 
production per area of land is not yet reached in the Office du Niger irrigation scheme 
(Haefele et al., 2003), extra time and money could be invested in the rice plot in order to 
increase yields, which would be an indicator for a farmer’s interest in rice farming. Results 
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indicate that only 38 % of the chiefs of operation from the sample would give priority to rice 
farming for investing extra time and money (Table 8.2).  
Significant determinants are age, the actual main activity, and generation, with postulated 
hypotheses being confirmed. This implies that, once a farmer has moved away from rice 
farming as a main activity, as many younger ones would prefer, the odds of returning are 
small. Under the current circumstances, a trend of farmers’ declining interest in rice farming 
can thus be expected. This is an important conclusion in itself. The Office du Niger already 
deals with 56 % part-time farmers (Table 8.1), a proportion that is likely to increase further. In 
addition, this trend might negatively influence farmers’ interest in water management and the 
success of collective action for water management at farmers’ level. The expected negative 
impact of plot size is not significant in the model, even though the average plot size is smaller 
for chiefs of operation who give priority to other activities than rice farming. 
 
Table 8.2 Determinants of the probability of priority for rice farming in investment decisions 
Independent variables Parameter estimates Sample descriptives2 
according to priority for 
investment in rice farming 
 B Exp(B) Yes No 
Total   38% 62% 
Middle position of plot on the tertiary canal1  0.690 1.993 39% 32% 
Tail end position of plot on the tertiary canal1  0.666 1.946 37% 34% 
Plot size (ha) 0.115 1.121 3.9 (2.8) 3.2 (2.5) 
Age (years) 0.062*** 1.064 46 (12) 41 (11) 
Employment of > 4 family workers  -0.808 0.446 39% 40% 
Member of a cooperative1  0.088 1.091 89% 87% 
Executive member of a cooperative1  0.599 1.820 26% 24% 
Principal activity (1 if rice farming, 0 otherwise) 1.317** 3.732 66% 31% 
Second-generation farmer1  1.647** 5.193 76% 74% 
Third generation farmer1  4.146*** 63.178 16% 2% 
Model constant -6.107*** 0.002   
Likelihood ratio index = 101.280*** 
Nagelkerke R square = 0.368 
% correctly predicted = 75 
** Significant at 0.05 probability level 
*** Significant at 0.01 probability level  
1 Increase or decrease in the value of the model constant compared to the reference category 
2 Numbers between brackets represent standard deviations 
 
8.4.2 Interest in water management 
In principle, the chief of operation takes all strategic and day-to-day management decisions 
regarding the rice plot. Likewise, important or delicate tasks are typically implemented by the 
chief of operation, while routine or more cumbersome tasks are left to other family members 
or seasonal wage laborers. The person responsible for decision-making and implementing 
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water management is thus a good indicator for interest in water management. As irrigation is 
one of the principal activities of water management throughout the growing season, the 
survey assessed (1) who decides on the time and volume of irrigation, and (2) who puts it into 
practice. The dependent variable used in the model is a dummy with a value of one if both 
decision-making and implementation are done exclusively by the chief of operation and a 
value of zero otherwise. 
 
Table 8.3 Determinants of the probability of irrigation activities being performed by the chief of 
operation 
Independent variables Parameter estimates Sample descriptives2 
according to irrigation being 
performed by the chief of 
operation 
 B Exp(B) Yes No 
Total   48% 52% 
Middle position of plot on the tertiary canal1  -0.224 0.799 33% 37% 
Tail end position of plot on the tertiary canal1  -0.300 0.741 35% 35% 
Plot size (ha) -0.343*** 0.710 2.8 (2.2) 4.0 (3.0) 
Age (years) 0.022 1.023 45 (12) 41 (12) 
Employment of > 4 family workers  0.589 1.802 42% 38% 
Member of a cooperative1  1.715* 5.559 96% 81% 
Executive member of a cooperative1  2.264** 9.623 29% 21% 
Principal activity (1 if rice farming, 0 otherwise) 0.040 1.041 46% 42% 
Second-generation farmer1  1.347** 3.847 81% 69% 
Third generation farmer1  1.775 5.898 8% 6% 
Priority for rice farming in investment decisions  0.617 1.854 46% 31% 
Model constant -3.028* 0.048   
Likelihood ratio index = 114.687** 
Nagelkerke R square = 0.282 
% correctly predicted = 68 
* Significant at 0.1 probability level 
** Significant at 0.05 probability level 
*** Significant at 0.01 probability level  
1 Increase or decrease in the value of the model constant compared to the reference category 
2 Numbers between brackets represent standard deviations 
 
About half of the chiefs of operation from the sample still both take decisions and 
implement them personally (Table 8.3). In reality, this figure might be lower, as non-resident 
plot holders, who are underrepresented in the sample, probably more often leave irrigation to 
others. Results from the binary logistic model show that, contrary to the expectations, this is 
more frequent on farms with a larger plot size. The reason might be that on large farms, it is 
simply impossible for the chief of operation to assume irrigation activities all alone. Other 
significant variables are membership of a cooperative and generation, whose impact is in line 
with the hypotheses. Ultimately, chiefs of operation for whom rice farming is not a priority, 
more often leave decision-making and/or implementing irrigation to others. The parameter in 
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the model is not significant, but this might be due to its relation with other significant 
parameters, such as generation. If only half of chiefs of operation are responsible for irrigation 
nowadays, this figure might further decline as interest in rice farming decreases over the 
years. Water management is thus not a major concern for farmers.  
 
8.4.3 Motivation for collective action for water management 
In this study, farmers’ willingness to introduce coordination of demand and supply at the 
tertiary canal intake is used as an indicator for motivation for collective action. This is an 
important aspect of collective action under the present circumstances of water abundance, 
since it can avoid over-supply of water to the tertiary block and its negative consequences. 
Furthermore, as water becomes more scarce due to the ongoing expansion of the irrigated 
area, this coordination will be essential to improve irrigation efficiency (Chapter 5). It is 
usually put into practice by an influential farmer, who collects information on water demand 
of fellow farmers and coordinates the opening and closing of the tertiary canal intake. 
According to the guidelines of the central management, this is the task of the tertiary canal 
chief, who is elected by the farmers of the tertiary block. All farmers however need to 
cooperate with this system by collecting and sharing information. In practice, coordination of 
water supply and demand takes place in about one third of tertiary blocks (Bastiaens, 2005). 
Respondents could be incited to answer positively on a direct question on whether the 
respondent would like coordination introduced because of political correctness. Therefore, the 
questionnaire featured a more open question asking what are, in the opinion of the respondent, 
the tasks a canal chief should perform. Next, a dummy variable was used with a value of one 
when both collecting information on individual farmers’ water demand and coordination of 
the tertiary canal intake were mentioned among the tasks and a value of zero otherwise. 
About 65 % of the chiefs of operation from the sample would like the canal chief to 
coordinate water supply and demand at tertiary block level, meaning there is quite a good 
potential for collective action (Table 8.4). The binary logistic regression model predicting the 
probability of favoring this coordination has only two significant variables. As expected, 
chiefs of operation from larger plots and at the middle position of the tertiary canal are more 
often in favor of coordination. Furthermore, the model is not significant as a whole, meaning 
the set of independent variables is not adequate to explain the probability of favoring 
coordination. In other words, farm characteristics say little about farmers’ motivation for 
collective action. Nevertheless, even though the model parameters are not significant, chiefs 
of operation who would not give priority to rice farming for investing extra time and money, 
 141
as well as those not taking on decision-making and implementation of irrigation activities, are 
less likely to be in favor of coordination. This might imply that as interest in rice farming and 
water management decline as is suggested by the results, motivation for water management 
also decreases. On the other hand, in view of the results on interest in water management, the 
motivation of the chiefs of operation might be of decreasing relevance. Indeed, only half of 
them are actually responsible for decision-making and implementation of irrigation, these 
tasks often being left to seasonal wage laborers. Consequently, the motivation of the latter is 
equally pertinent for the prospects of collective action.  
 
Table 8.4 Determinants of the probability of favoring coordination of water demand and supply at 
tertiary block level 
Independent variables Parameter estimates Sample descriptives2 
according to the respondent 
favoring cooperation 
 B Exp(B) Yes No 
Total   65% 35% 
Middle position of plot on the tertiary canal1  1.550** 1.601 43% 20% 
Tail end position of plot on the tertiary canal1  .626 0.793 32% 40% 
Plot size (ha) .216* 1.173 3.7 (2.8) 3.1 (2.5) 
Age (years) .024 1.026 43 (12) 43 (13) 
Employment of > 4 family workers  -.885 0.846 35% 49% 
Member of a cooperative1   1.396 86% 91% 
Executive member of a cooperative1  -.056 1.740 23% 29% 
Principal activity (1 if rice farming, 0 otherwise) -.155 1.965 46% 40% 
Second-generation farmer1  .300 1.310 75% 74% 
Third generation farmer1   1.033 5% 11% 
Priority for rice farming in investment decisions  -.085 0.457 35% 43% 
Irrigation activities are performed by the chief 
of operation  -1.508 0.541 40% 63% 
Model constant -.611 0.252   
Likelihood ratio index = 111.546 
Nagelkerke R square = 0.226 
% correctly predicted = 71 
* Significant at 0.1 probability level 
** Significant at 0.05 probability level 
1 Increase or decrease in the value of the model constant compared to the reference category 
2 Numbers between brackets represent standard deviations 
 
8.4.4 Employment of seasonal wage laborers 
The employment of seasonal wage laborers was assessed during the survey of chiefs of 
operation. A dummy variable was used with a value of one if any seasonal wage laborers are 
present and a value of zero otherwise. From the results, it appears that 35 % of chiefs of 
operation from the sample employ seasonal wage laborers (Table 8.5). In reality, this figure 
might be higher, since plot holders living outside the Office du Niger area are hardly ever 
present in the irrigation scheme and usually rely on wage laborers to cultivate their plot. 
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Indeed, if all plot holders living outside the Office du Niger area from the initial sample of 
150 cases employ wage laborers, the figure would rise to 47%.  
 
Table 8.5 Determinants of the probability of employing seasonal wage laborers 
Independent variables Parameter 
estimates 
Sample descriptives2 
according to the employment 
of wage laborers 
 B Exp(B) Yes No 
Total   35% 65% 
Middle position of plot on the tertiary canal1  -0.743 0.476 29% 38% 
Tail end position of plot on the tertiary canal1  0.405 1.499 37% 34% 
Plot size (ha) 0.628*** 1.874 4.5 (3.3) 2.9 (2.1) 
Age (years) 0.013 1.013 41 (12) 44 (12) 
Employment of > 4 family workers  -3.356*** 0.035 26% 48% 
Member of a cooperative1  -0.026 0.974 86% 89% 
Executive member of a cooperative1  1.965** 7.135 37% 18% 
Principal activity (1 if rice farming, 0 otherwise) -1.324* 0.266 37% 48% 
Second-generation farmer1  -0.883 0.413 69% 78% 
Third generation farmer1  -0.907 0.404 6% 8% 
Priority for rice farming in investment decisions  -0.403 0.668 34% 40% 
Irrigation activities are performed by the chief of 
operation  -1.261
** 0.283 29% 58% 
Model constant -0.616 0.540   
Likelihood ratio index = 85.012*** 
Nagelkerke R square = 0.494 
% correctly predicted = 80 
* Significant at 0.1 probability level 
** Significant at 0.05 probability level 
*** Significant at 0.01 probability level  
1 Increase or decrease in the value of the model constant compared to the reference category 
2 Numbers between brackets represent standard deviations 
 
The opposite effect of plot size and the number of family members working on the plot on 
the probability of employing seasonal wage laborers confirms the presence of two distinct 
strategies: supplementing family labor with wage labor on the one hand, and substituting 
family labor by wage labor on the other hand. Further, it appears that when the chief of 
operation is an executive member of a cooperative, he is more likely to employ wage laborers, 
which is contrary to intuition. A possible explanation could be that executive members are 
generally wealthier than regular members or non-members, and therefore can more easily 
afford to hire wage laborers. However, this explanation remains to be tested. Finally, the odds 
of employing seasonal wage laborers are much larger when rice farming is not the principal 
activity of the chiefs of operation as well as when the latter leaves decision-making and 
implementing irrigation to others. This might imply that, since in view of the results from the 
previous models, a trend of declining interest in rice farming and water management is 
expected, the number of wage laborers will rise over the coming years. Indeed, a 
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differentiation in the agricultural work force emerges in the Office du Niger irrigation 
scheme, with on the one hand chiefs of operation, whose family holds the title to the plot, and 
on the other hand seasonal wage laborers who actually work on the land. This differentiation 
might jeopardize the prospects for collective action, as those who implement water 
management are not the same as those responsible for it.  
 
8.4.5 Farmers’ versus wage laborers’ motivation for collective action 
Table 8.6 features the proportion of chiefs of operation and seasonal wage laborers in favor of 
coordinating water demand and supply at tertiary block level. It seems that a much smaller 
fraction of wage laborers would favor coordination of water supply and demand at the tertiary 
level compared to the sample of chiefs of operation. This difference might root in the fact that 
they do not have a long-term perspective, as can be expected from the wage laborers. Indeed, 
most have already worked on different rice plots and remain on a plot for only about three 
years. Furthermore, many of them are seasonal migrants and thus are no part of the social 
tissue of the village. In addition, relatively few are members of a cooperative (Table 8.1). 
Lastly, being paid a fixed amount (Traoré, 2006), most seasonal wage laborers do not benefit 
from an increased production, and consequently have fewer incentives to invest time and 
effort to optimize production. With the number of seasonal wage laborers increasing under the 
current trends, and their being less motivated for collective action, prospects look rather grim 
and a specific policy response is needed.  
 
Table 8.6 Proportion of chiefs of operation and wage laborers in favor or not in favor of coordinating 
water supply and demand at tertiary block level 
  In favor of coordination Not in favor of coordination Total 
Chiefs of operation 65% 35% 100 
Wage laborers  43% 57% 51 
Total 58% 42% 151 
Pearson Chi-square value = 8.512, df = 2, p = 0.014 
 
8.5 Conclusion and policy recommendations 
A spectacular rise in economic opportunities in the Office du Niger irrigation scheme has set 
off a trend towards diversification of income. Farmers, whose sole occupation used to be rice 
farming, are now part-time farmers with different activities in their portfolio that might even 
take up more time or produce more income than rice farming. Results from this study suggest 
that the number of part-time farmers, who already take up about half of the farmer 
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community, will further increase. Indeed, especially young chiefs of operation want to move 
away from rice farming and once rice farming is no longer the principal activity, they are not 
likely to return. At the same time, only half of the farmers, and even less in the case of part-
time farmers, implement water management personally, the other half leaving seasonal wage 
laborers in charge. Nevertheless, two thirds of chiefs of operation favor collective action for 
water management. More important is however the confirmation of a trend towards increasing 
employment of seasonal wage laborers, who are less motivated for collective action.  
Two policy recommendations follow from the analysis: 
1. Seasonal wage laborers as a target group: A first implication concerns the identification 
of relevant target groups for efforts aiming to enhance collective action through sensitization 
and transfer of information. Until now, seasonal wage laborers are entirely by-passed, 
whereas they are in fact most in need of them. Second, they are ignored by the Water User 
Associations being set up at tertiary block level to establish rules and regulations for water 
management. Consequently, their role in water management is not taken into account, and 
wage laborers usually are not aware of agreed rules and regulations so that it is difficult to 
hold them accountable for their actions.  
2. Agricultural policy supporting full-time rice farming: The results of this study raise 
questions about the compatibility of IMT and part-time farming. Part-time farming is no 
problem as such, but appears unfavorable for collective action, which will be necessary to 
face the future challenges. It is currently fuelled by several factors. First, there is the trend of 
diversifying income within the actual population of the irrigation scheme. While there is 
certainly a pull-factor due to burgeoning economic opportunities in the area of the Office du 
Niger, there are also push-factors, related to bottlenecks in financing, input supply and 
technical assistance, which limit profitability of rice farming. Next, the lack of fully-fledged 
property rights on land in the irrigation scheme further drives farmers to alternative economic 
activities for investment. Indeed, some farmers currently feel insecure about whether they will 
be able to reap the benefits of investments in their rice plot in the long term. In order to keep 
the current setting of water management workable, there might be a need of agricultural 
policy supporting rice farming. Second, the disproportional inflow of part-time farmers 
through new plot allocations speeds up the increase of their numbers. All land in the vicinity 
of the Office du Niger belongs to the Malian state, and the expansion of the irrigated surface 
is financed by public funds. In principle, every citizen should thus have access to irrigated 
land. Yet, to enhance the prospects for successful farmers’ water management, preferential 
access for full-time farmers might be justified. 
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Box 10 Land and water rights 
At first sight, land and water rights appear rather insecure in the Office du Niger irrigation scheme. 
Actual practice however turns out much more rosy. Land rights depend on the type of contract. 
Farming contracts, a first type, are yearly and tacitly renewable on the condition that the farmers’ 
obligations are fulfilled (payment of the water fee, conservation measures, etc.). The second type, 
farming licenses, have an indeterminate duration and are transferable to heirs. Farmers can obtain 
them after two years of cultivation with due diligence. Eviction is still possible when the farmers’ 
obligations are violated. The vast majority of farmers however still have farming contracts, either 
because they are unaware of the other type or because they cannot tell the difference. In practice, the 
farming contracts are also of an indeterminate duration, as farmers have never been evicted but for 
failure to pay the water fee. They are also transferable to heirs, who can even ask to subdivide the 
plot, which is called “séparation de famille”. Actual rights go even much further. Indeed, even though 
illegal as farmers do not own the land, transactions occur frequently enough for prices for renting and 
selling land to be well established and known to everybody. The practice seems furthermore to be 
tolerated by the central management.  
Water rights are not stipulated explicitly, but the ongoing practice is that water delivery is on demand 
and the central management guarantees water deliveries on all official plots.  
In-depth interviews with village leaders reveal how land and water rights are perceived by farmers. 
Several points stand out: 
• In irrigated agriculture, land and water rights are logically inseparable in the view of farmers, since 
you cannot use one without the other. This implies that the water fee is paid for both the land and 
the water at once. Paying the fee gives you access to irrigated land, i.e. a plot to which water is 
delivered. 
• Since land and water have to be paid for, they do not belong to the farmers; they belong to the 
state, embodied by the central management of the Office du Niger.  
• Perpetual use of land and unlimited quantities of water are guaranteed, on the sole condition that 
the water fee is paid. On the other hand, eviction follows immediately and irrevocably the first time 
the water fee is not paid, irrespective of how many years it was paid on time (even though you can 
try to get another plot using a made-up name). Once you are evicted, you have lost all your rights, 
and no compensation is paid. This is considered unjust. 
Even though established farmers have far-reaching land and water rights, access to these rights for 
outsiders to the irrigation scheme is highly unequal and unfavorable for the poor. Indeed, plots are 
allocated increasingly to non-farmers. Staff members of the central management appear to be first in 
line, as are local researchers, traders, civil servants etc. This practice violates one of the major 
objectives of the Office du Niger, which is reducing rural poverty. From the point of view of the non-
farmer beneficiaries, it makes however complete sense. As a staff member of the central management 
articulated: “It would be absurd: you work at the Office du Niger and you buy your rice at the market?” 
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PART III 
TOOLS FOR PARTICIPATORY WATER 
MANAGEMENT 
 
Summary 
This dissertation states that farmers need appropriate training and support to help them in their 
management tasks. Using the results from the field study on the impact of management 
practices on performance (Part I) and the analysis of the social forces behind water 
management (Part II), this part presents two types of tools that support farmers’ water 
management. The first tool consists in training material on the principles and processes of 
water management. It contains extension posters and a manual for trainers. The posters show 
how individual management practices and collective action affect irrigation efficiency and 
result in or alleviate irrigation and drainage problems. Given the difficult social context and 
the many practical constraints that farmers face, it would be unrealistic to optimize all aspects 
of water management. Still, some action must be taken to increase irrigation efficiency, which 
is urgently required when the irrigated area expands and water becomes more scarce. 
Therefore, the second tool is a simulation model of water management. This model is an 
analytical tool, which helps the user to find the best mix of practices that increase irrigation 
efficiency to a desired level while preserving farmers’ interests. The results of the simulations 
are subsequently translated into guidelines. Both tools have been presented in a workshop 
uniting farmers, extension officers, the presidency of the central management and 
international donors involved in the irrigation scheme. The positive reactions confirmed the 
necessity of training and training material on water management and validated the approach 
for their development. 
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Chapter 9  
Didactic tools for supporting farmers’ water 
management in collective irrigation schemes 
Abstract1 
In many irrigation schemes, Water Users Associations (WUAs) acquired the responsibility 
over water management after withdrawal of the state. Based on the success of some 
indigenous irrigation schemes, it was assumed that farmers could become easily managers. As 
decision-making was the exclusive terrain of the governmental agencies that ran the schemes, 
farmers never gained the necessary experience with water management. Therefore, training of 
farmers and WUAs on the principles and processes of water management is essential. This 
chapter reports on the process of developing training material on water management for a case 
study in the Office du Niger irrigation scheme. This process includes (i) setting the training 
agenda, (ii) selecting and adapting information to be featured, (ii) targeting the audience and 
(iv) designing the actual training material. It is based on a comprehension of the practical and 
socio-economic constraints that shape water management and its potential for improvement. 
A first validation of the approach and examples of the actual training material were obtained 
in a workshop uniting all stakeholders. 
 
9.1 Introduction 
Because of Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT), farmers and their Water Users 
Associations (WUAs) are taking over management in irrigation schemes all over the world. 
                                                 
1 This chapter is adapted from: Vandersypen, K., Keita, A.C.T., Lidon, B., Raes, D., Jamin, J.-Y. (Submitted) 
Didactic tools for supporting participatory water management in collective irrigation schemes. Irrigation and 
Drainage Systems 
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Training is essential to prepare them for this task, but is often limited to financial and 
administrative aspects, such as the structuring of WUAs, conducting meetings, keeping 
records and accounting. Water management is usually not part of the training package, while 
in many small-scale schemes or at the lower canal levels, farmers are in charge of it since 
IMT. Understanding of water management principles and processes is nevertheless a 
precondition for farmers to become successful managers, but training on the subject is omitted 
because of the implicit assumption that local knowledge, gained through daily experience, is 
adequate. Farmers in government-funded irrigation schemes however commonly originate 
from rain fed agriculture and did not bring a culture of hydraulics with them. Next, upon 
arrival in the irrigation scheme, a governmental agency monopolized all decision-making on 
water management so that farmers have even no experience to rely on when IMT was carried 
out (Shah et al., 2002; Meinzen-Dick et al., 2002). Actually, a lack of training undermines the 
effectiveness of WUAs throughout the world.  
This lack of training is obviously not the only obstacle for WUAs. They must be well 
designed and accepted by farmers. Furthermore, the right incentives should be in place and 
the necessary social capital should be available (Ostrom, 1994b; Snellen et al., 2004). A better 
understanding of water management principles and processes might partly alleviate these 
other obstacles and as such plays an important role in making WUAs functional. For example, 
awareness of the available management options and their impact increases farmers’ actual 
control over the system, which might foster their motivation. Furthermore, training can serve 
as an equalizer, putting every participant at the same level of information. This should in turn 
favor participatory processes and enhance the potential for cooperation.  
The Office du Niger irrigation scheme presents a clear case for the need for training on 
water management. Irrigation management transfer (IMT), which gave farmers the 
responsibility over water management at tertiary level, has not lived up to the expectations of 
the central management. The latter fears that low irrigation efficiencies, insufficient 
maintenance, drainage problems and conflicts among farmers might jeopardize the ambitious 
goals of expansion of the irrigation scheme. Currently, WUAs are installed in the irrigation 
scheme to help farmers organize water management in order to improve its performance 
(Chapter 7). Up to now, training is however limited to explaining the organization and 
administration of WUAs and farmers’ responsibilities on water management. Farmers 
appreciate their independence, but lack the necessary knowledge and skills to be in full 
control of water management (Colin and Petit, 2007). The training agenda will therefore have 
to include principles and processes of water management. 
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Office du Niger staff is in charge of the installation and training of WUAs. For this 
purpose, it disposes of an extension service in each of the administrative zones. However, the 
extension service does not contain sufficient staff to be in close contact with farmers. Water 
guards on the other hand, who operate intakes and control structures of secondary canals, 
interact daily with farmers and in practice do most of the extension work. In the remainder of 
the chapter, the term extension officer is used to mean both the actual extension officers and 
water guards who assume that role. Most extension officers have had no technical schooling 
and despite their job are not well up in water management. To increase their capabilities in 
extension, they need training themselves. During several preliminary workshops, extension 
officers furthermore expressed a demand for didactic material to use during training sessions. 
The central management acknowledged the need for training and training material on water 
management for WUAs and extension officers. Consequently, they requested a translation of 
the knowledge acquired during the research project into training material. This chapter reports 
on the development of the training material, which consists of extension posters to be used by 
extension officers during training sessions, and a trainers’ manual, for the extension officers 
themselves.  
 
9.2 Approach 
Over the past few decades, research and development for extension has advanced 
substantially in domains such as agronomy, integrated pest management and soil 
conservation, with new methodologies being developed and tested (Norton et al., 1999; Marra 
et al., 2003; Bodnár et al., 2006). Training and extension has evolved from a model of 
‘transfer of technology’ to more participatory approaches (Vanclay and Lawrence, 1994; 
FAO, 2001; Bodnár et al., 2006). In the first model, scientists identified problems and 
developed solutions, which were then transferred by extension officers. This approach 
suffered from a lack of adoption, as scientists neglected cultural, socio-economic or practical 
constraints and ignored farmer-developed solutions already in place. Rather than proposing a 
particular solution, participatory training aims to develop farmers’ problem solving ability by 
making knowledge available and stimulating the decision-making process (Stemerding et al., 
2002; German, 2006). As such, the content of training package consists in principles, methods 
and possibly some examples of solutions from which farmers can select (FAO, 2001; 
Loevinsohn et al., 2002). These solutions can take into account current farmers’ practices or 
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existing local knowledge (Defoer et al., 2002). The training material will have to be used in 
the specific context of the target area, which very often implies some constraints. They can be 
physical, agronomic, economic, socio-cultural and institutional. These constraints determine 
which variables in the relations under study should be considered as fixed, and which can be 
adjusted. Researchers’ role has thus shifted from developing innovations to making 
information available that takes into account local practices and constraints. Farmers and 
extension officers participate in this process by giving feedback on the identification of 
problems and the information developed (van de Fliert and Braun, 2002).  
Not all farmers need to be trained directly by extension officers, as useful knowledge is 
easily diffused. This diffusion process can however be stimulated by including opinion 
leaders in the training sessions, as they are key for information transfer among their peer 
(Feder and Savastano, 2006). These patterns of information transfer might however exclude 
particular groups of society, which consequently have to be targeted explicitly. A good 
knowledge on the social environment is therefore necessary. 
On the basis of these principles, an approach is elaborated for the development of training 
material that consists of five steps.  
1. Setting the training agenda using the insights of a stakeholder analysis; 
2. Selecting which parameters should be considered as variable and which as fixed, through 
an investigation of the physical, agronomic, economic, socio-cultural and institutional 
constraints that shape water management and its potential for improvement; 
3. Targeting the audience of extension officers through an analysis of the patterns of transfer 
of information on water management; 
4. Designing the actual training material; 
5. Presenting the training material to local stakeholders in order to validate the approach and 
obtain feedback.  
Depending on the outcome of the last step, one or more of the previous steps can be reiterated, 
after which step five is repeated.  
 
9.3 Results 
9.3.1 Setting the training agenda 
Results from the stakeholder analysis show that the central management prioritizes increasing 
irrigation efficiency to make the expansion of the irrigation scheme possible. Farmers on the 
 154
other hand do not care about efficiency, but value easy irrigation and drainage highly. Indeed, 
easy irrigation and drainage implies a minimal labor input, which is important as it comes at 
the cost of time available for other income generating activities or leisure. Furthermore, when 
severe, irrigation and drainage problems might affect quality and quantity of rice yields. Low 
irrigation efficiencies are, besides a structural shortage of drainage capacity, an important 
cause of recurring drainage problems. Unfortunately, individual farmers’ efforts to improve 
efficiency dissipate over a large area and only combined efforts would have a tangible impact. 
Many farmers are furthermore not aware of the effect of water losses on drainage problems. 
Current water management strategies imply a systematic over-supply of water, which imply 
low irrigation efficiency, but allow easy irrigation without the need for collective action on 
water allocation. Only after a supply crisis or in tertiary blocks with an unfavorable 
topography, collective action on water allocation is required to avoid irrigation problems. Not 
all tertiary blocks however dispose of the necessary social capital to establish it.  
Meanwhile, the expansion of the irrigation scheme is already under way. As the primary 
canal level imposes a bottleneck on total water deliveries, over-supply at one moment will 
inevitable be alternated by shortages on other moments. Farmers whose plot has an 
unfavorable location will be the first to suffer. Furthermore, drainage problems currently 
affect one third of the surface at harvest. Given the structural shortcomings of the drainage 
system, the problems cannot be expected to disappear soon.  
The following topics are set on the training agenda: 
• How individual management practices and collective action affect irrigation efficiency and 
increase or reduce irrigation and drainage problems.  
• What is the link between water losses and drainage problems.  
• Which management strategies can be used to cope with irrigation and drainage problems 
or alleviate their consequences.  
 
9.3.2 Selecting the fixed and variable parameters 
Over the past decades, some technical interventions greatly improved the performance of the 
irrigation scheme. Rehabilitation and modernization of irrigation infrastructure have nearly 
eradicated irrigation problems. Furthermore, the introduction of rice transplanting reduced 
water requirements at the onset of the growing season and decreased overall consumption. At 
present, it is however unlikely that more of such interventions will be implemented. On the 
other hand, improvements in both individual management practices and collective action are 
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expected to further increase the irrigation scheme’s performance. In fact, there exist various 
management practices which result in quite different performance levels. Therefore, 
management practices are considered as the variable parameters when developing the training 
material, while infrastructure and cultural practices are considered fixed. The only exception 
is the coordination of cropping calendars within a tertiary block, which should be considered 
as a fixed parameter. Indeed, labor constraints typically occur at the onset of the growing 
season, since land preparation and transplanting are labor-intensive tasks. Farm households 
with little family workers need the help of day laborers, which at that moment are in short 
supply. This forces them to postpone the cropping season. Farm households without their own 
equipment for land preparation face similar constraints, as they need to rent it from 
neighboring farmers. In addition, financial constraints can provoke delays, as farmers struggle 
to purchase necessary inputs, such as sowing seed. On the other hand, farmers with logistic 
and financial clout face strong incentives to start early in the cropping season. Bringing their 
rice early on the market, they can benefit from high prices. All these constraints and 
incentives make coordination of the cropping calendar nearly impossible (Keita, 2003).  
Other management practices also face constraints. First, labor is highly valued by farmers. 
Furthermore, among the cultural practices, such as fertilization and weeding, water 
management has a low priority (Bastiaens, 2005). Consequently, even though few farmers 
will encounter hard labor constraints during most of the growing season, proposals that imply 
an increased labor input for water management might have limited success. On the other 
hand, current priorities reflect the ample water availability (Bastiaens, 2005). When water 
becomes scarcer or incentives for rational use are introduced, these priorities might change. 
Concerning collective action in particular, a strong set of constraint comprises the 
ineffectiveness of peer pressure, the prevalent egalitarian norms and the absence of customary 
law regulating resource use in the irrigation scheme. These make it difficult to cooperate or to 
enforce rules (Chapter 7). Because of these constraints, any training aiming to enforce 
collective action for water management inevitably loses effectiveness. Certain evolutions or 
strategies might however alleviate them. First, WUAs can draw up their internal code and 
provide sanctions to enforce it. On the condition that WUAs are institutionally well designed, 
this could cancel the problem of rule enforcement. Second, village leaders today often possess 
a certain authority over water management. Their physical or moral presence at the training 
and extension sessions might enhance the effectiveness.  
There are furthermore several factors on which individual farmers, or even farmer groups 
at the level of the tertiary block, have little impact. First, the water level in the secondary 
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canal partly determines the incoming flow rate in the tertiary canal, but its regulation is the 
domain of the central management. Second, water losses in primary, secondary and tertiary 
canals, in addition to the drainage water from all tertiary blocks, fill the collector drains. The 
water level in the collector drains directly influences the water level in the tertiary drains, as 
they are communicating vessels. As such, actions of a single farmer or a single tertiary block 
are negligible. These factors are therefore considered as fixed. 
 
9.3.3 Targeting the audience for training 
The audience for the training corresponds to all persons involved in water management at 
tertiary block level. Based on the results of the field study, this section formulates several 
recommendations to target the training to a specific audience. First, training should be 
targeted to the farmers of tertiary blocks that confront irrigation and/or drainage problems or 
irrigate with excessively low efficiency. This implies that many tertiary blocks where water 
management does not follow the prescribed rules, but that still achieve good performance, can 
be ignored. Such an approach breaks away from the current normative view on how water 
management should be organized, imposing it indiscriminately on all tertiary blocks. It is 
however believed that this approach will make training efforts more effective. This is 
extremely important in an environment with only about a hundred extension officers for more 
than 30,000 farming families. 
Second, the village leadership might have a crucial role to play in the adoption of 
improved management practices. They furthermore function as opinion leaders in their 
villages. It is therefore desirable to include them in the target public, either by organizing 
training sessions especially for them, or by inviting them for the regular training sessions. 
Third, as alternative economic opportunities become available in the irrigation scheme, 
farmers increasingly diversify their income. Many therefore employ seasonal wage laborers to 
substitute for family labor when the latter have other professional priorities. Furthermore, 
about 7 % of the land is cultivated by leaseholders. Nevertheless, only plot holders are invited 
to meetings on water management. It has however been observed that information does not 
trickle down to wage laborers and leaseholders, as they have no part in traditional patterns of 
information transfer. Since they are more in need for training than plot holders, they should be 
explicitly included in the audience.  
In the trainers’ manual accompanying the training material, a procedure for organizing 
training sessions is presented. This procedure incorporates the above recommendations and 
consists of five steps:  
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1. At the initiative of either farmers or the extension officer, one or more problems are 
acknowledged, from which a demand for training can result. As most of the extension 
officers live in the farmers’ villages, they are well informed about possible water 
management problems inside a tertiary block and should therefore be allowed to take the 
initiative for training. 
2. A meeting of the WUA is convoked according to the procedures of its internal code. 
Starting from this stage, village leaders can be implied in the training process.  
3. The meeting aims to establish a consensus on the problem(s) observed and on who is 
involved.  
4. If some of the involved parties (e.g. wage laborers and leaseholders) are not present at the 
first meeting, it can be decided to convoke a second meeting to which they will be invited. 
The second meeting again aims to establish a consensus on the observed problem(s). 
5. In a last step, the actual training takes place in which all involved parties participate. The 
extension officer animates a discussion in which a solution to the problem(s) is explored. 
At this stage, the extension posters can offer some structure to the training sessions and 
provide the audience with practical and technical information. 
 
9.3.4 Designing the training material 
The actual design of the extension posters and the trainers’ manual is carried out by a local 
research center. As part of this research, technical assistance was provided to the research 
center to supply the scientific input and assist the editing of the manual and designing of the 
posters. The design phase is however not yet completed. Only one evaluation has been done 
so far (see below) and further testing and amending the material remains to be done.  
The extension posters consist of three modules with each six or seven posters featuring 
images, tables, graphs and short statements. A first module discusses irrigation and drainage 
problems viewed from the angle of the cropping calendar. Farmers as well as the central 
management often attribute problems to the diversity of farmers’ cropping calendars at 
tertiary block level. For the reasons stated above, the module will not recommend an ideal 
cropping calendar, but rather presents solutions to problems that might ensue from starting too 
late or too early, and being too dispersed or too much in line. Given their importance in the 
irrigation scheme, the second module digs deeper into the subject of drainage problems at 
harvest. It aims to give advice and practical information for different degrees of drainage 
problems, such as cleaning the tertiary drain when evacuation of water by the collector drain 
is possible, to the number of days necessary to evaporate a water layer from the rice basins 
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when it is impossible to drain them. The module contains one poster that demonstrates the 
relation between excessive water use by farmers and the saturation of the collector drains. The 
third module discusses good irrigation practices at field and tertiary level. It shows farmers 
how irrigation efficiency can be increased through careful field management and by 
coordinating the opening of the tertiary intake. Furthermore, whereas module one only 
introduces the notion of coordinating water allocation in periods of high aggregate demand, 
module three presents some practical allocation schemes applicable in different situations 
(Figure 9.1). 
The trainers’ manual aims to boost the capacity of the trainers on water management 
issues. A first part treats the basics of hydraulics, crop water requirement and performance 
measurement at an elementary level. During the many interactions with extension officers and 
water guards, it was observed that not all comprehend such notions as flow rate or slope of the 
hydraulic surface in a canal. As these concepts are used in training sessions, it is indispensable 
for trainers to grasp them profoundly, as it will be their role to explain them to farmers. The 
second part explains the principles of the targeting of the training sessions and describes the 
procedure for organizing training sessions (see section 9.3.3). The third part of the training 
manual contains background information and instructions for use of the extension posters.  
 
9.3.5 Presenting the training material to local stakeholders 
A one-day workshop was organized to present for the first time the training material to 
farmers, extension officers, the presidency of the central management and international 
donors involved in the irrigation scheme. First, the approach to the development of the 
training material was explained and the extension posters and trainers’ manual were shown. 
Next, discussions among the participants were animated.  
Farmers reasserted the need for training on water management and confirmed their view 
that it is a necessary condition for WUAs to become functional. Likewise, extension officers 
emphasized that their capabilities as trainers need to be reinforced, both concerning the 
technicalities of water management and the organization of training sessions. Consequently, 
farmers and extension officers welcomed the initiative to provide training material and 
validated the approach for its development. Thereupon, the presidency of the central 
management and international donors recognized the importance of completing the design of 
the training material and expressed their willingness to cooperate for the organization and 
financing of extension programs. These will include a ‘training of trainers’ to increase the 
capabilities of extension officers, and farmer training. 
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Figure 9.1 Example of an extension poster 
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During the discussions, some questions, remarks and suggestions were raised concerning 
the topics of the training material and particular terms or phrases. Furthermore, the 
importance of translating the extension posters in Bambara, the local language, was stressed. 
In a next step, working groups will be formed including farmers and extension officers to 
propose practical improvements for the training material. Then, the design phase will be 
resumed. 
 
9.4 Conclusions 
After IMT, the training of farmers and WUAs concerning water management is often 
neglected. A good understanding of water management principles and processes is 
nonetheless one of the conditions for a successful management transfer. In this chapter, an 
approach for developing training material on water management is presented and illustrated 
for the case of the Office du Niger irrigation scheme. The first step in the approach is defining 
the objectives of training, which builds on a stakeholder analysis of water management. 
Second, the training material is selected. At this point, practical and socio-economic 
constraints of water management determine which variables in the relations under study 
should be considered as fixed, and which should be presented as adjustable. Third, based on 
knowledge of the social environment, the audience of the training is targeted in order to make 
training more effective. A last step is the design of training material. In the scope of this 
research, examples of extension posters and a trainers’ manual were designed and presented 
in a workshop to farmers, extension officers, the presidency of the central management and 
international donors. The positive reactions confirmed the necessity of training and training 
material on water management and validated the approach for their development. During the 
workshop, the stakeholders agreed to organize an extension program in which the training 
material will be used. 
The different steps in the approach result from research on the practical and socio-
economic constraints that shape water management and its potential for improvement and the 
impact of management practices on performance. This demonstrates the role research can play 
in providing input for training. 
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Box 11 Participatory construction of irrigation infrastructure 
In view of the large agronomic potential and demographic pressure on irrigated land, the Malian 
government pursues a fast expansion of the Office du Niger irrigation scheme. However, the 
availability of funds to finance new infrastructure restrains the growth rate. Therefore, a new approach 
is experimented in which the beneficiaries of new irrigation infrastructure participate in the construction 
process to reduce its cost. State or donor financed professional firms still dig the primary and 
secondary canals and construct the intake of the tertiary canals. Then, farmers take over and dig the 
tertiary and field canals, install the field canal intakes and outlets, clear the land from its original 
vegetation, level it and divide it into rice basins. The approach was first implemented in the late 1990s, 
and even though a full appraisal might be premature, some preliminary evaluations have been made 
(Diassana and Sidibé, 2002; GEDUR, 2003). The first few growing seasons, yields disappointingly 
averaged 2 t/ha. In general, beneficiaries received plots of less than a hectare per farming family, 
which is much too small for sustaining a livelihood. Consequently, farmers had to combine different 
sources of income, and the allocation of production factors was not always optimal for their rice farm. 
Furthermore, for farmers originating from the rain fed area surrounding the irrigation scheme and new 
to rice farming, access to credit, availability of equipment and know-how on cultural practices of rice 
farming were often insufficient. Even though they hoped that obtaining a rice plot would entail an 
escape from poverty, many ran into financial deficits, were unable to pay the water fee and eventually 
were evicted from their plot without compensation (Dave, 2004). Consequently, their initial investment 
was lost. 
Apart from the disappointing yields, the issue of water use raises some questions. Four out of the 36 
tertiary blocks from the sample described in Chapter 5 were constructed with the participatory 
approach. Their efficiency (barely 25 %) is among the lowest of the sample. Even though many 
factors, such as soil conditions and water management practices, contribute to explain this figure, the 
banks of the tertiary canals, constructed by farmers in 2002, were very feeble and frequently 
breached, provoking huge water losses (Vandersypen et al., 2005). Even though one should be 
careful to generalize findings from such a small number of cases, the poor physical condition of 
tertiary infrastructure is a general feature where farmers participated in the construction process 
(Diassana and Sidibé, 2002; GEDUR, 2003). One possible explanation is that farmers did not learn 
from the professional firms as intended. Indeed, whereas they were supposed to be working in 
parallel, delays in timing of the firms made that farmers often started before they arrived. Another 
explanation, as one farmer stated, is that “men simply cannot replace machines”.  
While it has been shown that farmers are prepared to participate in the construction of irrigation 
hardware when convinced of the benefits, the participatory approach might need some qualification. 
Firstly, technical and managerial assistance is a must during both the construction phase and the first 
years of cultivation to ensure the sustainability (financially and in terms of water use) of the 
investment. Secondly, land rights need to be adjusted so that farmers who leave their plot (voluntarily 
or not), are compensated for their investment.  
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Chapter 10  
Adapting irrigation strategies to water scarcity:  
A modeling approach 
Abstract1 
Collective irrigation schemes throughout the world are facing pressure to increase irrigation 
efficiency, which relies heavily on improved farmers’ water management. Farmers however 
face a variety of constraints that get in the way of optimal management practices. This chapter 
presents a modeling approach to find the best mix of practices to increase irrigation efficiency 
while preserving farmers’ interests. This approach combines an understanding of the physical 
and of the social constraints in the irrigation scheme. As such, not only the dynamics of the 
physical resource can be modeled, but also farmers’ management practices and decision rules 
that interact with this resource.  
 
10.1 Introduction 
The challenge of irrigation is to produce enough food for the growing population, while water 
is becoming increasingly scarce (Howell, 2001). Following the global trend of transfer of the 
management of natural resources to the users, farmers now participate in decision-making in 
most irrigation schemes. Consequently, they will have to formulate strategic answers to face 
this challenge. However, having limited experience with water management, they are not 
necessarily well prepared for this task and might need decision support. In particular, they 
need to understand which are the alternative management options available to them and what 
are their consequences.  
                                                 
1 This chapter is adapted from: Vandersypen, K., Raes, D., and Jamin, J.-Y. (Submitted). Adapting irrigation 
strategies to water scarcity: A modeling approach. Journal of Irrigation and Drainage Engineering. 
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The Office du Niger irrigation scheme reflects these challenges quite well. Rehabilitation 
of the irrigation infrastructure started in the 1980s and solved technical bottlenecks limiting 
good performance (Chapter 3). Still, low irrigation efficiency results in recurring drainage 
problems at harvest, which incur increased production costs as well as a reduction in the 
quantity and quality of yields (Chapter 6). The irrigated surface is however expanding rapidly, 
and in the coming 20 years, the 80,000 hectares already in use will be doubled or even tripled. 
The water resource, currently abundant, will thus inevitably become scarce, which might 
result in irrigation problems. The largest potential for increasing irrigation efficiency exists at 
the tertiary level, where farmers are responsible for water management after the institutional 
reforms (Ouvry and Marlet, 1999). As farmers already in place have no stake in the expansion 
of the irrigation scheme, they are not necessarily interested in investing time and effort in 
improved water management to increase irrigation efficiency. In addition, water and the 
irrigation infrastructure are common resources. Hence, many aspects of water management 
need to be tackled collectively, whereas the social context complicates collective action. 
Finally, farm management poses some constraints on farmers’ liberty of action. In summary, 
it can be stated that although optimizing water management is not always feasible, actions 
must be taken to increase irrigation efficiency (Chapter 3 and Chapter 7).  
Even though the practical setting may vary, this problem is common to irrigation schemes 
throughout the world and revolves around the following question: Which management 
practices succeed in improving irrigation efficiency while avoiding irrigation problems? This 
question often concerns complex and interrelated relationships. Furthermore, future scenarios 
might be completely different from today’s (e.g. with water scarcity replacing abundance). A 
simulation model of water management can therefore provide an appropriate analytical tool to 
formulate guidelines for improving water management (Olsson and Andersson, 2007). 
However, such a model should not only represent the dynamics of a physical resource, but 
also farmers’ management practices and decision rules that interact with this resource 
(Feuilette et al., 2003). It therefore has to build on knowledge of both a physical and a social 
system. In this chapter, a simulation model is presented that is able to simulate the impact on 
performance for different combinations of management practices and for different conditions 
(e.g. water availability, weather conditions, etc) and as such to provide an answer to the 
question raised. This model is specific to the Office du Niger irrigation scheme. However, as 
many irrigation schemes face similar challenges, the approach is relevant for other situations.  
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10.2 Materials and methods 
10.2.1 Data collection 
The simulation model is designed conceptually using the results of a field study that lasted 
three years (2003-2005). The field study included an analysis of organization and 
performance of water management on a sample of 36 tertiary blocks (Chapter 5). 
Management practices and field conditions are described in the literature (e.g. Kamissoko, 
1999; Condom, 2000; Klinkenberg, 2000; Boeckx, 2004; Dicko, 2005) and validated through 
interviews with farmers and regular field observations. To this end, water management 
strategies were discussed with 8 farmers in semi-structured interviews (see Appendix 3). 
Furthermore, irrigation activities on 12 of the 36 tertiary blocks were monitored closely 
throughout the day for several periods of one week.  
 
10.2.2 Model framework 
The simulation model is an expert system in the sense that it incorporates farmers’ decision 
rules in a series of “if-then”-relations that determine water flows. Not all decision rules are 
deterministic, meaning that every event has only one outcome. Therefore, some probabilistic 
functions are included, making the model stochastic.  
The model simulates the water level in the tertiary canal and the water stored in a selected 
management unit in the course of time, based on a water balance which considers the 
incoming and outgoing fluxes. Water levels, amount of water stored and fluxes can be 
translated in performance indicators assessing irrigation efficiency, irrigation problems and 
crop water stress (output). The input consists of farmers’ management practices and external 
factors (Figure 10.1). A specific combination of input data constitutes a scenario.  
Output
Performance
indicators
1. Irrigation efficiency
2. Irrigation problems
3. Crop water stress
Simulation 
model
Input
Farmers’ management practices
1. Decision rules on the closing of the tertiary intake
2. Maintenance of the tertiary canal
3. Decision rules on water allocation
4. Management practices at field level
5. Cropping calendar
External factors
1. Water supply of the secondary canal
2. Type and dimensions of infrastructure
3. Weather conditions
4. Soil and crop characteristics
 
Figure 10.1 Input and output of the simulation model 
 165
Water level in the tertiary canal 
The tertiary canal is represented as a cascade of reservoirs, each corresponding to a section of 
the canal in-between two nodes (Figure 10.2). At each node, a field canal branches off. The 
water level (Hi,t) at a particular moment (t) and in a particular section (i) is determined by 
adding to the water level of a previous moment, the flows in and out the section during the 
interval (Figure 10.3). The model proceeds with time steps of one second. Within each 
section, the water level is assumed to be horizontal. It has a fixed length (X) but as canals in 
the Office du Niger have a trapezoidal cross section, the width of the water surface (B) varies 
as a function of the water level. Water enters in the first section through the tertiary intake. 
The flow rate (Qin,1) is a function of the water availability at secondary level, the type and 
dimensions of the intake and the opening of the valve, which depends on farmers’ decision 
rules. The water flow to the next section is determined by the difference in water level of the 
two sections and calculated using the Manning-Strickler formula and by taking into account 
the maintenance level of the tertiary canal (Smout et al., 1997). The water level in each 
section determines the direction of the water flow (in or out of the section). The flow entering 
a section i (Qin,i) equals the flow leaving the upstream section. This cascade continues until 
the final section is reached, where water can only flow out by returning to the previous 
section. Furthermore, in each of the sections, water can discharge into the field canals (Qfc,i). 
At the start of each day, the model determines the number of management units that irrigate 
using a probabilistic function based on the total irrigation requirements of the tertiary block, 
field losses and the irrigation dose. The irrigation requirements are calculated following the 
procedures described in Chapter 3 and depend on the cropping calendar and rainfall. Field 
losses and the irrigation dose depend on farmers’ management practices. Next, an algorithm 
assigns the irrigation turn to specific management units. Allocation rules can regulate both the 
number and the location of the management units that withdraw water from the tertiary canal. 
The rate of discharge into the field canals depends on the water level in the tertiary canal and 
the dimensions of the field intakes.  
 
H1
Qin, 1 Qin, 2 Qin, 3
H2 H3
Section 1 Section 2 Section 3  
Figure 10.2 Representation of the tertiary canal in the simulation model as cascading reservoirs, with 
Qin = flow entering or leaving a section and H = the water level in the section 
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(Qin, 1H1, t = H1, t-1 + Qin, 2)-Qfc, 1- Qconv, 1 -
∆t
B(H)i . Xi
Dimensions tertiary intake 
Sec
water 
supply
Open/close Tertiary Intake
Farmers’ 
decision 
rules
Irrigation Permission Farmers’ 
decision 
rulesDimensions field intake 
Irrigation requirement 
Farmers’ 
management 
practices
- Qman, 1
Tertiary drain
(Qin, 2H2, t = H2, t-2 + Qin, 3)-Qfc, 2- Qconv, 2 -
∆t
B(H)i . Xi
- Qman, 2
Dimensions tertiary canal
Hydraulic slope 
Maintenance level 
Dimensions tertiary canal
Maintenance level 
Output
water crisis
Management unit
Management unit
Tertiary drain Qin, 3  
Figure 10.3 Flow chart of ingoing and outgoing fluxes in the sections of the tertiary canal (full line = water flow; dotted line = information flow, H = water level, 
Qin = flow entering or leaving a section, Qfc = discharge into the field canal, Qconv = conveyance losses, Qman = management losses, ∆t = time step, B(H) = 
width of the water surface, and X = length of the water surface) 
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Finally, water is lost in the tertiary canal through conveyance (Qconv,i) and management 
losses (Qman,i). Conveyance losses are a function of maintenance and the water level. 
Management losses occur whenever the water level exceeds the level of the overflow 
structures with the flow rate depending on their dimensions. 
The output of the model consists in the total water consumption at the tertiary intake over 
the period of simulation, which is used as an indicator of efficiency. The number of days that 
the water level in the tertiary canal drops below 0.3m, 0.2m and 0.1m is calculated as 
indications of irrigation problems. At 0.3m, irrigation problems might occur for certain 
management units with an unfavorable topography. At 0.1m, the water level is below the field 
intakes so that irrigation is no longer possible. 
 
Water storage in a particular management unit 
In order to assess the impact of the management of the tertiary canal at field level, the model 
simulates the water storage (WS) in one selected management unit. Water storage is the 
amount of water stored in and/or on the soil. It is zero when the soil is saturated, positive 
when it contains a water layer and negative for an unsaturated soil. The water storage at a 
certain moment equals the water storage at a previous moment plus the amount of water 
flowing in or out during the interval (Figure 10.4). Calculations proceed with time steps of 
one day. Positive (in)flows add water to the management unit and are irrigation (IRRI) and 
rainfall (P). Capillary rise is negligible on the heavy clay soils of the area (N’Diaye and 
Guindo, 1998). Negative (out)flows withdraw water from the management unit and are actual 
evapotranspiration (ETa), deep percolation (DP) and losses (Loss). Lateral drainage occurs at 
the end of the growing season to evacuate water from the field for harvesting, but is not 
considered in the scope of this model, which focuses on the periods of irrigation.  
The decision to irrigate and the irrigation dose depend on the actual water storage in the 
management unit compared to a minimum and maximum target level (Figure 10.5). The latter 
are a function of the growth stage and farmers’ management practices, which are adapted 
according to water availability at the tertiary level. The decision to irrigate is however still 
subject to possible allocation rules. All rain is supposed to be effective (unless it exceeds the 
storage capacity of the management unit) and the model retrieves daily rainfall from the input. 
Actual evapotranspiration is calculated by multiplying reference evapotranspiration with a 
crop factor and adapted to water stress if the water storage falls below zero following Allen et 
al. (1998). Deep percolation is constant throughout the growing season and as the vast 
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majority of soils have similar physical properties, it is a fixed parameter. Losses are the result 
of excess irrigation or rainfall. They depend on the physical layout of the management unit 
and farmers’ management practices. Model output consists of the number of days with water 
storage below 0.1m, 05m and 0m, which are a measure of water stress. Depending on the 
degree of land leveling, water stress can occur even with positive water storage on parts of the 
management unit. 
 
WSt = WSt-1 + IRRI + P - LOSSDPETa - - ∆t
Qfc, i
Weather 
Weather 
Crop 
Soil 
Atmosphere
Atmosphere
Tertiary drain
Water table
 
Figure 10.4 Flow chart of incoming and outgoing fluxes of the water balance of the management unit 
(full line = water flow; dotted line = information flow, WS = water storage, IRRI = irrigation, P = rainfall, 
ETa = actual evapotranspiration, DP = deep percolation, LOSS = losses and ∆t = time step) 
 
10.2.3 Choice of scenarios to be simulated 
The simulations study the impact of various interventions on irrigation efficiency and 
irrigation problems under various external conditions. Three broad issues are singled out on 
the basis of which scenarios are selected. 
(i) Water saving interventions for a full water supply at secondary level. Today, average 
seasonal water delivery to the tertiary blocks lies around 2,000 mm, whereas the target is 
1,400 mm (Office du Niger, 2005; Vandersypen et al., 2005). Results from the field study 
revealed that the over-supply is related to excess delivery to the tertiary block compared to 
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demand, excess application in the fields and field losses (Chapter 3 and Chapter 5). The 
simulations will evaluate the impact of the following measures:  
- Good management practices at field level improve application efficiency and limit field 
losses by strengthening contour dikes, monitoring irrigation and land leveling.  
- A tight control of the tertiary intake, in the sense of decision rules prescribing to 
systematically close the tertiary intake after irrigation, limit excess delivery to the 
tertiary block.  
- Applying a rotation schedule between field canals makes aggregate water demand more 
predictable, facilitating adjusting supply to demand.  
 
Hi, t-1
Qfc, i
Management unit
Irrigation Permission 
Farmers’ 
decision rules
Dimensions field intake 
Irrigation requirement 
Water crisis
TargetWSmin
State of land leveling
TargetWSmax
Height of dikes
Crop
WSt-1
 
Figure 10.5 Decision model for irrigation of the management unit followed up closely (full line = water 
flow; dotted line = information flow, boxes represent results from calculations, H = water level in the 
tertiary canal, WS = water storage in the management unit, Qfc = discharge to the field canal) 
 
(ii) Water saving interventions for a limited water supply at secondary level. In a situation 
where the total water availability is constraint, over-consumption will cause water levels in 
the secondary canal to drop so that at the tertiary intakes, the nominal flow rate is no longer 
attained. In addition, at low water levels, fluctuations translate in variations in the incoming 
flow rate. Therefore, a situation with a relatively low but stable water level is compared to a 
situation of important fluctuations. 
(iii) Maintenance. From the field study, it appeared that maintenance does not have a 
significant impact on efficiency or resulted in irrigation problems under the current 
circumstances. It will be tested whether these findings still hold when water saving measures 
are applied and/or the water supply at secondary level is limited.  
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The simulations were run for various cropping calendars and with rainfall data from three 
different years, corresponding to a typically dry year (1981), normal year (1990) and wet year 
(1979). Next, only the most common crop and soil characteristics have been used, which are 
nevertheless valid for more than three quarters of the surface. Finally, the simulations 
discussed concern the most frequent physical layout. As such, in the simulations, the tertiary 
intake is equipped with baffle modules having a maximum capacity of 60 l/s. The canal serves 
20 ha through 10 field canals with each a maximum capacity of 20 l/s. About two thirds of the 
fields are divided into 2 or 3 management units, resulting in a total number of 19 units. Key 
simulations were repeated for different layouts to test whether the results still hold. This 
allowed broadening the scope of the guidelines and pointing to important exceptions, but as 
the analysis is based on the same principles, the results will not be discussed in the scope of 
this chapter.  
 
10.3 Reliability of the model 
As the model is a strong simplification of reality, a validation sensu strictu is impossible. In 
particular, the model input is too simple to replicate observed scenarios exactly. Furthermore, 
not all performance indicators produced by the model have been measured in the field. 
However, in order to be reliable, output of scenarios close to those observed in the field 
should be in line with measured performance indicators (Feuillette, 2003). In addition to the 
performance indicators, some process indicators can be compared, such as the opening of the 
intake of the tertiary and field canals.  
Scenarios from 3 out of 36 tertiary blocks (named block A, B and C) in the 2004 growing 
season have been used for the verification. Input data for the model and output and process 
indicators are based on measurements, observations and calculations. The dimensions of the 
tertiary intake, tertiary canal, field intakes and management units were measured. For the 
water supply of the secondary canal, daily records of the water level above the sill of the 
tertiary intake are used. Based on observed planting and harvesting dates, 10-day irrigation 
requirements could be calculated. Daily rainfall data were obtained from a nearby weather 
station. Input concerning management practices is based on interviews and field observations. 
The simulation period covers July to September, which is the main irrigation period. For those 
months, water consumption at the intake of the tertiary block was measured using the 
procedures described in Chapter 3. The occurrence of irrigation problems and water stress 
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were assessed qualitatively in interviews, as described in Chapter 5. Daily records of the 
opening of the tertiary intake are available for each block. The opening of field canals was 
observed once every fortnight. Consequently, only a few observations are available for each 
tertiary block, which cannot be considered representative. In order to obtain a rough idea 
whether the model simulates the opening of the field canals good enough, observations of all 
blocks of the sample with 6 to 8 field canals (118 observations) were lumped to compare with 
simulations for block A and B. Likewise, observations of all blocks with 9 to 13 field canals 
(89 observation) were lumped for comparison with block C.  
Block A counts 8 farmers. They do not coordinate water allocation, even in times of water 
shortage. The 2004 growing season witnessed several periods of water crisis because of 
supply disruptions at secondary level. On other occasions, the tertiary intake remained closed 
for several days because the water guard, detaining the key, was unavailable. These water 
crises were furthermore prolonged, as when supply restored, all farmers started irrigating at 
once. Consequently, several of them mentioned irrigation problems. The water guard 
operating on the corresponding secondary canal is rather strict and frequently closes intakes 
when he estimates that no one is taking water, and as such helps to limit water consumption. 
The maintenance level of the tertiary canal was average throughout the 2004 growing season. 
Transplanting stretches from the end of June to mid-August.  
Block B has only three farmers. Coordinating water allocation is rarely needed, as the 
tertiary block is seldom confronted with water crises. Indeed, in 2004, none of the farmers 
mentioned irrigation problems. Not much attention is paid to the closing of the tertiary intake, 
which is often left open even when no one is irrigating. Consequently, water consumption is 
high. Maintenance of the tertiary canal is carried out every growing season, resulting in an 
excellent maintenance level. The entire tertiary block was transplanted between the end of 
June and the end of July. 
Block C has 11 farmers. Transplanting extends from mid-June to the end of August, with a 
peak by the end of June. Maintenance worsens towards the tail end of the tertiary canal and 
can be considered average overall. Farmers on this block do not cooperate on water 
management. Whereas blocks A and B have baffle modules at the intake of the tertiary canal, 
block C has a semi-modular intake. Management at field level is considered bad for all three 
blocks, since on several field visits, water leaks to the tertiary drain through breaches or 
overflow have been observed. As a rule, farmers are not present during irrigation. 
Table 10.1 shows the simulated and observed performance and process indicators of the 
scenarios for the three selected tertiary blocks. Simulated total water consumption and the 
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occurrence of irrigation problems and water stress are in line with observations. The opening 
of the tertiary intake is simulated rather well, except for block A. This is however due to the 
fact that in this block, the intake was closed with a padlock by the water guard several times 
despites farmers’ water requirements. This was modeled by setting the water supply at 
secondary level at zero for those periods. As there was an unfulfilled water demand, the 
model however sets the opening of the intake at maximum all that time. 
 
Table 10.1 Comparison of simulation results with observations for three different tertiary blocks.  
Indicators Block A Block B Block C 
 Sim Obs Sim Obs Sim Obs 
Performance indicators       
Total water consumption (mm) 807-951 824 1,293-1,522 1460 946-1,099 999 
Irrigation problems (# of days with 
water level < 0.3 m) 37-44 Yes 0 No 16-28 Yes 
Water stress (# of days with water 
storage < 0.15 m) 0-5 No 0-0 No 0-0 No 
Process indicators       
Probability of field intakes to be in operation at the same time at the number of 
0 45% 26% 25% 26% 23% 20% 
1 23% 19% 50% 19% 35% 15% 
2 13% 19% 17% 19% 17% 24% 
3 - 5 13% 34% 8% 34% 15% 35% 
> 5 6% 1% 0% 1% 9% 7% 
Probability of the tertiary intake to be 
Closed 24% 40% 21% 19% 40% 56% 
Open between zero and maximum 
width 17% 51% 43% 49% - - 
Open at maximum width 59% 9% 36% 32% 60% 44% 
 
Regarding the number of field canals in operation, there is some divergence between 
simulated and observed results. Indeed, the simulation model underestimates the number of 
open field canals. This is due to the simplifications of the model compared with reality. First, 
in practice, some fields lie on a slight elevation. Consequently, irrigation will advance slowly 
and to reach a particular dose, more application time is required. In the model, all field canals 
can irrigate at their design flow rate when the water level in the tertiary canal is high enough. 
Next, farmers sometimes forget to close the field canal after irrigation, and some have been 
noted to remain open for days. Such negligence is very arbitrary and the model does not 
consider it. For block A, there was furthermore an overestimation of high numbers of open 
field canal. This distortion once again results from the closing of the tertiary intake. In the 
model, an unfulfilled water demand that last several days translates in field canals that remain 
open all that time. As in practice, the tertiary intake was closed, farmers closed their field 
intakes of fear that water would actually flow back to the canal, which is impossible in the 
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model. Overall, it can be concluded that the model is a fair enough representation of reality to 
be suitable as an analytical tool. 
 
10.4 Results and discussion 
Figure 10.6 shows the impact of different measures on total water consumption in a normal 
rainfall year and for the most frequent cropping calendar. Simulations cover the months of 
July to September, which account for about 75 % of seasonal water requirements and 
delivery. When applied as a single intervention, the rotation schedule is most effective in 
reducing consumption, followed by a tight control of the tertiary intake and good field 
management practices. None of the measures individually however succeeds in remaining 
below the target consumption, which for the three months of the simulation corresponds to 
1,050 mm. From the simulations, it appears that combining good management practices with 
either a rotation schedule or a tight control of the tertiary intake does reach that objective. On 
the other hand, a tight control of the tertiary intake does not add much to the advantages of a 
rotation schedule. Indeed, both help to adjust water delivery to the tertiary block to demand.  
As a single intervention or in combination with good field management, the rotation 
schedule is clearly more successful than a tight control of the tertiary intake. Nowadays, 
farmers seldom apply a schedule as it severely constraints their flexibility and requires heavy 
monitoring and sanctioning to make farmers respect it. Only in case of water crisis, a schedule 
is applied, and even then, not all groups of farmers succeed in surmounting free-rider 
problems (Chapter 4). In contrast, a tight control of the tertiary intake does not demand a 
radical change in farmers’ actual habits and shirking by one farmer does not punish the others. 
It is sufficient that after irrigating, they check on other irrigation activities in their tertiary 
block before going home at night. This way, they can prevent over-supply, which usually 
occurs when the intake remains open all night while no one irrigates. Not even all farmers 
need to contribute equally. Another option is that one of the farmers is made responsible for 
checking on irrigation activities at the end of each day and closing the tertiary intake if 
necessary. Both the rotation schedule and a tight control of the tertiary intake require 
cooperation between farmers. Management practices at field level are an individual matter, 
and therefore perhaps easier to implement. On the other hand, they are subject to the same 
incentives of free-riding and moreover harder to monitor. Nevertheless, they seem a necessary 
ingredient to achieve the target for water delivery. With water supply at secondary level at full 
capacity, irrigation problems never occur, regardless the measures to reduce consumption. 
These results are analogous for different cropping calendars and in dry or wet years. 
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Figure 10.6 Impact of different measures on total water consumption in a normal rainfall year and for 
the most frequent cropping calendar (transplanting evenly spread between mid-June and mid-August 
and harvesting starting in October)   
(1) Good management practices at field level  
(2) Tight control of the tertiary intake  
(3) Rotation schedule for water allocation 
 
The situation becomes completely different when the water level in the secondary canal 
drops. When water allocation among field canals is unregulated, chances become real that 
demand of the tertiary block sometimes surpasses supply. As a result, the water level in the 
tertiary canal declines, leading to irrigation problems. Simulations show that irrigation 
problems occur for at least 20 days, resulting in a 20 % chance of water stress in fields at the 
tail end of the tertiary canal. The situation further aggravates when the water level in the 
secondary canal fluctuates substantially. In this case, irrigation problems occur on at least 30 
days, and there is a 50 % chance of water stress in fields at the tail end of the tertiary canal. 
Irrigation problems can be somewhat reduced by lifting the tight control of the tertiary intake, 
but this strategy results in further over-consumption and would start a vicious circle of ever-
dropping water levels in the secondary canal. The only way out is adopting a rotation 
schedule, which both eliminates irrigation problems and reduces water consumption. The 
rotation schedule does not need to be applied permanently, but can be invoked just when the 
water supply in the secondary canal is constraint. 
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Good maintenance of the tertiary canal can only realize a supplementary reduction in total 
water consumption in combination with a tight control of the tertiary intake. Indeed, as long 
as the amount of water entering the tertiary block is not controlled, reduced conveyance losses 
because of good maintenance can only be achieved at the expense of increased management 
losses. When irrigation problems occur, corresponding to low water levels in the tertiary 
canal, conveyance losses decrease sharply. In this case, maintenance has a negligible impact 
on total water consumption. Poor maintenance can however exacerbate irrigation problems at 
the tail end of the tertiary canal. Indeed, the combination of a smaller cross-section of the 
canal because of the low water level and a high resistance due to poor maintenance (Manning 
coefficient at 0.1, typical of heavily invaded canals (Smout et al., 1997)), results in a steep 
slope of the hydraulic surface. Consequently, the water level at the tail end of the tertiary 
canal is insufficient to irrigate the fields and crop water stress ensues quickly. In contrast, 
good maintenance results in a near horizontal water surface, even at low levels, and as such 
ensures an equitable water distribution. Long-term negligence of maintenance might result in 
crumbling of the canal banks, altering its shape and dimensions. As stated before, simulations 
for different physical layouts fall outside the scope of this chapter. 
 
10.5 Conclusion 
Collective irrigation schemes throughout the world are facing pressure to increase irrigation 
efficiency. There is a large consensus that an important part of the solution lays in improving 
water management practices. In most collective irrigation schemes, water management 
responsibilities were transferred to farmers. The latter however face a variety of constraints 
that stand in the way of optimal management practices. This chapter has shown that a 
simulation model of water management can help to gain insights in the effectiveness of 
various interventions and combinations of those interventions to increase irrigation efficiency 
and to reduce irrigation problems under various external conditions. Combined with a 
thorough knowledge of the constraints that farmers face, it is possible to find an optimal mix 
of management practices that increase irrigation efficiency to a desired level while preserving 
farmers’ interests as much as possible.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
Conclusions of the case study 
When the Office du Niger irrigation scheme was close to bankruptcy at the beginning of the 
1980s, major reforms were imposed by the international donors who invested in rehabilitation 
of its infrastructure. The reforms put it on a road to success. Indeed, profitability of rice 
cultivation has grown, which served farmers’ objective of securing a livelihood. It also serves 
the objectives of the central management, which are combating rural poverty and enhancing 
national food security. As a part of the reforms, Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) was 
introduced. It reassigned responsibilities on water management at the tertiary level to farmers. 
Results from the field study revealed that thanks to the physical rehabilitation of the irrigation 
scheme and the demand-driven water supply, water delivery at the tertiary block level is 
adequate. Before the reforms, water shortages were common and resulted in low yields. In 
contrast, irrigation efficiency at the tertiary level, on average about 60 %, remains low. 
Furthermore, it was shown that the low irrigation efficiency brings along considerable water 
losses that choke the drainage system. As such, it is an important cause of the drainage 
problems currently affecting one third of the surface at harvest. Indeed, farmers’ strategies are 
to maintain a constant over-supply of water to minimize the need for collective action and 
individual labor input. Labor is valuable to them as it comes at the price of time available for 
other income generating activities. This strategy conflicts with the view of the international 
donors and the central management of “rational” water management. They worry that the 
current low irrigation efficiencies and recurring drainage problems might thwart their 
ambitious plan to more than double the size of the irrigation scheme without a significant 
increase in total water consumption. Successive projects to remedy this situation did not 
deliver the desired results up until now, as they continuingly failed to take into account 
farmers’ perspective. Furthermore, some projects were biased towards maintenance, which is 
a very visible indicator of management, but has little impact on irrigation efficiency. 
In view of the ongoing expansion of the irrigation scheme, national and international 
competition for water and the recurring drainage problems, the concern of international 
donors and the central management to improve irrigation efficiency is redeemed justified. On 
the other hand, farmers may face physical, agronomic, economic, socio-cultural and 
institutional constraints that limit the possibilities of improving water management. The 
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central objective of the research was therefore to find ways to increase irrigation efficiency 
while preserving farmers’ interests. The approach was, in line with many scientists and 
practitioners around the world, to investigate how this goal could be achieved through better 
water management, rather than by implementing technological innovations. Benefiting from 
hindsight, it should be possible to answer a first question: 
 
Is a focus on water management justified to increase irrigation efficiency while preserving 
farmers’ interests? 
In fact, during the reform process, modernization of the irrigation infrastructure and the 
introduction of innovative cultural practices, allowing farmers to triple or even quadruple their 
yields, have also realized water savings. Indeed, rehabilitation reduced conveyance losses in 
canals and the introduction of transplanting techniques diminished water requirements during 
the first part of the growth cycle. Further technological innovations might allow an additional 
reduction in water requirements or facilitate better water management, but for the time being, 
no such technologies announce themselves. Furthermore, there is a financial cost to take into 
account. High-tech infrastructure and its maintenance are generally expensive, and their costs 
should be weighed against the value of gains in labor time. Finally, they are no guarantee for 
success (Box 12). 
 
Box 12 Farmers’ use of modern flow control technology 
There is a trade-off between flow control technology and management requirements. Infrastructure 
that has to be operated manually to adjust water supply to demand requires a lot of labor and certain 
knowledge of hydraulics (Horst, 1998; Plusquellec, 2002a). If labor is highly valued and knowledge 
poor, improving irrigation efficiency becomes difficult. However, sophisticated infrastructure that 
simplifies its use or regulates water delivery automatically is no guarantee for better use. First, even 
though operation is simple, sophisticated control structures often look complicated and farmers might 
have a completely different understanding of their use than the engineers that designed them (Scheer, 
1996). For example, in the Office du Niger irrigation scheme, baffle modules were introduced at the 
intake of the tertiary canal. They allow farmers to estimate the incoming flow rate easily and adjust it to 
their demand. Some farmers however do not like them, as they give them the impression to obstruct 
the water flow into their canal. Consequently, they make holes in the intake to allow a free water flow. 
So in fact, an understanding of basic hydraulics is still needed for farmers to accept the infrastructure. 
Second, automatic regulation may spare labor, it also reduces farmers’ and water guards’ sense of 
control. In the Office du Niger irrigation scheme, almost all automatic regulators (fixed or floating) in 
the primary and secondary canals are tampered as water guards and/or farmers feel - rightly or 
wrongly - they do not deliver the required amount of water downstream.  
In contrast, the results of this research provide two arguments for the focus on water 
management to increase performance. First, research results demonstrate that improved water 
management practices can increase irrigation efficiency from an average 60 % to about 90 %, 
corresponding to a decrease of actual consumption with more than a third. Indeed, most of the 
water losses are currently related to water management practices: excess supply to the tertiary 
block, excess application to the plot and spillovers in the rice basins due to the bad shape of 
contour dikes. The increase in efficiency can be achieved without involving irrigation 
problems. Indeed, through proper management practices that require some collective action 
but are not too arduous for farmers, irrigation efficiency can be improved with the current 
infrastructure and cultural practices. A second argument is that farmers’ actual strategy of 
substituting labor by water is motivated by the high ratio of value of labor to water. Making 
water more valuable can however change this ratio. 
Still, achieving this increase in irrigation efficiency is quite a challenge, and it is not self-
evident that farmers are motivated and able to realize it. Furthermore, with water and tertiary 
infrastructure being common resources, they have to be able to surmount possible collective 
action problems. International donors pushed through IMT as a part of the reform package 
that breathed the spirit of increasing farmer control. Farmers were however not demanding 
any responsibilities on water management that extended beyond the plot level. Now, they 
carry the burden of increasing irrigation efficiency. Is the goal of increasing irrigation 
efficiency compatible with IMT? 
 
Was IMT the right policy option for the Office du Niger? 
IMT involves more than farmers being responsible for water management at the tertiary level. 
Part of IMT was the shift from a supply-driven to a demand-driven water delivery schedule, 
putting farmers at the top of the chain of decision-making. This shift has greatly improved 
water management from farmers’ point of view, up to a point where irrigation problems have 
become rare. Next, concerning decision-making within the tertiary block, virtually all farmers 
agree that their new independence from the central management is an improvement. Even 
though they still have to take into account their fellow farmers’ interests, they can implement 
water management as they think it best. Furthermore, the central management’s involvement 
at the tertiary level in a context of increasing irrigation efficiency would require a close and 
thus costly follow up.  
Yet, collective action remains a hurdle to be taken. About twenty years after the reforms 
started, collective action for water management is still underdeveloped. On the one hand, 
 181
 182
there is currently little need for collective action, with water supply being abundant and 
infrastructure recently rehabilitated. On the other hand, even when necessary, not all farmer 
groups possess sufficient social capital to establish it. For example, even though irrigation 
problems have become rare, they might arise after a temporary supply disruption at the 
secondary level, or on tertiary blocks with an uneven topography. Rules on water allocation 
have been observed to effectively prevent or resolve these irrigation problems. Some farmer 
groups however do not agree on such rules, or cannot enforce them due to the ineffectiveness 
of peer pressure, the only enforcement mechanism currently available. Hence, even when 
required in the context of increasing irrigation efficiency, it is far from sure that farmers will 
engage in collective action. Overall, IMT seems the best option on the condition that farmers’ 
water management is strengthened, and impediments for establishing collective action are 
lifted.  
 
What should be done next? 
The following recommendations to strengthen farmers’ water management and to enhance the 
prospects for collective action result from the research: 
1. Incentives are needed to increase the value of water to farmers. Today, most farmers 
have little incentives to invest in rational water use. Even as water becomes scarce because of 
an expansion of the irrigation scheme, farmers with a favorable plot location will still be able 
to minimize their labor input at the cost of vast water losses. Others will then inevitably suffer 
from shortages and falling yields. Therefore, incentives are needed to increase the value of 
water to all farmers, so that all will rationalize its use. Volumetric water pricing is a well-
known incentive and applied in many irrigation schemes throughout the world. Other 
measures could involve physically limiting the water delivery, or sharing the benefits of an 
expansion of the irrigation scheme made possible by increased efficiencies with the farmers. 
Any measure or incentive would however involve quantifying water deliveries at some point, 
which is costly, involves many practical constraints and requires sound procedures (both 
technical and organizational) to make sure that data are correct (Vandersypen, 2006). The 
Office du Niger’s unfavorable layout creates some challenging trade-offs. In particular, the 
lower the level at which water deliveries are measured, the more effective incentives can be. 
Indeed, incentives at a collective level induce free riding on other farmers’ efforts, which 
erodes their effectiveness. In the short term, practical constraints are such that measuring 
water deliveries is only realistic at the tertiary or even secondary level. In that case, collective 
action will be needed to monitor and sanction free riding. A thorough reflection including 
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both the central management and farmers is required to come up with the right measures and 
incentives.  
2. Agricultural policy needs to support full-time rice farming. It can be expected that 
with time, social capital will develop and a mentality shift towards assuming collective 
responsibility will take place, lifting current obstacles for collective action. The trend of 
diversifying income however thwarts this evolution, as the importance of water management 
decreases when farmers have to allocate their time and effort over multiple activities. It seems 
doubtful that IMT could be compatible with a model of part-time farming. Agricultural policy 
measures might reverse the trend towards part-time farming and thus enhance the prospects 
for collective action. Measures could include lifting bottlenecks in financing, input supply and 
technical assistance. These measures will boost the profitability of rice farming and lower the 
need to sustain different sources of income. Regulations concerning new plot allocations 
should furthermore favor full-time farmers.  
3. Water User Associations need to evolve in order to enhance their effectiveness. Water 
User Associations (WUAs) were set up in the irrigation scheme to fill the power vacuum left 
by IMT. Although they could provide a much-needed platform for institutionalizing collective 
action, they currently suffer from a lack of effectiveness. In order to redress their current 
flaws, some evolutions are required. First, farmers should be allowed to adjust structures and 
procedures of their WUA to their needs and possibilities. This might imply making room for 
oral and ad-hoc agreements that respond to specific situations. Second, support of existing 
authority, present at the village level, should be sought to enhance the legitimacy of WUAs, 
which is insufficient at present. When village leaders are involved in the WUAs, they can 
bring in their authority and as such might increase their effectiveness. Third, WUAs should 
dispose of a watertight sanctioning system. When disputes over sanctions cannot be resolved 
within the WUA, or even by the village leadership, the WUA should be able to appeal to an 
outside authority for final settlement. While the legal system implies too much of a barrier for 
many farmers, the central management possesses the necessary authority and is close to 
farmers.  
4. Farmers need training and decision support on water management. While farmers 
generally appreciate their newly won autonomy, they do not yet feel in full control of water 
management, because they lack the necessary knowledge and understanding. This might make 
them unable to respond adequately to the incentives put into place to increase efficiency or to 
make full use of the structures and procedures offered by WUAs. Training and decision 
support are thus indispensable to make farmers’ water management work. Furthermore, 
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awareness of the consequences of different water management practices (such as for example 
the link between over-irrigation and drainage problems) might motivate them further for 
rational water management. To optimize the effectiveness of training and decision support, 
the following points need consideration. First, the information transferred needs to take into 
account the practical and social constraints that farmers face. Particularly, parameters that 
farmers can change should be presented as variable, but parameters over which farmers have 
no influence should be presented as fixed. Second, the information should be targeted towards 
those aspects of water management that matter most for performance and are the easiest to 
organize and implement. Third, the audience of extension officers should include those who 
do not take part in the existing patterns of information transfer, but play an important role in 
water management, such as wage laborers employed by part-time farmers.  
Given their importance, this research has developed two types of tools for training and 
decision support. The first tool consists in training material in the shape of extension posters 
and a trainers’ manual. The second is a simulation model of water management, which 
provides an analytical tool that allows finding the best mix of practices that increase irrigation 
efficiency to a desired level while preserving farmers’ interests. The results have been 
translated into guidelines. These tools have been presented in a in a workshop uniting farmers, 
extension officers, the presidency of the central management and international donors 
involved in the irrigation scheme. The positive reactions confirmed the necessity of training 
and training material on water management and validated the approach for their development. 
 
Lessons learnt for scaling-up the case study to other irrigation schemes 
The process of IMT in the Office du Niger, the way it was implemented, its successes and 
flaws and the subsequent reality of farmers’ water management are quite typical for other 
irrigation schemes in Africa or even worldwide. From the case study, the following lessons 
can be drawn that are also relevant for other situations. 
1. Throughout the world, IMT departed from the assumption that once given the 
responsibility, farmers would automatically invest in “rational” water management, which 
from the point of view of central managements and donors generally implies efficient water 
use. Farmers however balance their highly valued labor input against the benefits of 
increasing irrigation efficiency. The fact that increasing irrigation efficiency is not necessarily 
“rational” from a farmers’ point of view is not yet fully realized by donors and scheme 
managers. The subsequent measures they take to address the disappointing outcome 
furthermore often build on the wrong assumptions of how water management can increase 
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efficiency and thus miss their mark. As they have a more distant and neutral perspective, 
researchers can play a beneficial role in the process of IMT by setting the problem statement 
right and providing negotiation support to the various stakeholders.  
2. In many government built irrigation schemes, farmers originating from different 
communities and with no social ties share a common water source and irrigation 
infrastructure. In addition, they were completely excluded from management until IMT. 
Under these conditions, traditional forms of organization and sources of authority are hard to 
find. Consequently, IMT often leaves a power vacuum hampering collective action for water 
management. In response to this situation, WUAs are set up as new legalities to fill the power 
vacuum, but when they by-pass the few existing sources of authority, they cannot fulfill their 
intended role. In an African context, the village leadership usually provides a strong authority. 
The central management, which WUAs are nevertheless meant to replace, also provides an 
important source of legitimate leadership. In order to make WUAs work, they should be 
involved in WUAs, even if it might contradict principles of democratic representation favored 
by international donors and NGO’s that usually implement them. 
3. Looking at the example of successful farmer management in indigenous irrigation 
schemes, IMT departed from the assumption that sufficient local knowledge is present for 
farmers to become managers, and capacity building has so far omitted training on water 
management. However, in government built irrigation schemes, most farmers arrived with no 
hydraulic culture, as they originated from rain fed agriculture. Farmers’ exclusion from 
management impeded the emergence of local knowledge on water management and a 
hydraulic culture. Consequently, local knowledge on water management principles and 
processes is scarce and it lessens farmers’ actual control of water management. The Office du 
Niger case study has learned that farmers embrace opportunities to acquire knowledge and 
understanding of water management. Indeed, it permits them to fully and wisely use the 
powers transferred to them by IMT, as it gives them confidence that they will be able to 
respond to actual and future challenges. Capacity building of farmers and WUAs in the light 
of IMT is on top of the agenda of many donors and practitioners (World Bank, 2006; 
Van Hofwegen, 2006; UNDP, 2006). Training and decision support on water management 
should be a priority in that context. The tools designed in the frame of the research for 
training and decision support are quite specific for the case of the Office du Niger. The 
approach on which the development of the tools is based are however relevant for other 
irrigation scheme facing the challenge of improving irrigation efficiency in a context of IMT. 
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Interest of the research approach 
The research approach of this work contains an analytical and an applied component. The 
analytical part aims at acquiring an understanding of farmers’ water management. The applied 
part answers to the challenge of translating the results of the analysis into practical guidelines 
and tools that support farmers’ water management. A merit of the approach lies in the 
combination of these two. Of course, the development of guidelines and tools builds on the 
results of the analysis. Conversely, the objective of translating the results of the analysis into 
tools also benefits the analysis itself, as it forces the researchers to focus on what is both 
important and realistic.  
For the analytical component, an analytical framework is developed that allowed 
(1) putting the problem statement right, (2) assessing the impact of different management 
practices on performance, (3) discerning the practical and socio-economic constraints of water 
management and its potential for improvement and (4) understanding how the wider social 
forces might help or hinder actual and future developments in farmers’ water management. 
The use of both quantitative and qualitative methods proved essential. A quantitative 
approach substantiates facts and relations resulting from the analysis, while through a 
qualitative approach, the wider context of these facts and relations can be understood.  
For the applied component, examples of extension posters and a trainers’ manual were 
designed, as well as a simulation model for water management. As such, the research is not 
limited to theoretical reflections, but also shows how farmers’ water management can be 
improved. The main merit of these tools is that they are scientifically founded and on account 
of the preceding phase of analysis, benefited from an understanding of both the technical and 
social reality of the irrigation scheme. Both the tools and the approach to develop them were 
validated in a workshop uniting all stakeholders. 
 
Perspectives for further research 
This research has enhanced understanding of the process of IMT and farmers’ water 
management and resulted in the development of tools for training and decision support. The 
findings and results raise some additional questions that could be tackled by future research 
activities or projects.  
1. A doctoral research is a relatively short-term project, and allows no full validation of 
the recommendations that were formulated. The implementation of these recommendations 
will undoubtedly reveal new problems and challenges requiring new answers. As IMT 
proceeds and farmers’ water management evolves, the input of research could continuously 
refine, adjust or complement the recommendations made. 
2. Irrigation has an important impact on the environment, altering natural habitats, 
influencing soil processes and affecting the quality of surface and groundwater. Consequently, 
the ongoing dynamics in the Office du Niger irrigation scheme might have important 
environmental consequences. Particularly, the influence of the expansion of the irrigated 
surface, the changes in water management practices and possible groundwater use (see Box 6) 
on the level of the water table and related processes such as salinisation and alkalinization 
should be assessed.  
3. The simulation model was built to answer specific questions of particular importance 
in the irrigation scheme. A modeling approach is however most interesting when it is used in 
close collaboration with stakeholders, results are validated and presented and give rise to new 
questions. A presentation of the modeling approach to the stakeholders in a workshop has 
raised their interest in the approach. It would be worthwhile to further develop and complete 
the simulation model together with the stakeholders.  
4. In the frame of the research, examples of extension posters and a trainers’ manual 
were designed. Before the posters and manual can be used in actual training sessions, they 
need to be translated in Bambara, the local language, tested and adapted. Finally, a training 
campaign for extension officers has to be organized and procedures should be prepared for the 
extension officers to implement the training sessions. During a workshop in which the posters 
and trainers’ manual were presented and discussed with all stakeholders, enthusiastic 
reactions led to the agreement to organize the remaining steps in the near future. 
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Appendix 1  
Calculation procedures of the simulation model 
Water level in the tertiary canal 
The water level (H) in a section i of the canal is the result of flows in and out of the section 
during a time step ∆t: 
 t
XB
QQQQQ
HH
ii
1i,ini,lossi,effi,fci,in
i,1ti,t ∆⋅⋅
−−−+= +−−  [m] 
With: Qin = Flow entering the intake of the tertiary canal [m³/s] 
 Qfc = Water consumption by field intake [m³/s] 
 Qloss = Flow leaving the section of the tertiary canal through overflow [m³/s] 
 Qeff = Flow leaving the section of the tertiary canal through percolation, evaporation 
and leaks [m³/s] 
 B = Width of the water surface in the section [m] 
 X = Length of the section [m] 
The simulation starts at a moment (t0) and proceeds with steps (∆t) of 1 second until tend. 
Decisions can however only be taken at the beginning of each hour or each day. t0 and tend 
correspond to the start and end date of the simulation period, and a day starts at 6 AM in the 
morning. The user can set H at t0 at either zero or the nominal water level. The flows are 
computed through one or several submodels that use model input and the output of other 
submodels. Note that H stabilizes when Qloss equals the difference in incoming and the 
remaining outgoing fluxes and has a maximum level of Hmax at which Qloss equals the 
maximum difference. H will not be able to fall below zero. Tertiary canals in the irrigation 
scheme have trapezoidal cross sections with inclination 1:1, for which the following formulas 
are used: 
Cross-sectional area (A) (Bmax - 2Hmax) · Hi + Hi² [m²] 
Wetted perimeter (P) (Bmax - 2Hmax) · Hi + 2Hi21/2 [m] 
Hydraulic radius A/P [m] 
With: Hmax = maximal water level [m] 
 Bmax = width of the canal at Hmax [m] 
 Water consumption by field intakes (Qfc) 
The water consumption by field intakes is driven by the submodel IrrigationProgram that 
simulates the irrigation program of the different units of the tertiary block. Next, the submodel 
CalculateQfc determines the flow rate per field canal. As a part of the scenario, the user needs 
to define the number of units per field canal with their surface, and the management practices 
at tertiary and field level. The irrigation program is influenced by the rules on water 
distribution that are applied on the tertiary block. These rules limit the number of field canals 
irrigating. 
 
IrrigationProgram 
This submodel determines how many units are irrigating, which units irrigate, and the 
irrigation requirement of irrigating field canals. The number of units irrigating equals m + n. 
m is the number of units irrigating the day before but with irrigation requirements (Qfc,req) still 
being positive (taking into account a certain margin), and which are allowed irrigation on that 
day according to the rules on water distribution (IrrigationPermission = true; see below). n is 
the number of units starting irrigation on that day.  
(a) Units continuing irrigation from the day before. The irrigation requirement is 
calculated at field canal level and is updated by the submodel CalculateQfcReq. When m is 
known, the irrigation requirement remaining from the day before is increased with a certain 
amount for all irrigating units in case of water crisis, but cannot exceed the maximum 
irrigation dose.  
(b) Units starting irrigation on that day. n is the result of a random procedure and will de 
determined through a binomial probability distribution which takes into account the average 
irrigation frequency applied in the tertiary block and the maximal number of field canals 
possibly irrigating. The latter depends on the application and type of rules on water 
distribution applied in the tertiary block (Submodels IsWaterCrisis and IrrigationPermission).  
nMaxUnitsn )f1(f
)!nMaxUnits(!n
!MaxUnits)n(p −−⋅⋅−=  
With: n = the number of units irrigating on that day 
 MaxUnits = the maximum number of units likely to irrigate  
 f = average irrigation frequency applied in the tertiary block 
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The average irrigation frequency is determined by dividing the sum of net irrigation 
requirements (Inet) and field losses (FieldLoss ) by the average irrigation dose (Dose).  
 f = (Inet + FieldLoss)/Dose [day-1] 
Inet is calculated at tertiary block level and is a function of the cropping calendar, selected 
through the model input, weather conditions and soil and crop characteristics. When few units 
are transplanted, Inet will be very low, which gives results that are very similar to the real 
world situation (with fewer units possibly irrigating, but with higher irrigation requirements 
per unit) and simplifies data input considerably. Field losses are added to the irrigation 
requirements, and are caused by percolation through contour dikes of the paddy basins, 
breaches etc. They are considered constant and expressed as mm/day. The level of field losses 
and the average irrigation dose depend on farmers’ management practices at field level, which 
is model input. Management practices at field level are assumed homogeneous over the 
tertiary block. In accordance with design standards of the irrigation scheme, it is also assumed 
that irrigation can be finished in one day. If in practice, this is not the case, m already 
compensates for the extra units needing irrigation.  
(c) Which units irrigate at which dose? For m, the units and dose are already determined. 
For n, the model selects the units that are irrigated last and have the permission to irrigate. At 
the start of the simulation, the submodel ShakeUpLastIrri assigns randomly to each of the 
field canals a unique date (prior to the start date of the simulations) of the last irrigation. The 
model remembers the date of the last irrigation for each unit. A unit that continues irrigation 
from the day before cannot be assigned again. Similarly, it is impossible to assign irrigation to 
the management unit selected for a close follow-up. The irrigation dose for these units is 
determined by management practices at field level (input) and is increased with a certain 
amount for each day of water crisis. Once again, it cannot exceed a maximum dose. The doses 
of irrigating units are added to the irrigation requirement of their corresponding field canals. 
 
CalculateQfc 
The ingoing flow rate of the irrigating field canals (Qfc) is calculated hourly for field canals 
with positive irrigation requirements. Depending on farmers’ irrigation practices, irrigation 
will be interrupted from 6 PM until 6 AM the next morning. The field canals to which this 
rule applied are determined by model input. Qfc is a function of the difference in water level 
of the tertiary canal (H) and field canal (h). It has a maximum (Qfc, max) linked to the 
characteristics of the infrastructure as given by model input. The water level in the field canal 
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corresponds to the level required to dominate the water level in the rice fields and is a 
program parameter. Supposing that the water level in the fields drop in times of water 
shortage, this level is reduced proportional to the duration of a water crisis. It has a bottom 
value (also a program parameter) below which irrigation is no longer possible. In summary: 
if H ≥ h Qfc = Qfc, max [m³/s] 
if h > H > h ( ) 81.92hHS65.0Q wetfc ⋅⋅−⋅⋅=  [m³/s] 
if H ≤ h Qfc = 0 [m³/s] 
With: Swet the wet cross section of the field canal intake: 
if H ≥ D 2wet D4S
π=  [m²] 
if H < D 





 −⋅

−⋅−

 −⋅

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with:  D = diameter of the field canal intake (m²) 
 
CalculateQfcReq 
The irrigation requirement is calculated at field canal level, supposing that irrigation 
deliveries are evenly distributed among all irrigating units of the field canal. It is updated 
every hour as follows: 
 Qfc,req,t = Qfc,req,t-1 - Qfc · eff · ∆t [m³] 
with: eff = irrigation efficiency of the field canal taking into account application losses 
Application losses occur during irrigation and increase the necessary time and amount of 
water to apply the required dose of the field canal on the day of irrigation. They depend on 
farmers’ management practices at field level, and in particular monitoring of irrigation. It has 
been observed that when farmers are not present during irrigation, over-application in certain 
basins with water flowing to neighboring basins and eventually the tertiary drains is frequent. 
 
IrrigationPermission 
IrrigationPermission determines whether a certain field canal has the permission to irrigate on 
a certain day, depending on the collective rules in use on water distribution. Depending on 
model input, these rules will be applied (i) continuously, (ii) in times of water shortage in the 
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tertiary canal (represented by the model as the output of the submodel IsWaterCrisis being 
true) or (iii) never. One out of three types of rotation can be selected: 
- Daily rotation: the field canals allowed to irrigate vary every day; each has only one 
day of irrigation per week 
- Two-daily rotation: the field canals allowed to irrigate vary every two (or three) days, 
each has two (or three) days if irrigation per week 
- Three-daily rotation: the field canals allowed to irrigate vary every three (or four) days, 
each has three (or four) days if irrigation per week 
At the start of the simulation, every unit is assigned a specific weekday on which it is allowed 
to irrigate when rules are applied using a certain algorithm. This is that such that only 
neighboring units irrigate on the same day. 
 
WaterCrisis and IsWaterCrisis 
WaterCrisis is a parameter that increases each time the average water level of the tertiary 
canal is below a certain threshold. If the average water level rises above another threshold, 
WaterCrisis is reset to zero. These thresholds depend on the dimensions of the irrigation canal 
as determined by model input. If WaterCrisis exceeds the value WaterCrisisMax, 
IsWaterCrisis will be set at “true”. The value of WaterCrisisMax is set by model input, with a 
higher value meaning that the strategies responding to a water crisis are applied more quickly. 
 
Flow entering the tertiary canal through the tertiary intake (Qin, 1) 
The flow entering the tertiary canal is determined by the water availability at secondary level, 
the opening of the valve, and the type and dimensions of the intake. The water supply at 
secondary level is expressed in terms of height above the sill of the intake and ranges from 0 
(for a water level at or below the level of the sill) to a value corresponding to the maximum 
flow rate of the intake. Water supply at secondary level is model input. The type and 
dimensions of the tertiary intake are model input as well. The opening of the valve is piloted 
by the submodels OpenTertiaryIntake and CloseTertiaryIntake, which depend on farmers’ 
decision rules. The intake is opened only once a day (in the morning). It can be closed every 
hour during the daytime. CloseTertiaryIntake is ran also just before opening the intake. 
 
OpenTertiaryIntake 
This submodel consists of a set of decision rules that determine the opening of the tertiary 
intake (O), defined by its width (Table A.1). The maximal opening (Omax) depends on the 
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dimensions of the intake (model input). The rules are the same for all farmers and 
independent of management practices. They use Ht-1 and the water supply at secondary level 
as criteria. The same rules apply for different types of infrastructure but will have different 
outcomes. Modular intakes can be adjusted with small steps, while the semi-modular intake is 
either open at its maximum width or closed. Whenever Qfc,req of one of the field canals is 
positive, the intake will be opened. 
 
Table A.1 Decision rules regarding the opening of the tertiary intake 
Criterion1 Rule Modular intake2 Rule semi-modular intake 
H > Hmax - k1 O = Qmax, fc * 10 O = Omax 
Hmax - k1 > H > hmax + k2 O = Ot-1 + Qmax, fc * 10 O = Omax 
H < hmax + k2 O = Omax O = Omax 
Water level secondary canal < k3 O = Omax O = Omax 
1 k1, k2 and k3 are program parameters 
2 For the type of intake common in the study area, 1 cm of opening of the intake corresponds to 1 l/s 
 
CloseTertiaryIntake 
CloseTertiaryIntake consists of decision rules that determine the closing of the tertiary intake 
(Table A.2). In reality, different farmers have different decision rules. In the model, decision 
rules will be attached to field canals, as decisions are triggered by irrigation activities at field 
canal level. The mix of rules is determined by model input and an algorithm assigns the rules 
to the field canals at the start of the simulation. The rules are put into practice whenever one 
of the field canals stops irrigating. At every time step during daytime, the model evaluates 
whether a field canal stops irrigating (because Qfc,req = 0 or t = 6 PM), and then looks up the 
decision rule attached to the field canal. If more than one field canal stop irrigating, rules with 
a higher number have priority over the lower numbers. 
 
Table A.2 Decision rules regarding the closing of the tertiary intake 
Rule Criterion1 Rule Modular 
intake 
Rule semi-
modular intake 
1 In all circumstances Ot = Ot-1 Ot = Ot-1 
2 if Ot=6AM > Ot=5AM (else rule 1) Ot = Ot-1 - qmax, fc not applicable 
3 if Qfc;req = 0 for all field canals (else rule 2) Ot = 0 Ot = 0 
4 if t = 6PM (else rule 3 and wait until 6PM) O = 0 O = 0 
1 Rule 4 is assigned exclusively to field canals on which irrigation is interrupted between 6 PM and 6 
AM the next morning (see submodel CalculateQfc) 
 
CalculateQin0 
In function of the opening of the tertiary intake and the water level in the secondary canal, the 
submodel CalculateQin0 computes the flow rate entering the intake. Standard hydraulic 
formulas are used. 
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 Flow entering a section from a neighboring section (Qin, i) 
Water enters a section from a neighboring section when its water level is lower. The flow rate 
can be calculated using the Manning-Strickler formula: 
 i1i
3
22
1
max
i,in HH3
H2H
H
HT
3
2
n
1Q −⋅

⋅⋅


⋅⋅⋅= −  [m³/s] 
With: n = roughness coefficient 
The roughness coefficient is assumed to be homogeneous over the length of the tertiary canal 
and depends on the maintenance level (model input). 
 
Conveyance losses (Qeff) 
Conveyance losses are assumed to occur evenly throughout the length of the canal. They are a 
function of the maintenance level (worse maintenance corresponds to higher losses) and the 
water level (through the width of the water surface in the canal). Qeff varies linearly from zero 
when the water level equals zero, and Qeff, max, for H = Hmax. Qeff is calculated using Ht-1 and 
variations of H during the time step are not considered: 
 Qeff = Ceff · Bi · Xi [m³/s] 
With: Ceff = constant determined by the maintenance level 
The larger the conveyance losses, the more difficult it will be to maintain a sufficiently high 
water level in the tertiary canal when supply at secondary level is limited. 
 
Management losses (Qloss) 
Security structures in tertiary canals are overflow weirs that are placed either at the end of the 
canal, or at each field canal intake. They are placed at a certain distance below the canal 
banks. Their placement and dimensions are model input. As long as H < the level of the 
overflow weir (Hweir), Qloss will be equal to zero. Otherwise, the flow is determined as 
follows: 
  [m³/s] 5.1weirloss )HH(l8.1Q −⋅⋅=
With: l = length of the overflow weir (m) 
 Hweir = level of the overflow weir (m) 
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 Water storage in a management unit 
The simulation model computes the water storage (WS) of a unit at a certain moment by 
adding to the water storage at a previous moment the aggregate water flows to and from the 
unit over the period in-between: 
 ( )∆tLOSSDPETaPIRRIWSWS t1t −−−++=+  [mm] 
Water storage is the amount of water stored in and/or on a soil. It can be positive, zero or 
negative: 
WS > 0 → saturated soil with water layer; WS = level of the water layer (mm) 
WS = 0 → saturated soil without water layer 
WS < 0 → unsaturated soil; WS = root zone depletion (with saturation as the reference): 
 Root zone Depletion = WSU, sat - Wr, act (mm) 
 WSU, sat = 1000 θsat ZR (mm) 
 WSU, act = 1000 θact ZR (mm) 
With: θsat = water content of the root zone at saturation (m³/m³); 
 θact = actual water content of the root zone (m³/m³) 
 ZR = depth of the root zone (m) 
WS cannot be larger than the height of the contour dikes, and not lower than the level of the 
water table during the rainy season, which are program parameters. The simulation of the 
water storage in the management unit is done simultaneously with the simulation of the water 
level in the tertiary canal, and starts and ends on the same moment. The water storage is 
calculated daily. Since irrigation activities for the selected unit are piloted in a different way 
than the other units, and since these activities determine water deliveries by the field canal, 
the selected unit should be the only unit depending on its field canal. As for the tertiary canal, 
the flows are computed through one or several submodels that use model input and the output 
of other submodels.  
 
IrrigationUnit 
The submodel IrrigationUnit triggers the irrigation events. This decision is based on the actual 
water storage of the unit, which is the basis of farmers’ decision rules on irrigation. As long as 
the water storage of the unit remains above the minimum target level, the irrigation demand 
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will be zero. When the water storage falls below the minimum target, the irrigation demand 
will be equal to the difference between the actual water storage and the maximum target level, 
and is added to the water requirement of the corresponding field canal. Both targets evolve 
with the growth stage of the rice crop, and an input file specifies their values as a function of 
the number of days after transplanting. They can be increased in function of the state of land 
leveling (linked to management practices at field level as selected by model input) and the 
output of the WaterCrisis submodel, but have a maximal value. The irrigation demand can be 
limited by the rules on water allocation. 
 
Irrigation 
This submodel calculates the actual irrigation dose delivered to the unit (IRRI) as a function 
of the total amount of water delivered by the field canal and the surface of all irrigating units. 
If the dose did not fulfill the requirements of the unit, irrigation will be continued the 
following day using the procedures of IrrigationProgram.  
 
Rain, evapotranspiration and percolation 
All rain (P) is supposed to be effective. The submodel Rain therefore only retrieves the daily 
rainfall from an input file. Actual evapotranspiration (ETa) is calculated as the product of the 
reference evapotranspiration (ET0) and a crop factor (Kc). Two-weekly averages are used for 
ET0, which are contained in an input file. Kc, a program parameter, is supposed to be 
constant throughout the growing season. When WS < 0, actual evapotranspiration decreases 
following the calculation methods of Allen et al. (1998). Deep percolation (DP) is also 
constant throughout the growing season, except if WS < 0 when it is zero. As the vast 
majority of soils have similar physical soil properties, DP is a program parameter. 
 
Losses 
Losses are the result of excess flows into the unit, compared to its water storage and the 
physical layout. In the scope of the simulations under consideration, the model will only allow 
for excess rainfall and excess irrigation at night.  
 
Model input 
The model has default entries for each of the management practices and external variables. 
However, in the Main Menu (Figure A.1), a different scenario can be composed by clicking 
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on the Hydro, Layout and Management buttons in the Scenario panel. In the Simulation panel, 
the start and stop date of the simulation period are selected, as well as the position and plant 
date of the simulated unit. Check boxes give the user the choice to specify whether the tertiary 
canal is empty at the start of the simulation and whether allocation rules are applied 
continuously or not. A text box allows the user to specify the number of times the model 
should run.  
 
 
 
Figure A.1 Screen shot of the different input menus 
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Farmers’ management practices 
1. Farmers’ decision rules regarding the closing of the tertiary intake: The mixture of rules 
on the closing of the tertiary intake is entered as percentages, such that the sum is always 100 
%. In addition to these rules, the user can specify the proportion of field canals interrupting 
irrigation between 6 PM and 6 AM the next morning. As rule 4 implies this interruption, the 
user should check for coherence in the input.  
2. Maintenance of the tertiary canal: The maintenance level can be good, reasonable or 
bad and determines the Manning coefficient and the efficiency coefficient (Table A.3) 
 
Table A.3 Value of the parameters linked to the maintenance level of the tertiary canal 
Maintenance level Manning coefficient Efficiency coefficient 
Good 0.01 12 10-8 
Reasonable 0.05 35 10-8 
Bad 0.1 58 10-8 
 
3. Farmers’ decision rules regarding water distribution within the tertiary block: These 
decision rules contain two aspects: the type of rules and the application of rules. If rules are 
only applied in case of water shortage, the severity of water stress necessary to trigger the 
rules is taken into account by the value of WaterCrisisMax to which WaterCrisis is compared. 
Two choices appear in the input: 
- Under water stress: WaterCrisisMax = 47; 
- Under severe water stress: WaterCrisisMax = 95 
Finally, on some blocks, rules are never applied. This is taken into account by a third option 
in the input. Since some other decision rules are based on the occurrence of water crises, 
WaterCrisisMax will be set at 47 (as in the first option). However, the submodel 
IrrigationPermission will always allow irrigation for all field canals on all days.  
4. Farmers’ management practices at field level: Farmers’ management practices at field 
level determine the water losses in the field (FieldLoss), which will be added tot the irrigation 
requirements, the irrigation dose (Dose), the degree of land leveling (LandLevel) and the 
application efficiency of irrigation (Eff). Roughly speaking, bad management practices 
increase the irrigation requirement and thus the chance of irrigation problems. Values are 
shown in Table A.4. 
5. Cropping calendar: The simulation model uses ten-daily irrigation requirements as 
input. These are calculated using the calculation procedures explained in Vandersypen et al. 
(2006). There is just one input file with in each column the ten-daily irrigation requirements 
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for a specific cropping calendar and rainfall. In the dialog box Hydro, the user fills in the 
number of the column to use in the simulation.  
 
Table A.4 Value of the parameters linked to the management practices at field level 
Management practices FieldLoss (mm) Dose (mm) LandLevel (mm) Eff 
Good 1 80 0 0.9 
Fair 1.5 70 50 0.8 
Bad 2 60 100 0.7 
 
External factors 
1. Water supply of the secondary canal: The water level of the secondary canal can vary 
daily and is entered in an input file. Each scenario has a different file. All input files are 
shown in a list box in the Hydro dialog box.  
2. Rainfall: Daily rainfall data are needed to simulate the water layer in the selected unit. 
Similar to the water level in the secondary canal, the data are contained by input files that can 
be selected in a list box in the Hydro dialog box. 
3. Type and dimensions of infrastructure: Two input files specify the type and 
dimensions of the infrastructure. The first contains data on type and dimensions of the tertiary 
canal. Every column represents a different canal, and the number of the column is asked in the 
dialog box Layout. The second contains information on the number and surface of units for 
each field canal. There are one or more files for each canal type. In the dialog box Layout, the 
number of the file should be entered. 
 
Output 
The output of the model is written to text files and consists in the evolution (per hour) of the 
water level in the tertiary canal for each of the nodes and the evolution (per day) of the water 
level in the selected unit (see Figure 10.7 for an example). In addition to this output, the 
model will calculate certain performance indicators: 
• Total water consumption: The model calculates the total water consumption at the tertiary 
intake over the simulation period per hectare (m³/ha).  
• Water losses: At tertiary level, water is lost though field losses, application losses, 
conveyance losses and management losses. Apart from reducing overall irrigation 
efficiency, field losses, application losses and conveyance losses increase the probability 
of irrigation and drainage problems on a canal. As they are predetermined by the scenario 
(for conveyance losses, also the water level plays a role), they are however not considered 
 212
for the performance indicator, which is based solely on management losses. They are 
expressed as the total management losses over the simulation period per hectare (m³/ha). 
• Irrigation problems: Irrigation problems occur whenever the water level in the tertiary 
canal drops below a certain threshold. When the water level drops even further, irrigation 
is no longer possible. The model calculates the total number of time steps for which the 
water level drops below 30 cm, 20 cm and 10 cm. The performance indicators then 
express these values in days, by dividing by 24. 
• Water stress at field level: The model calculates the average water level in the selected 
unit. Depending on the degree of land leveling, water stress can occur on some parts of the 
unit when the average water level is quite low. The model therefore calculates the number 
of days with a water level lower than 10, 5 and 0 cm (with the minimum target level being 
higher than these levels).  
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Figure 10.7 Evolution of the water level (a) in the tertiary canal and (b) in the selected unit for Block A 
(see Chapter 10) 
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Appendix 2  
Closed question survey 
In standardized closed question surveys, the order and phrasing of questions are fixed, and the 
interviewed persons are obliged to pick their response from a set of pre-determined answers. 
This approach is appropriate when results are treated quantitatively. This appendix describes 
the closed question survey administered to quantify performance of water management from a 
farmers’ point of view (Chapter 5). The questionnaire is translated from French into Bambara. 
On the next pages, the parts of the French version of the questionnaire concerning the back-
ground data, irrigation assessment, conflicts and rice production are inserted. Interviewers 
administered the questionnaires in personal interviews of about one hour. This method might 
give rise to survey errors. Below, the different sources of errors are described flowing the 
classification by Groves (1989), along with strategies to circumvent them. 
 
Errors of non-observation 
Errors through non-observation arise when no information is obtained from certain 
respondents and/or questionnaire items. (1) Non-coverage occurs when units in the population 
have no chance of being selected by the survey sample. The target population of this survey 
consists the in plot holders of the sample of 36 tertiary blocks. As complete lists of farmers 
are available from the register of water fees, the sample frame leaves no room for non-
coverage. (2) Unit non-response occurs when selected plot holders cannot be located or refuse 
to participate in the survey. People in the irrigation scheme are usually cooperative and only 
one refusal occurred. Farmers have no addresses, but most live in the village corresponding to 
the secondary canal. With the instruction of fellow-villagers, they could be located easily. 
Twice, it was impossible to locate non-resident farmers, who were then replaced by other 
non-resident farmers. (3) Item non-response refers to certain questions not being asked or 
answered. A good layout of the questionnaire and training of interviewers made these rare. 
 
Errors of observation 
Errors of observation occur when information noted down on the questionnaire is false. 
(1) The interviewer can be a source of error when responses are made up or falsified, 
questions are asked wrongly or his style or relation with the respondent influence responses. 
In order to reduce these errors, two interviewers were selected carefully based on their 
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reputation of honesty. Furthermore, they participated in a testing phase in which question 
phrasing and layout were improved and trained using the final version of the survey. Finally, 
the interviewers cultivated a rice plot themselves, which should favor a good relation with the 
respondents. These strategies appeared successful as an extensive control of the survey could 
largely confirm the results for most parts of the questionnaire. (2) Respondents are another 
source of error, as they might misunderstand or misinterpret questions, or give wrong answers 
on purpose. The first is avoided through careful question wording and by adding short 
introductions to the different parts of the questionnaire explaining the purpose of the 
questions. To avoid the second, a series of strategies are applied. First, in a general 
introduction of the questionnaire, the interviewer explained that the survey is organized by a 
local research center, which is popular in the area (see Box 1). This should avoid antagonism 
of the respondents. Second, the introduction furthermore states that the survey is not linked 
with a development project, which could induce the respondent to answer strategically and 
overstate certain problems in the hope that the “project” would then come to solve them. 
Third, special attention is given to the introduction and wording of questions on the presence 
and respondents’ involvement in conflicts.  
As farmers are usually embarrassed about them, conflicts make for a sensitive topic. As 
such, the word “conflict” was replaced by the softer “misunderstanding”, and question 
phrasing suggested that conflicts are commonplace and the respondents are probably involved 
in them (presumed behavior), which are common strategies to put respondents at ease. In this 
case, the strategies did not work. Only a handful of farmers answered positively on the 
presence and their involvement in conflicts, while interviews on conflict mediation suggest 
that they occur rather frequently. The control of the survey furthermore revealed several 
falsified answers. The best strategy to tackle sensitive questions is to guarantee 
anonymousness. This was however impossible because interviews were administered face-to-
face. Furthermore, in order to make a control possible, names were noted down at the start of 
the questionnaire. Lastly, interviewer effects must have played a role. For one of the two 
interviewers, positive responses were virtually absent. 
 
Conclusion 
Overall, the survey can be considered successful. Careful preparation of the questionnaire and 
the selection and training of the interviewers could avoid many sources of error. Only the 
results on sensitive questions, in particular on conflicts, were unreliable and the topic has 
therefore been treated in a more qualitative way. 
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Appendix 3  
Semi-structured questionnaire surveys 
In semi-structured interviews, the interviewer uses a list of open questions that serves as a 
guide and checklist during the exchange. Both the exact formulation and the order of 
questions can be adapted to the flow of the interview. In this setting, interviewed persons are 
expected to express their viewpoints more freely and precisely, which makes it appropriate to 
obtain detailed, in-depth and/or sensitive information. Interview methods and techniques are 
based on Flick (1998). The interviews were assisted by an interpreter, with whom the 
translation (French to Bambara and Bambara to French) of questions and specific terms were 
elaborately discussed beforehand. Before each interview, the context and purpose of the 
research in general and the interview in particular were communicated in an introduction. 
Below, the key questions (in French) of the various series of interviews are given.  
 
Stakeholder analysis (Chapter 2) 
Quel est votre rôle au sein de /dans la zone Office du Niger ? • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Quels sont vos objectifs (personnels / par rapport à l’Office du Niger) à court terme / à 
long terme ? Comment ces objectifs peuvent-ils être réalisés ? Quelles contraintes 
rencontrez-vous pour réaliser ces objectifs ? 
Comment jugez-vous l’organisation / la performance de la gestion de l’eau ? 
Quelles sont les enjeux majeurs par rapport à la gestion de l’eau ? Comment ces enjeux 
peuvent-ils être adressés ? 
 
Assessment of irrigation and drainage problems in preparation of the closed question 
survey (Chapter 5) 
Avez-vous eu des problèmes d’approvisionnement en eau / de drainage ? (Où, quand) 
Quelles en sont les causes/ les conséquences ? 
Comment avez-vous géré le problème ? 
 
Organization of water management at the tertiary block level (Chapter 5) 
Est-ce que sur votre arroseur, il y a des règles qui parlent sur le moment juste de vos prises 
d’eau ? (Expliquez) Si oui : 
- Quelles sont ces règles ? 
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- Est-ce qu’elles sont appliquées depuis le début des travaux champêtres jusqu’à la fin ? 
- Les règles sont-elles toujours respectées ? Qu’est-ce qui se passe quand une personne ne 
respecte pas les règles ? 
Si non : 
- Est-ce qu’on peut prendre de l’eau quand on veut ? 
- Comment est-ce que c’est réglé quand plusieurs personnes veulent avoir l’eau à la fois 
et il n’y en a pas assez ? 
- Qu’est-ce qu’on fait quand quelqu’un vous dérange pendant l’irrigation ? 
Est-ce que vous vous parlez pour déterminer la quantité d'eau d’irrigation dont vous aurez 
besoins dans les jours à venir ? 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Des fois, il n’y a pas assez d’eau dans l’arroseur pour irriguer sa parcelle. A qui est-ce que 
vous vous adressez le plus souvent pour demander l’eau ? 
 
Interviews with village leaders on the social and historical back-ground of the village 
(Chapter 7) 
Quand le village a-t-il été crée ? Comment a-t-il été colonisé ? 
Quelle est la composition actuelle de la population ? Comment les gens s’entendent-ils au 
sein du village ? 
Comment l’AV/TV (coopérative) fonctionne-t-il ? Y-a-t-il d’autres coopératives actives 
dans le village ? Comment pouvez-vous décrire leur relation avec l’AV/TV ? 
 
Interviews with village leaders on their role in water management (Chapter 7) 
Quel est votre rôle au sein du village ? Quel est votre rôle concernant la gestion de l’eau ? 
Quelle est votre relation avec les exploitants, chefs d’arroseur, OERTs, chef de partiteur, 
CPP, AV/TV, agents et chefs de l’Office du Niger, … ? 
Existe-t-il une chose au sein d’un arroseur qui est pareille à l’autorité d’un chef de 
village ? Quelles sont les caractéristiques d’un bon chef d’arroseur ? Qui parmi les chefs 
d’arroseur de votre village possède ces caractéristiques ? 
 
Interviews on water management practices (Chapter 10) 
Comment est-ce que vous déterminez qu’il est temps d’irriguer le champ ? 
Quelle est la hauteur de la lame minimale ? C’est la même pour tous les paysans ? Qu’est-
ce qui fait la différence ? 
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Combien d'eau ajoutez-vous lorsque vous remplissez le champ ? Est-ce qu’une journée 
suffit pour remplir le champ ? Si non, que faites-vous ? Comment pouvez-vous contrôler 
la quantité ajoutée ? Assistez-vous à l’irrigation ? Est-ce que vous irriguez pendant la 
nuit ? 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Quelle est la hauteur des diguettes ? Est-ce que c’est la même pour tous les exploitants ? 
Qu’est-ce qui fait la différence ? 
Quelle est la fréquence avec laquelle vous partez au champ ? Vous estimez que c’est 
beaucoup par rapport aux autres exploitants ? Quelles catégories utiliseriez-vous pour 
juger la fréquence de partir au champ ? Est-ce qu’il y a des jours spécifiques sur lesquels 
vous ne partez jamais au champ ? La fréquence normale, peut-elle être influencé par les 
circonstances ? Les quelles ? 
Au moment d’une crise d’eau, est-ce que vous adaptez vos stratégies d’irrigation ? Allez-
vous essayer de remplir le champ pour pouvoir faire face à la crise ? Allez-vous 
augmenter la fréquence avec laquelle vous partez au champ ? 
Combien de temps passe d’habitude entre deux irrigations ? Qu’est-ce qui peut 
l’influencer ? 
Lorsque vous irriguez, combien d’autres exploitants sur votre arroseur irriguent d’habitude 
au même moment ? Est-il possible que plusieurs exploitants irriguent au même moment et 
avec la même rigole ? 
Combien de vidanges faites-vous pendant la campagne ? Quand ? Pourquoi ? Qu’est-ce 
qui détermine si vous faites une vidange ? Est-il toujours possible de faire une vidange 
quand vous voulez ? Pourquoi pas ? Vous assistez lorsque vous faites une vidange ? 
Comment déterminez-vous la date de récolte ? Qu’est-ce qui peut influencer la date de 
récolte ? Combien de temps êtes-vous prêts à attendre avec la récolte si le champ ne peut 
pas être vidangé ? 
Quand se passe-t-il la dernière irrigation ? Combien de jours avant la récolte ? Qu’est-ce 
qui peut influencer cette date ? 
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